Russia’s Military still has a lot to worry about

ROBERT P. ASHLEY

Source Link

EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — On the eve of the one-year mark of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Andriy Chernyak, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate at the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, told the Kyiv Post that “While information is spreading about a large-scale Russian offensive planned for Feb. 24, Ukraine’s military intelligence reports that Russia has already launched a full-scale offensive on Feb. 24 last year, which is still ongoing.”

That Ukrainian perspective was shared by a number of senior officials whom The Cipher Brief spoke with recently, many of them saying it doesn’t mean that Russia isn’t planning a renewed military push after what seemed like a brief period of disengagement. Based on their performance over the past year, there are enough questions around Russia’s military capabilities to question whether Moscow could sustain a new offensive.

Until now, Western assessments of Russia’s military performance have included questions of stabilization, recovery, and replenishment. In short, even with a new offensive push into Ukraine, Russia’s military has a lot to worry about.

The Cipher Brief spoke with Lt. General Robert Ashley (Ret.), former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for his perspective.

The interview has been lightly edited for clarity and length.

EXPERT Q&A

The Cipher Brief: What do you think Moscow’s prospects are for stabilizing its forces in Ukraine, and taking renewed initiative on the battlefield?

Ashley: Russia’s path of disengagement and backing off probably gave its military some breathing space to figure out exactly how to reorient. They recently withdrew in some areas under some degree of pressure. That’s not an easy task, and they had spread themselves too thin. All of their assumptions about what the Ukrainians were going to do in terms of resistance in the fight were clearly well off the mark. I think they’re going to have to pick the locations where they want to fight without thinning out their ranks. Then you can see the ongoing effort, which is the destruction of the infrastructure. But I think we’re premature to judge that they can’t get themselves reorganized to some degree with a level of battlefield effectiveness.

Can they take the entire country? No. Are they going to be able to maybe hold some of the provinces and Crimea? Possibly. Maybe that’s a readjustment of their strategy with their long-term hope being that the West and the Americans will, at some point, agree to a negotiated settlement in a frozen conflict. Anything that allows them to keep the eastern provinces and Crimea will always keep Ukraine at risk.

The Cipher Brief: In terms of what Russia has been expending on the battlefield – missiles, armor, high-tech components — is there any one of these areas that stands out as a substantial difficulty for Russia to replenish?

Ashley: I think from reading all of this, collectively, the supply chain issues, they’re going to have to start figuring out where can they strip and cannibalize electronics for any kind of repair. But some of the estimates that I saw indicate that they’re getting into the magnitude of years to be able to rebuild. But as long as they can’t get all of the components they need, they’re going to have to rely on some older, industrialized kinds of weapon systems in the inventory, and it’s going to impact not only their ability to replenish, but their ability to modernize going into the future. All of it has a cumulative effect. The fact that they’ve not been able to establish air supremacy — I don’t know whether that is a very deliberate decision because they don’t want to lose the aircraft and resources, or they’re just going to invest in the ground forces let those get chewed up.

But there is a cumulative effect here that the sanctions will make this more problematic over time. Then they’ve got to start to figure out how to rebuild some of this capability. Even without the electronic components, can they even build it back? Who’s going to help restore some of those supply chains? Can they get what they need from China? Can they get it via Iran and other nations that are willing, or other industrialized companies, that don’t really care, they’re just willing to sell it?

The Cipher Brief: Another dimension of this war is the presence of Russian proxy forces, like the Wagner Group and Chechen troops. How important are they to Russia’s military strategy and what do you think is the effect of having proxy forces intermixed with regular Russian troops?

Ashley: I’m not sure how intermixed they are. I think the Wagner Group is starting to have some of its own battle space right now. When you commit to proxy forces, you’re not using up your own military force. So, depending on how the contract is set and who’s being paid for what, you have to remember that the most precious resource in any military is its personnel. So I think this is an economy of force that allows them to put in a private military company (PMC) that allows them to husband resources. Wagner Group’s leader doesn’t have to worry about morale issues and has already leveraged criminals and has demonstrated no adherence to anything that follows an ethical rule of war, which should be no surprise to anyone anyway.

I think it’s an economy of force for Putin. It’s a very intimidating factor. It’s one thing to look at the values and standards of a Russian soldier, which is very lacking in terms of their leadership and what they’re willing to adhere to, but when you get a number of criminals and these PMC’s and the level of violence, retribution, I think that is something of an intimidating factor. But clearly the Ukrainians are not going to back down.

The Cipher Brief: How do you assess Russia’s relationship and dependence on other friendly nations — China, Iran, North Korea and Belarus? A lot of ink has been spilled on China’s relationship with Russia. What do you make of it?

Ashley: There’s a convergence there. Whatever they can do to thwart the west and thwart the US, that’s the convergence. China has been very measured in that, clearly they’ve not openly provided arms. I don’t really think the Iranians care in that context, so they’re less concerned about that. But I don’t think China is looking to bring any additional sanctions their way by virtue of violating what they may provide to Russia in terms of support.

The Cipher Brief: What are your forward-leaning predictions about what Russia will do in the next six months, militarily?

Ashley: The next six months is really for Russia to prepare and to determine whether they have enough resources for an effective second wave of mobilization. I think it will also have to focus on logistics preparation to sustain and continue the war. I think it’s also going to involve trying to solidify the ground that they’ve occupied thus far. They are probably focused on reinforcement and looking at maintaining Crimea so they don’t lose any ground there and then trying to position themselves for what may either be additional pushes or an inevitable stalemate that they could use to urge the West and NATO to a point of negotiation.

In the latest State Secrets Podcast, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, The Hon. Susan M. Gordon talks about balloons, China, Ukraine, Russia and the new world order as well as the role that AI plays in all of it. Listen here or wherever you subscribe and listen to podcasts.

The Ukrainians were warning about another push for Kyiv. You need to understand how much of that is meant to inform the West, and how much of it is meant to influence the West in order to accelerate the delivery of promised weapons and other things. Not that the Ukrainians are trying to deceive, but if they’ve got any kind of concerns along those lines, they can use that as the means to accelerate the delivery of that support.

So while you’re seeing this potential second mobilization, Russia is looking at their logistics and where they can potentially apply pressure in the future and part of that is the continued destruction of infrastructure, something I think is being done with the intent of trying to drive toward some kind of settlement. I don’t think Putin’s going to admit that he can’t get all of Ukraine, but I think that rationalization may be presenting itself to him.