Masahiro Kurita
Japan’s security cooperation with India can be expected to steadily deepen under the new National Security Strategy (NSS). As long as China remains both countries’ main and imminent security concern, Japan and India, which have currently no direct issues in their bilateral relationship, have every reason to proceed further in their partnership.
Meanwhile, there are no signs that Tokyo, much less Delhi, is intending to qualitatively upgrade this partnership into a formal alliance-like relationship involving a commitment to collective defense, which would surely create controversies between the two partners. In short, what awaits the Japan-India security cooperation under the 2022 NSS may be progress without drama.
Introduction
The Japan-India security partnership has developed over the last two decades, not so rapidly but steadily, to a significant level. As both Japan and India have faced increasingly assertive behaviors from China, there have been ample reasons for Tokyo and Delhi to deepen security cooperation. Of course, because of geographical distance and insufficient power-projection capabilities, as well as their respective strategic orientations—Japan’s pacifist security policy and India’s strategic autonomy—which continue to be strong, this cooperation has always embraced a structural limitation: no chance to be elevated into a formal alliance with a commitment to collective defense. Nonetheless, even below that level, a wide range of meaningful cooperation can be possible.
Looking into the future, as long as two countries face a geopolitical challenge from China, this trend is likely to continue, which is what the latest Japanese National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) publicized in December 2022 suggests.
Development of the Partnership under the 2013 NSS
The 2013 version of the Japanese NSS already espoused a partnership with India. It stated: “Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership.” When the 2013 NSS was launched, Japan-India security cooperation was still in its early stage. It was after both Japanese PM Shinzo Abe and Indian PM Narendra Modi came into office that this cooperation gained significant momentum.
Since then, Tokyo’s security partnership with Delhi has seen steady development. Several landmark pacts have been signed, including the 2015 Agreements Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information; the 2021 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA); and the 2022 Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Cybersecurity. The 2015 “Japan and India Vision 2025” expressed the two capitals’ commitment to “a peaceful, open, equitable, stable, and rule based” Indo-Pacific and intention to promote quality infrastructure to augment connectivity in the region.
Furthermore, the 2+2 ministerial dialogue was established in 2019. The two capitals have also worked together to develop the Quad cooperation since 2017. In terms of military-to-military ties, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), which began its bilateral exercise with the Indian Navy in 2012, became a permanent participant of the U.S.-India Malabar exercise in 2015 – a step forward from its occasional participation in previous exercises. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) also started its annual joint exercise with the Indian Army focusing on counterterrorism in 2018.
Meanwhile, Japan has not only continued to engage in high-profile economic development initiatives in India—such as the Delhi Ahmedabad High Speed Railway—but has also emerged as a trusted partner for Delhi to develop India’s sensitive Northeast, which is crucial to intraregional and interregional connectivity. Japan has also been allowed to conduct projects in the Andaman Nicobar islands, which is close to the Strait of Malacca.
Prospects for the Partnership under the 2022 NSS
The 2022 NSS mentions Japan’s security cooperation with India within two contexts: as a part of the enhancement of cooperation with partner countries to develop “a multilayered network among its ally and like-minded countries,” as well as deepening of the Quad cooperation to promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). At the same time, the 2022 NDS expresses Tokyo’s intention to “deepen bilateral and multilateral defense exchanges including service-to-service exchange in a broad range of fields including maritime security and cybersecurity, while promoting training and exercises as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.”
What these strategic guidance documents suggest is twofold. First and foremost, Japan’s security cooperation with India is likely to deepen further. However, there is nothing to suggest a significant departure from the trajectory that this partnership has followed. Rather, the course that these documents suggest is an evolution of what has been done or discussed between Tokyo and Delhi.
Some prospective areas for furthering such cooperation are noteworthy. Despite the gridlock over the sales of US-2 aircraft, defense equipment and technology cooperation remain important aspects of the partnership. In addition to exports of hardware, including a sale of the stealth antennas for destroyers which is currently under consideration, cooperation in technology development is also promising. To enhance cooperation in this respect, Japan and India have already identified projects in several dual-use technology areas, like UAVs and anti-UAV systems, robotics, underwater communication, lithium-ion batteries, and intelligence systems.
As for joint exercises, following the first Japan-India joint air exercise in January 2023, all three services of their militaries conduct a regular joint exercise. While this marks an important milestone, it may be worth considering expanding these exercises in the future to include more “joint force” exercises, and/or with expanded menus and participants (i.e., involving the U.S. and/or Australia in land and/or air drills).
Regarding the connections between security and the economy, Japan-India partnership in infrastructure development in India’s neighborhood is promising, as South Asia is increasingly becoming an arena of China-India competition. The top official of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) expressed the agency’s keenness on this front, even though the specifics require discussion with the Indian counterpart. The two countries have already succeeded in jointly securing the contract to develop the Colombo Port’s Western Container Terminal in March 2021. Given Delhi’s remaining reservations on Washington’s direct engagement with regional countries, Japan is particularly well-positioned to team up with Delhi to push back Chinese influence in South Asia.
Also, India has been emerging as a crucial partner in the field of economic security, especially for the development of secure supply chains both bilaterally and through the Quad. In this regard, Japan-India cybersecurity cooperation, which has been discussed with a particular focus on 5G technologies, is worth attention henceforth.
Implications of the Imbroglio Over the Ukraine War
As in other Western democracies, India’s reluctance to confront Russia over its invasion of Ukraine caused consternation in Japan. Delhi’s refusal to allow Japan’s military cargo aircraft carrying aid for Ukraine to land in India was particularly disappointing for the Japanese policy communities, stirring voices questioning India’s credentials as a like-minded partner.
After the initial controversy died down, however, it has turned out that while India’s policy toward Russia is an irritant, it is not a serious hurdle for the Japan-India partnership, as shown by the result of the 2+2 dialogue in September 2022. After all, as long as the two capitals’ main and imminent security concerns (i.e., China) overlap, there is no reason for them to abandon this partnership on other grounds.
Meanwhile, this experience suggests an important lesson for Tokyo on how to manage the domestic perception of its partnership with India. This relationship has been touted as one based on common values; however, it is undeniable that India’s policy stance contradicts Western and Japanese understanding of liberal democratic values on multiple fronts, as shown by India’s stance toward Russia’s attempts to change the status quo by force and Delhi’s domestic policies on human rights. Hence, advertising this partnership as one based on common values will occasionally create unnecessary disappointment. It should be described in a more straightforward manner—based on a shared geopolitical challenge to manage China—rather than shared values.
Conclusion
Japan’s security cooperation with India can be expected to steadily deepen under the new NSS. As long as China remains both countries’ main and imminent security concern, Japan and India, which have currently no direct issues in their bilateral relationship, have every reason to proceed further in their partnership. Meanwhile, there are no signs that Tokyo, much less Delhi, is intending to qualitatively upgrade this partnership into a formal alliance-like relationship involving a commitment to collective defense, which would surely create controversy between the two partners. In short, what awaits the Japan-India security cooperation under the 2022 NSS may be progress without drama.
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