Sonika Gupta
On the eve of Indian Independence, as Britain prepared to devolve the Crown’s treaties with Tibet to the Indian government, the Tibetan government was debating its future treaty relationship with India under the 1914 Simla Convention and associated Indo-Tibetan Trade Regulations. Soon after Indian independence, Tibetan government made an expansive demand for return of Tibetan territory along the McMahon Line and beyond. This led to a long diplomatic exchange between Lhasa, New Delhi and London as India deliberated its response to the Tibetan demand. This article decodes the voluminous correspondence between February 1947 and January 1948 that flowed between the British/Indian Mission in Lhasa, the Political Officer in Sikkim, External Affairs Ministry in Delhi and the Foreign Office in London, on the Simla Convention and the ensuing Tibetan territorial demand. Housed at the National Archives in New Delhi, this declassified confidential communication provides crucial context for newly independent Indian state’s relationship with Tibet. It also reveals the intricacies of Tibetan elite politics that affected decision-making in Lhasa translating to a fragmented and often contradictory policy in forging its new relationship with India. Most importantly, this Tibetan territorial demand undermined the diplomatic efficacy of Tibet’s 1947 Trade Mission to India entangling its outcome with the resolution of this issue. This was a lost opportunity for both India and Tibet in building an agreement on the frontier which worked to their mutual disadvantage in the future.
In 1959, as India and China wrangled over the McMahon line, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru asserting that the McMahon Line was illegal and that Tibet too had expressed ‘dissatisfaction with this line, and, following the independence of India in 1947, cabled Your Excellency asking India to return all the territory of Tibet region of China south of this illegal line.’1 In response to this Nehru wrote back to Zhou Enlai refuting the territorial claims made in the Tibetan cable as fantastical. Nehru asserted;
I entirely disagree with the inference drawn by you from the exchange of two communications between the Tibetan Bureau in Lhasa and the new Government of India in 1947. The facts are that our Mission in Lhasa forwarded to us a telegram, dated the l6th October 1947 from the Tibetan Bureau. The telegram asked for the return of alleged Tibetan territories on boundaries of India and Tibet ‘such as Sayul and Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan; Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of river Ganges and Lowo, Ladakh, etc., up to boundary of Yarkhim.’ It will be seen that the areas claimed by Tibet had not been defined. If they were to be taken literally, the Tibetan boundary would come down to the line of the river Ganges. The Government of India could not possibly have entertained such a fantastic claim. If they had the faintest idea that this telegram would be made the basis of a subsequent claim to large areas of Indian territory, they would of course have immediately and unequivocally rejected the claim.2
The Tibetan Foreign Bureau had indeed sent a cable to the Prime Minister Nehru on 16th October 1947 making this expansive demand for return of the territories mentioned above. The receipt of this cable had created considerable alarm in New Delhi and there followed several months of communication between the Indian (former British) Mission in Lhasa, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Foreign Office in New Delhi trying to assess the Tibetan demand and formulate a suitable response to it. Existing accounts of the period make only a brief mention of this Tibetan territorial demand and do not document the Indian response to it (Goldstein, 1991, p. 564–570; Lamb, 1989, p. 488; Richardson, 1984, p. 174). This article details the flow of this communication between the outgoing British government and its incoming Indian counterpart between February 1947 to January 1948. This voluminous paper trail reveals the crucial importance of the Tibetan territorial claim in independent India’s relations with Tibet in its first year and its eventual impact on India’s actions as it entrenched its claims along the McMahon Line over the next few years.
Exit Britain, Enter India
In 1947, with the transfer of power quickly approaching there was a somewhat testy exchange of letters between the British Political officer A. J. Hopkinson stationed at Sikkim, Hugh E. Richardson, the British Mission head at Lhasa, Major L. A. C. Fry, Deputy Secretary at the External Affairs Department in New Delhi and the Foreign Office in London.3 In this year-long exchange Hopkinson urged the Indian government to seek speedy clarification on the future status of the Crown’s treaties concluded with Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim. The interim Indian government was also in the process of concluding standstill agreements with Indian princely states that were joining the Indian Union and most of these agreements were essential to prevent administrative dislocation that would otherwise ensue. Hopkinson emphasised the need for concluding a similar agreement with Tibet pending any final decision from either side on the 1914 Simla Convention that formed the basis of existing relations between Tibet and India.
The Simla Convention, concluded between the plenipotentiaries of the Britain, Tibet and China, had demarcated the McMahon Line as the border between Tibet and India. It was followed up by the 1914 Trade Regulations between Tibet and India that remained in force right up till the British exit and beyond till 1954. Politically, the Simla Convention and its associated trade regulations, remained the last treaty that Tibet had entered into with India as a de-facto independent state without the restrictive imposition of Chinese suzerainty. While the Chinese had repudiated the Convention, Britain and Tibet continued to be governed by its provisions right up till 1947, though with selective enforcement by both sides. Upon Indian independence, according to customary international law, the British treaty obligations and rights would routinely devolve from Britain to India. However, in practice, it was not that simple a matter.
Writing to Deputy Secretary L. A. C. Fry on 5th February 1947, Hopkinson raised concerns about the future status of the British treaties with Tibet and corresponding changes in British Mission in Lhasa, his own post in Sikkim and the British trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok in Tibet. These two issues were interlinked in that the British government was recalibrating its relationship and accordingly its representation in Tibet. However, due to poor coordination between External Affair & Commonwealth Relations Department and the Protocol Branch, it took the Government of India an inordinately long time to draft a suitable reply to Hopkinson’s concerns. This prompted Fry to implore V. M. M. Nair, Deputy Secretary, External Affair, New Delhi to hasten as he bemoaned that ‘the Political Officer continues to bombard us with questions.’4 While India decided to retain the Mission in Lhasa and the existing British trade agencies, the question of the treaty relationship was not directly addressed. India assumed that there was no need to revisit any treaty obligations and rights inherited from the British. This turned out to be misplaced assumption as despite mutual political agreement between the two, there were outstanding issues regarding the enforcement of the Simla Convention in the frontier areas between India and Tibet.
Frontiers in Flux
Since the 1930s, the border between India and Tibet had been a source of friction between British frontier officials and the Tibetan outposts in areas like Tawang and Siang. Following the signing of the Simla convention in 1914, British frontier administration had not been effectively extended till the McMahon line and there had been multiple negotiations between British frontier officials and local Tibetan monk-officials over taxation and jurisdictional claims (Lamb, 1989, pp. 477–536). In 1935, the Tibetan government’s arrest of British botanist Kingdon-Ward brought to light the gaps between political agreement on the border as embodied in the Simla Convention and the continued Tibetan practice of collecting civil and monastic taxes in Tawang (Guyot-Réchard, 2016, p. 59). Kingdon-Ward’s arrest prompted the British to send a military mission to Tawang to assess the situation and to reiterate their claims on the ground. The 1938 Lightfoot Mission documented continued Tibetan administrative and taxation regime in Tawang in contravention of the 1914 Simla Convention and recommended a ‘light administration’ with establishment of the British ‘control areas in the un-administrated parts of the Balipara Frontier tract’ including Tawang.5
Meanwhile, Britain wanted the Tibetan government to expressly commit to abiding by the Simla Convention. Rai Bahadur Norbhu Dhondup, the British trade agent at Yatung wrote a letter to the Tibetan government on 24th August 1938 broaching the issue. However, his queries were met with evasive responses and delaying tactics from Lhasa. He reported that the Tibetan government had professed ignorance of the Simla Convention by saying,
[M]ost of the officers who had been to India in connection with the Anglo-Tibetan Simla Conference of 1913–1914 had expired and some of them had already retired from government service and that the present cabinet ministers and king (Regent) are all ignorant of the knowledge that Tawang was ceded to the British India.6
He contacted the Kashag (Tibetan Cabinet) no less than nine times and the met the Regent three times only to be told that the papers regarding the Simla Convention were scattered among different offices of the Tibetan government and it would take time to recover these before a suitable response could be sent. Norbhu Dhondup informed Basil Gould, the British Political Officer at Sikkim, that the Tibetan government was likely to delay the matter for months, possibly years. Meanwhile, Gould and the Assam government urged the British government to extend frontier administration to Tawang accompanied by an increased presence of half a platoon of Assam Rifles. This proposal was debated for almost a year and finally turned down in May 1939. London considered the proposed recurring annual expenditure of 1 lakh rupees in an area as remote as Tawang as economically unviable. The British government took the view that the ‘strategic and political dangers envisaged in 1936 are now overshadowed by other pressing threats to India’s internal and external security.’7 W. R. Hays, the Deputy Secretary, Government of India wrote to the Secretary of State for India, London on 4th May 1939 that it was likely that the Tibetan government ‘had no intention of giving us a definite answer on the subject and it will allow Rai Bahadur Norbhu’s letter of 24th August 1938 to remain unanswered unless we raise the question again.’ Given Britain’s preoccupation with the looming possibility of war in Europe and the challenges of the growing independence movement in India, the British let the matter languish for the moment. Gould was instructed to not make any overtures to the Tibetan government regarding the Simla Agreement or Tawang. It was decided to revisit the policy in a year’s time. However, the outbreak of the Second World War put paid to that intention and the issue of the Simla Convention remained at status quo till the transfer of power from Britain to India.
After the end of the Second World War, the issue of Indo-Tibetan political relationship and the border gained traction again. In 1945 A. J. Hopkinson took office as Political Officer in Sikkim and was instructed to once again provide treaty documents and relevant maps concerning Simla Convention to the Tibetan government, emphasising British concerns about the border. In December he travelled to Lhasa and delivered an aide memoire on 22nd January 1946 to the Tibetan government. In this he requested Tibetan re-affirmation of the Simla Convention and suggested the conclusion of a standstill agreement. However, given there was no tangible outcome of Hopkinson’s interactions with the Kashag, having spent five months in Lhasa, Hopkinson returned to India, without an official response from Tibet and with a renewed sense of urgency that the Indo-Tibetan border must be addressed before British exit from India, not least because of a possibility of a Tibetan–Chinese accord on the issue. Hopkinson noted that some members of the Kashag were gravitating towards the proposals made by Chinese representative Shen Tsung-lien in Lhasa to come to a possible bilateral agreement on the Tibet (Lamb, 1989, p. 486).
However, there was scant interest in London in pursuing this issue. Britain was considering a rapid disentanglement from Tibet that would allow London to focus on its other interests in China such as Hong Kong. In fact, Britain was not looking to even maintaining diplomatic representation in Lhasa preferring a quiet conversion of the British Mission in Lhasa to the Indian mission with the minimum of attention or ceremony.8 Therefore, the Foreign Office in London did not want to make or encourage overtures to address the issue of Tibet’s political status or the treaty relationship. While the British government was of the view that India would inherit all treaty obligations and rights of the Crown’s treaties with Tibet, they were waiting for the Indian Constituent Assembly to take a view on the matter. Both Britain and the successive Indian government considered the Simla Convention as a settled political issue, if not an administrative one. On the other hand, many in the Tibetan government viewed the impending British exit as an opportunity to re-negotiate territorial claims and trade privileges with India. In April 1946, the Tibetan Foreign Bureau had already demanded that the Government of India should return any Tibetan territory that it was currently occupying. In response Richardson ‘denied that the British were in fact occupying any Tibetan territory whatsoever.’ (Lamb, 1989, p. 488).
On the ground, there continued to be recurrent friction between Tibetan tax collectors and British frontier officials in areas south of the McMahon Line. In January 1947, the Assam government reported that an armed thousand-man strong Tibetan force led by two Tibetan officials was intending to cross into Siang Valley for the annual tax and tribute collection.9 While the size of the Tibetan force was a concern, this was by no means a new occurrence. Tibetan tax collectors, accompanied by armed parties, routinely collected civil tax and monastic tributes from Tawang, Siang and Dirang, south of the McMahon Line. This practice had not been discontinued with the conclusion of the Simla Convention. The British response this time was, however, more strident than before, authorising a show of force by the Air Force as well as use of force by the Assam Rifles, though as a last resort. The Assam government also approved the establishment of a forward post of one platoon at Pango which was at ten days march south of McMahon Line. The establishment of the post at Pango had apparently been in the pipeline since July 1946.10 This accompanied a reinforcing of existing eleven posts in NEFA by air-dropping supplies.11 Richardson was instructed to enquire with the Tibetan government about the strength and purpose of the armed Tibetan group proceeding to Siang. The Tibetan government characteristically denied any knowledge of the matter and dismissed it as rumour.12
Meanwhile, the Assam government dispatched P. L. S. James, the Assistant Political Officer stationed at Siang to head off the Tibetan contingent’s advance into the valley. James led a platoon of Assam Rifles, established the post at Pango, called for another platoon as reinforcement and travelled up to Tuting to wait for the Tibetan party. The Tibetan contingent turned out to be smaller than reported but larger than previous years. James met the leaders of the Tibetan contingent on 27th February and initiated a negotiation under instructions to be tactful but forceful.13 The Tibetans were poorly armed and confronted with a firm British refusal to advance. After amicable negotiations and exchange of presents, on 4th March the Tibetan officials turned back.14 Richardson and Hopkinson were satisfied over the non-confrontational resolution of the matter. In a private letter to Hopkinson, Richardson commented that the Assam government had panicked over a routine matter and the peaceful conclusion of the matter ‘just shows that we are better judges of Tibetan reactions and personalities than Assam are’.15 Richardson hoped that Delhi would not lodge a formal protest to the Tibetan government as suggested by Sir Andrew Clow, the Assam Governor. Richardson believed that the lack of protest from the Tibetan government over the Pango post should be taken as their acceptance of the Indian position on the frontier. While Hopkinson and Richardson seemed satisfied with the outcome of James’ mission, Major Fry in Delhi seemed less impressed. He instructed Richardson to make clear to the Tibetan government that ‘Government of India is unable to absolve Tibetan government for direct responsibility for ensuring that such violations of India’s territory by their frontier officials do not recur.’16 Similarly, in April, as the Tsona Dzongpons made preparations for their annual tax and monastic tribute collection in Se La sub-agency in Tawang, similar negotiations ensued that stretched into August.17 On 18th August, the Indian government decided to not lodge any protest with the Tibetan government over the matter, presumably pending a political response from the Tibetan government on the Simla Convention.18 On the eve of Indian independence, it was therefore clear that the incoming Indian government would have to enter into negotiations with the Tibetan government to settle their frontiers.
Britain’s Hands-off Approach
As the transfer of power grew imminent, Tibetan and Indian anxieties regarding their future relationship began to be apparent. An intelligence report from Lhasa to the Indian External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations department dated 3rd June 1947 states,
Rearising at long last that the British really are quitting India, many leading Tibetan officials are asking themselves what is to become of the treaties between Tibet and H.M.G. The general Tibetan opinion considers that these treaties should not be inherited by the India Govt. but that Tibet should make fresh treaties with India. It is understood that they are not at all keen to give the Indian Govt. control of the trade route which was previously in the hands of the British by virtue of the trade treaty.19
Tibetan government was also apprehensive about the loss of support from Britain in the maintenance of its autonomy from China and sceptical whether such support would be forthcoming from India.20 To allay these fears, both Richardson and Hopkinson repeatedly urged London and New Delhi to speedily convey to the Tibetan government the future of existing treaties as well as the nature of the political relationship between India and Tibet. In a telegram dated 7th July 1947, Hopkinson urged that if it seemed impossible to make an authoritative statement about the future arrangement before the transfer of power, the British government should at least send a friendly message to Tibet to ensure that it had not been forgotten. He also proposed to convey to the Tibetan government that political relations would continue on the same standstill procedures as those proposed for princely states of India on the basis of existing British treaties.
The response from London was merely to instruct Richardson to tell the Tibetans that while Britain remained favourably disposed towards the ‘preservation of Tibetan autonomy’ all further questions with regard to political status of Tibet should be addressed to the successor Government of India and hoped that Tibet would continue to abide by the provision of the Simla Convention.21 Britain hoped that the Tibetan government would allow the British High Commissioner stationed in New Delhi to visit Lhasa for from time to time for ‘resumption of present friendly relations’. The British response was a clearly intended to disabuse any hopes of support for Tibet in its quest for re-negotiation of the existing treaties.
Richardson conveyed the British position to the Tibetan government on 25th July detailing that the British Mission and its trade agencies would be handed over to India on 15th August and Britain would cease to be responsible for these. A month later, Richardson informed New Delhi that while the Tibetan National Assembly has passed a proposal for immediate revision of existing treaties with India, the Kashag had advised to wait for a suitable time to approach the issue with the Indian government.22 He also noted that the Assembly had ‘agreed to abide by the Simla Convention and the trade regulations for the present vis-à-vis Government of India stating that Tibetan government would like to discuss the question regarding trade and boundaries in the future.’ The general thinking in both New Delhi and London was that Tibet could be persuaded to continue the status quo with regard to the Simla Convention. Despite queries from Hopkinson, the bureaucracy in New Delhi felt that there was no need for a standstill agreement with Tibet, even as such an agreement was being contemplated with Bhutan. Hopkinson, as yet waiting for a formal reply from the Tibetan government, wrote in a private letter to Harishwar Dayal, Joint Secretary, External Affairs conveying ‘great relief about the satisfactory reception of the message from HMG and Government of India’. He was sanguine about situation in Lhasa and expected that the official reply would be ‘completely satisfactory’. He countenanced the delay in response from the Tibetan side to the Dalai Lama’s upcoming visit to Drepung and Sera, the Kashag being pre-occupied for this annual exodus. His view was that ‘economic factors ought to draw them into inevitably into the Indian orbit’.23
The Tibetan Foreign Bureau’s Cable to Nehru
It was therefore a shock when the Indian government received a communication from the Tibetan Foreign Bureau making demand for return of Tibetan territories. In response to the British and Indian governments messages of ‘continued friendly support for Tibetan autonomy’ the Tibetan Foreign Bureau responded by sending communications to both New Delhi and London naming specific territories to be returned to Tibet. The letter to India was addressed directly to Prime Minister Nehru and is reproduced below.24
To
The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi
From,
Tibetan Foreign Office Lhasa
We have been informed by Mr Richardson, the Indian trade agent at Gyantse, the contents of your message by wireless. We would like to express gratitude for your message which states that the Government of India wishes to maintain the cordial relationship with Tibet and will consider the maintenance of Tibet’s independence.
We have discussed time after time with the Government of India when India was under British rule, to return all of our indisputable Tibetan territories gradually included in India. As our delegates to the Asian Conference Theiji Sampho and Khenchung Lowang have approached the functionaries of the Indian Government regarding the return of the Tibetan territories on the boundaries of India and Tibet such as: Zayul and Walung and in the direction of Pema Koe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of the river Ganges and Lowo and Ladhak, etc., up to the boundary of Yarkhim. Hence, we hope that the Indian Government will give paramount consideration regarding the return of the above Tibetan territories and our trade relations with India for which we propose to discuss with Government of India in the near future.
Dated: 2nd of the 9th Month of Tibetan Fire-Pig year
(Corresponding to 16th October 1947)
A similarly worded communication dated the same day was sent to the UK High Commissioner in New Delhi. It read:
Regarding our request to return of excluded Tibetan territories gradually included in India and regarding trade relations affecting general economic welfare of Tibet, we have discussed the matter with the Government of India when India was under British administration. And it becomes (unintelligible) Government of Tibet must continue the negotiations with the government of India in the near future. Hence we hope that H.M.G will also support and help us in achieving our desire.25
There was considerable alarm about these messages in the Political Office in Sikkim, the External Affairs Ministry and the British High Commission in New Delhi. Both these communications had been handed over to the Lhasa Mission by Dzasa Surkhang, the de-facto Foreign Minister of Tibet. Hopkinson flagged the unusual manner in which the communication was delivered without any signature or official seal and in English. This was contrary to the usual practice of official messages being in Tibetan accompanied by an authenticated English translation. He was also sceptical about the reason for such an important communication being delivered when most of the Kashag were not in Lhasa, but at Drepung and all Cabinet business at standstill.26 This led to further speculation whether the communication had the backing of the Tibetan government or was an outcome of internal dissensions between the National Assembly, Kashag and Tibetan Foreign Bureau. In the light of these concerns, the Lhasa Mission was instructed to investigate the nature and content of the message.27
The Indian Reaction
The Indian reaction to the Tibetan demand for return of territories was one of indignation. V. M. M. Nair, Deputy Secretary, External Affairs Department, in an office note dated 26th October wrote that the Tibetan response to the Indian message of goodwill to Tibet was ‘unsatisfactory and even ungracious’ Nair writes:
Moreover, there is no mention whatsoever of the Simla Convention, even though we know-SL48-that the National Assembly had agreed to abide by it …. The extraordinary territorial demand and the fact that the message was delivered without seal or signature makes one suspect its genuineness but it can perhaps be assumed that in the absence of any special comment about it by the Mission, the message should be treated as authentic. I am not aware of the Tibetan delegates to the Asian Conference having discussed territorial claims with any officer of this ministry. But in any case, it would not be necessary to consider the present claim seriously, if only for its vagueness-the request for the ‘return of territories’ in the direction of Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling, etc.’ can hardly form the basis of discussions.28
An intradepartmental communication of the Ministry of External Affairs dated 24th October brought attention to the confusing nature of the Tibetan territorial demand:
With reference to the Tibetan Government’s message to us it will be observed that Zayul and Pemakoe are situated north of the McMahon Line and thus already fall under the Tibetan territory. The Tibetan’s Government’s request for their return is therefore not understood. Walong is of course situated south of the McMahon Line and thus definitely belongs to us. It has not been possible to locate LONAG, LOPA, MON, LOWO and YARKHIM on any of the maps readily available in the Branch. Nor is it quite clear as to what is the implied by the Tibetan Government by the terms ‘in the direction of Pema Koe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of the river Ganges.’ If it means inclusion of all these territories in Tibet, it may be stated that no such sweeping claims appears to have been made by them in the past.29
Nair proposed awaiting inputs from Hopkinson and Richardson before drafting a reply to Tibetan government. In his first assessment of the Tibetan communication, Hopkinson conveyed his alarm to Harishwar Dayal in the following letter dated 16th October;
I suspect this document is a ‘try-on’ on the part of the writers, intended to test how far they can go in twisting the tiger’s tail while the tiger is pre-occupied with temporary internal trouble …. Whatever the Tibetan intentions, the communication as it stands cuts away at the treaties of 1904 and 1914, the Trade Regulations and all that has occurred since 1904. It creates a vacuum and leaves India and Tibet without any treaty relationship at all …. In view of this presumably deliberate abandonment of the Simla Convention, so often described by the Tibetans as the basis to their autonomous position-the Chinese will be the first to seize the point, that India, by Tibet’s own act, has no longer any special status to enable her to stand up for Tibet vis-à-vis China. The Eden Memorandum30 now becomes obsolete. The Tibetans will have played into Chinese hands, when China before the world claims Tibet as merely a province of China with no special external relations.31
Hopkinson lamented the lack of interest both on the part of India and Tibet to conclude a standstill agreement pending a re-negotiation of the existing treaties and yet again pressed for doing so urgently. He also speculated whether pro-Chinese elements in the Tibetan government could have prompted these territorial claims despite the decision of the National Assembly to abide by the existing treaties at least till new arrangements were worked out. He assessed that it was also likely that the letter had the backing of wealthy and influential Tibetan business interests, namely the powerful Khampa businessman Rimshi Pangdatshang, who wanted free transit to India and other trade facilities negotiated as part of any new agreement with India.
At this time, India was shortly expecting the arrival of the important Tibetan Trade Mission to India, China, UK and the US. The Tibetan Trade Mission was an astute political and diplomatic undertaking of the Tibetan government. Led by the Tibetan Minister for Finance Tsipon Shakabpa Wangchuk Deden and travelling on Tibetan passports, the Mission was scheduled to travel to India, China, UK and the US. The main purpose of the Mission was to seek international recognition for Tibet from these countries in their acceptance of the Tibetan passports (Goldstein & Rimpoche, 1989; Shakabpa, 1968; Shakya, 1990). Hopkinson advised that the Indian government finalise a response before the Mission arrived in India. During its visit to India, the Mission expected to negotiate crucial trading concessions from India. One of the main tasks of the Mission was to import gold bullion from Europe to back Tibetan currency. In this connection, Tibet had imported some gold bullion from France through India. Hopkinson suggested that the proposed Indian concession to refund import duty on gold from France, amounting to 2 to 3 lakh rupees be withheld. He emphasised that Shakapba ‘be made to understand’ that realisation of this concession would depend ‘on the continuation of the ordinary trading relations existing prior to 15th August 1947.’32 Hopkinson also proposed scrapping of other existing concessions to Tibet such the free entry of Tibetans into India without passports, freedom from Foreigners Registration Act, import of Tibetan wool on favourable terms into India and the generous quota to Tibetan for controlled goods.
The Lhasa Mission, on the other hand, explained the Tibetan territorial demand as an outcome of Tibetan bureaucratic politics. A communication dated 26th October signed by Pemba Tsering, the British Trade Agent at Yatung, representing the Lhasa Mission termed the demand for return of Tibetan territories as a ‘routine matter’:
As regards the Tibetan request for the return of the so-called Tibetan territories, I am of the opinion that no particular attention need be paid to the matter for the present. As far as I can gather the demand was included to satisfy a certain section of the members of the National Assembly who were insisting on demanding the return of territories. Sikkim, Bhutan and Darjeeling were included at the suggestion of the leaders of the Tibetan delegation to the last Inter-Asian Conference who were under the impression that a federation of the Tibetan speaking countries would be welcome by all concerned. Another reason for doing so is that the Tibetan officials who are responsible for the administration often take advantage of such an opportunity to create documentary evidence to show the Dalai Lama when he comes of age that they had done their best to recover territories so that they might not be brought to book for neglect of their duties. Therefore, I consider this question of territories as routine matter and await further action by the Tibetan Government in their reply.
Pemba Tsering advised that even though the Tibetan government had not expressly agreed to abiding by the Simla Convention and the Trade Regulations, the fact that there had been no protest or adverse comment on the treaty position should be taken as their willingness to observe status quo till a new arrangement could be negotiated.
However, Hopkinson did not share the Lhasa Mission’s assessment of the situation. He was personally mistrustful of Dzasa Surkhang’s ‘ability to be sui compos’ referring to him as ‘once outstandingly brilliant and now a hopeless opium addict’.33 He pressed for clarity from the Tibetan government on their willingness to abide by existing treaties. Hopkinson recommended that Richardson seek an interview with the Kashag, backed if necessary by a written aide memoire, to ascertain that territorial claims had the backing of the Tibetan government and had not originated solely from Dzasa Surkhang or the Foreign Bureau without authorisation. Richardson disagreed with this suggestion and recommended a more moderate approach keeping Dzasa Surkhang as the main channel of communication, mainly to try and build a consensus within the Tibetan establishment.
Richardson made some private enquiries in Lhasa and shed light on internal dissensions within the Tibetan government regarding the position on the Simla Convention. He reported that the National Assembly had deliberated in August on a reply to the India’s goodwill message and agreed to abide by the Simla Convention for the present, pending fresh negotiations. However, in forwarding the National Assembly’s proposed draft to the Indian government, ‘the Kashag omitted the portion regarding the treaty position by PASTING a strip of paper over the draft and left the rest unaltered. The Regent while approving omission of the treaty question ordered that replies should be given without any further delays.’34 Hence, Richardson stressed that while there was no doubt about the authenticity of the cable to Prime Minister Nehru, it was not certain whether all in the Tibetan government were in favour of the contents of the message. This muddied the waters further, rather than clarify Tibet’s position on the Simla Convention.
In the meantime, the Tibetan Trade Mission arrived in India. Hopkinson had the opportunity to interact directly with Tsipon Shakabpa in Gangtok on 6th December 1947. In his report of the meeting to Dayal, Hopkinson shared the following intriguing details.35 It appeared that Shakabpa, the senior minister of the Kashag was apparently unaware of the Tibetan Foreign Bureau’s communication to Nehru. However, when appraised of its contents, Shakabpa explained the letter by saying that Tibetan government was pre-emptively stating their territorial claims for the future with India, just as they had done with China in 1946, so that ‘no one should be able to say at a future date that any such claims had gone by default for the want of having been mentioned.’ Hopkinson writes, ‘Tsipon Shagappa was particularly appreciative of the point if Tibet forgoes its special treaty relationship with India, it forgoes one of the best arguments in support of its special relationship vis-à-vis China.’ This was a multi-layered negotiation, with Shakabpa hinting that the Tibetan Mission was also being courted by the Chinese Consulate in Calcutta and emphasised the desirability of getting business with the Tibetan Mission cleared up quickly ‘before Chinese blandishments proved too strong for some of his colleagues’. Shakabpa had neither denied the Tibetan claims nor pressed them, and had in fact let Hopkinson know that parts of the Tibetan establishment were prone to Chinese pressure or inducement. Given this, Hopkinson remained convinced that Tibet should give an express declaration to abide by Simla Convention and tied the issue to release of the Tibetan gold imported from France. Even as Shakabpa pressed for an early release of the gold citing financial hardship in Lhasa, Hopkinson was adamant that the gold would be released only after an assurance on the Simla Convention. As the Trade Mission headed to Delhi, G. S. Bajpai, Secretary-General of Ministry of External Affairs remained firm that unless India had ‘satisfactory assurances that pending negotiations the Tibetan authorities would accept a standstill agreement, the trade discussions which the Tibetans desire, and for which a Tibetan delegation is on its way to New Delhi now, are likely to prove infructuous.’36
To add to the intrigue, Richardson discovered in his inquiries in Lhasa that Dzasa Sukhang was also unaware of the contents of the letter to Nehru. Richardson had met Dzasa Surkhang on 13th December and conveyed India’s concerns. This communication was accompanied by an aide memoire to ensure that the message reached the Kashag. In response to this, Dzasa Surkhang reportedly denied any knowledge of the Tibetan Foreign Bureau’s message to Nehru saying that the communication from the Kashag had reached the Bureau in English. Members of the Bureau were not conversant with the language and the Bureau had not seen any Tibetan version; hence they had no knowledge of its contents.37 Richardson reported that there seemed to be ‘an atmosphere to bewildered ignorance’ at the Bureau. He also shared that the English version of the Bureau’s message had been prepared at Drepung in the Kashag’s office by George Tsarong (Tsarong Dazang Dramdul), Tibet’s military commander.38
However, Hopkinson remained convinced that the Bureau’s cable to Nehru was indeed sent by Dzasa Surkhang. He additionally suspected that this might be the case for earlier contradictory communications purported to be sent by the Kashag, but might possibly be ‘handiwork of Surkhang’.39 Richardson dismissed this and responded that he was convinced that Dzasa Surkhang had been actually ignorant of the contents of the message to Nehru. Richardson also tried to assuage Hopkinson’s concerns about Dzasa Surkhang by writing that, ‘When Surkhang is on form he is incomparably the best member of the Foreign Bureau. In his absence the delays and incomprehension are even worse than in his presence.’40 Richardson was scheduled to handover his post at the Lhasa Mission on 14th January 1948. In a communication on his last day at the Mission he cautioned that the Tibetan approach to the McMahon line was likely to prove to be a difficult issue for the Government of India, owing mainly to the Tibetan indecision. He writes,
I fear this new hesitancy on the influence of Kapshopa Shape41 and perhaps Surkhang Dzasa who seem to be combining a desire to appear shrewd with timidity about taking any action for which they conceivably will be called to account when the Dalai Lama assumes power.42
He expected that the issue of the Simla Convention was likely to be needlessly referred back to the National Assembly again. Finally, the Lhasa Mission report of 1947 concluded that the cable to Nehru had indeed originated from the Kashag. The Kashag had omitted the National Assembly’s interim decision to abide by the Simla Convention. Instead, the Kashag had inserted expansive territorial claims in its response to Indian government.43 Richardson departed Lhasa without receiving any response on from the Tibetan government on the Simla Convention.
From Shakabpa’s meeting with Hopkinson and Richardson’s enquiries at the Tibetan Foreign Bureau it appears that the Tibetan leadership’s primary concern was to insulate themselves from responsibility of taking a wrong decision regarding Tibet’s future, lest the Dalai Lama upon assuming power held them accountable for any failures. This created a situation of crippling indecision in Lhasa and a mistrustful relationship with the incoming Indian government. This proved to be a costly mistake for both Tibet and India as they were unable to fashion a joint approach and response to Chinese claims on Tibet. The Tibetan Trade Mission, which could have been an opportunity to initiate a negotiated settlement on the frontier, was undermined by uncertainty on both sides. As the Mission arrived in India, India and Tibet had not yet agreed to a standstill agreement or a possible framework to discuss any territorial issues or even the political status of Tibet. Therefore, Tibet’s first mission to independent India was mostly an exercise in futility in furthering Tibet’s political or economic interests. It was inevitable that China would gain from this lack of cohesion between India and Tibet on the border.
The Chinese had already lodged a formal protest over Tibet’s political status with the Indian Embassy in Nanking, asserting its territorial claims over same territory that the Tibetan cable to Nehru had claimed. In October 1947, George Yeh, the Chinese Foreign Minister, had raised the issue of India inheriting Britain’s ‘unequal treaties’ with the Indian Ambassador in Nanking. The Chinese government specifically wanted to terminate the 1908 Trade Regulations signed between Britain and China which would leave their 1904 Treaty with Britain as the last standing agreement between the two parties. The Chinese government did not recognise the 1914 Simla Convention and hence wanted to ensure that Tibet was not considered an autonomous party in any negotiations between India and China on its future. The Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar, in his response to George Yeh pointed out that the 1908 Trade Regulations were a dead letter as they have been superseded by the 1914 Simla Convention. India had been conducting its political and trade relations with Tibet in accordance with the Simla Convention and was ‘not prepared to turn the clock back by 33 years.’44 Panikkar also conveyed to Foreign Minister Yeh that it was ‘unlikely that the Government of India would enter into any formal conversation with the Chinese government to settle the status of Tibet over the head of Tibet herself. To do so would be to repudiated the autonomy of Tibet which the Government of India had recognised for the past 33 years.’45
This presented a tricky situation as the Indian policy towards Tibet was based on the assumption that the Tibetan government would abide by the Simla Convention. However, even as Yeh and Panikkar spoke, the Indian government was actually in the dark about what would be the Tibetan government’s view on the Simla Convention. This led to a temporary loss of goodwill towards the Tibetan government (Mullick, 1971, p. 54). The Indian approach towards Tibet was therefore overcautious in its assumptions about the Tibetan government’s willingness and ability to abide by the Simla Convention and the McMahon line. Having already rejected the Tibetan territorial claims, the Indian government moved to entrenching its own position on the McMahon line. The first major outcome of this was the Khathing Mission in 1951 (Shukla, 2012). The Khathing Mission established unequivocal Indian control in Tawang by stationing Indian troops and putting an end to Tibetan taxation and presence there. B. N. Mullick, India’s Intelligence Chief notes that combined Tibetan and Chinese hostility to the Simla Convention was a factor in the hastened Indian action in Tawang (Mullick, 1971).
In sum, the Tibetan demand for return of territories seemed ill-advised as it tied up both Tibet and India in a fruitless negotiation at a crucial historical juncture. The Tibetan government had admittedly made the demand for return of territories as a pre-emptive move. This was well within Tibet’s rights as they had concerns regarding the Simla Convention all through the 1930s. However, the Kashag failed to support its own assertion in a credible manner in its negotiations with India. It appears that the territorial claims were more a declaratory gesture intended for the domestic political audience than policy proposal to re-negotiate Tibet’s border with India.46 This brought no gains to Tibet as it became increasingly hamstrung by internal differences. On the Indian side, there was a lack of appreciation of Tibetan anxieties as Tibet negotiated rapid political changes along its borders with both India and China. British/Indian inability to decode Tibetan elite politics also proved to be a major hurdle in developing an effective response to Tibetan anxieties about its future relationship with India. The Indian assumption that there was no need to discuss existing frontier arrangements under the Simla Convention with Lhasa proved to be a costly error of judgement. A mutually agreeable Indo-Tibetan re-affirmation of the Simla Agreement, prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949 would certainly have proved to be an asset in countering Chinese claims in Tibet. It would have, at the least, removed from the equation the critical lacunae of the Indo-Tibetan border being demarcated but not de-limited. As evident from Zhou Enlai’s 1959 letter to Nehru quoted above, China disingenuously used the Tibetan territorial claims made to Nehru to amplify its own territorial claims even as it rejected the Simla Agreement.
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