Ben Barry
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The Russia–Ukraine war has demonstrated some key features of modern war between states, reaffirming that war is a dynamic contest of wills across multiple domains where both sides seek to outfight, outmanoeuvre and out-adapt each other.
Major wars severely test armed forces. The Russia–Ukraine war is no exception. Although there are currently only two direct combatants, many other states are involved in the conflict: politically, diplomatically and economically, and by providing military and intelligence assistance to Kyiv. They have supplied Ukraine with considerable military support, including a wide variety of weapons, ammunition, spare parts and training. The international effort to prevent Russia from winning the war has also seen self-organised participation by international businesses in withdrawing from Russia and, in some cases, helping Ukraine.
At the time of writing, the outcome and duration of the war cannot be reliably forecast. But it has demonstrated some key features of modern war between states. It has reaffirmed that war is a highly dynamic contest of wills across multiple domains, where both sides seek to outfight, outmanoeuvre and out-adapt each other. The battle of the narrative is a key factor. The war reminds us that the prime military capability is competence and that numbers and mass still count, both on the battlefield and in logistics stockpiles. It also suggests that many current precision weapons are limited by cost, complexity and lead times to manufacture; and that it is increasingly difficult to hide forces from surveillance by satellites and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), the latter playing an increasing role in land warfare. Battles in the conflict have often revolved around urban terrain, demonstrating the need for competence in urban warfare.
The changing character of the warCarl von Clausewitz, the German military theorist, outlined two dimensions of war: its nature, which is enduring; and its character, which changes as the ways and means used to fight wars change. War’s nature is brutal and chaotic. It is an intensely human activity in which the enemy exercises its free will and its determination to fight to the death. Waging war is a political act. Aims can include gaining advantage, improving a situation or influencing the attitudes or behaviour of other parties.
Combatants can use a wide range of military and non-military ways and means, constantly seeking advantage over each other. This makes war a dynamic contest. Initiatives, such as the introduction of new strategies, technologies or tactics by a combatant, often result in attempts by other combatants to develop countermeasures. These can often prompt further adaptation by the enemy. So, wars often become contests of combatants’ ability to ‘learn under fire’, as each side tries to gain advantage by adapting the ways and means of conducting the war. This means that most wars feature action–reaction dynamics that constantly change their character. This can result in conflicts changing direction as they evolve, often generating opportunities and setbacks that were unanticipated before the war.
These factors and dynamics can be discerned in the war between Russia and Ukraine and at all levels: the strategic, operational and tactical. Russian efforts to rapidly decapitate the Ukrainian government, followed by a speedy seizure of the capital Kyiv, both failed, largely due to considerable weaknesses in the planning, tactics, training and command of Russian land and air forces. But Russia adapted its strategy, seeking to eject Ukrainian forces from the Donbas by concentrating large amounts of artillery to inflict a high level of attrition. Ukraine then conducted counter-attacks and precision strikes around the Kherson oblast, seeking to threaten Russian control of the city of Kherson and draw Russian forces away from the Donbas. This proved, in part, an effective deception operation. In early September Ukraine launched an offensive around Kharkiv that liberated up to 6,000 square kilometres of territory that Russia had held for months. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has secured dominance of the air or maritime domains, which has constrained both sides’ options. External supplies of weapons, ammunition, intelligence and military training have greatly influenced the war’s dynamics on land, at sea and over Ukraine’s airspace.
The battle of the narrativeWar since 9/11 has featured considerable competition to influence the attitudes of combatants, national populations, their leaders and international supporters. From the outset this has been an important part of this war, applied at all levels – from the national and strategic to the tactical. For example, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has played a major role in influencing Ukraine’s international supporters by directly addressing a wide variety of bodies, ranging from national legislatures to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and the Glastonbury Festival in southwest England. Zelenskyy tailors each message to his audience to maximise its impact. He has also made extensive use of social media, not least in showing walkabouts in Kyiv early in the war. Zelenskyy’s constant presence in Western media and political and public fora has been a major factor in influencing attitudes in the United States, Europe and further afield.
Both sides have invested considerable resources in a wide variety of communication technologies. They have sought to use short videos and phone intercepts to influence international attitudes to the war. Ukraine has been much more successful at producing these (despite disruption from Russian kinetic and cyber attacks on Ukrainian government communications), reflecting the speed with which videos can be produced and released. Copious amounts of photographs, video and satellite imagery add credibility to Ukrainian allegations of war crimes committed by Russian troops against Ukrainian civilians. But Russia has adapted its diplomacy and messaging in the global south, claiming that the US and NATO were responsible for Russia’s aggression and that Western sanctions are responsible for global economic harm (especially food insecurity). The lesson is that the battle of the narrative is a key element of modern warfare, as is the maintenance of legitimacy by the warring parties. Nations will need to plan for this battle with a wide variety of means, from traditional to modern social media, and to wage it among diverse global audiences, taking into account local differences (especially between societies with ‘open’ and ‘closed’ media environments).
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