Meia Nouwens
The People's Liberation Army's modernisation programme has seen the commissioning of some impressive military platforms and systems since 2021, but progress in institutional reform and restructuring is less obvious and China's leaders do not yet have complete confidence in their military's war-fighting capabilities.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has set three goals for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation by mid-century (2049 or 2050) as part of China’s larger ambition to become a strong country (强国 qiáng guo) with a strong military (强军 qiáng jūn). These goals were slated for completion between 2020 and 2050, with a fourth added in 2021 as a midway point between 2020 and 2035. The goals are: by 2020, mechanisation of PLA army forces and progress in ‘informationisation’ – the integration of information and communications technology (ICT); by 2027, army building and professionalisation; by 2035, full modernisation and ‘intelligentisation’ – integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy into the PLA’s command and control, weapons systems and platforms, and decision-making – through reform of theory, organisational structure, service personnel and weaponry; and, by the mid-21st century, the ability to fight and win wars. These reforms will be implemented across all PLA service arms – army, navy, air force, rocket force and strategic support forces – and focus on developing efficient joint operations for theatre commands according to modern and future war-fighting concepts of network-centric and target-centric warfare.
While the PLA commissioned impressive military platforms and systems in 2021 and into 2022, modernisation is not just about ‘heavy metal’ (procuring hardware). The less visible aspects of reform, including institutional reform and restructuring, reveal greater variation in the PLA’s progress towards modernisation. Though the PLA plays an important role in Beijing’s regional assertiveness below the threshold of war, incomplete modernisation may limit the PLA’s willingness to enter into state-on-state conflicts. While Washington points to the PLA’s meteoric rise, the latter’s own assessment of its capabilities is less confident. Lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may further dampen any confidence.
Expanding the PLA’s heavy metal
By 2022, the PLA had undergone significant change since Xi set forth his military-reform agenda in 2013. This is particularly true as regards the procurement of more (and more modern) military systems and platforms – an aspect of military reform easily visible to public audiences in China and abroad.
The past two years have also seen an impressive procurement of military heavy metal – platforms and systems that the Chinese leadership sees as central to building modern war-fighting capabilities in the maritime, air and land domains.
Between 2014 and 2018, the PLA launched naval vessels with a total tonnage greater than the tonnages of the entire French, German, Indian, Italian, South Korean, Spanish or Taiwanese navies. This momentum has continued. In 2021, the PLA Navy (PLAN) commissioned at least nine guided-missile cruisers and destroyers (two Type-055 and seven Type-052D), one Type-075 amphibious assault ship and one Type-094 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine. By July 2022, they had commissioned two more Type-052D destroyers, three more Type-055 cruisers and a second Type-075 amphibious assault ship. In June 2022 in Shanghai, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian – fitted with a new electromagnetic catapult launch system.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) has now largely removed its inventory of ageing Cold War era combat aircraft from frontline service. Instead, it appears to be standardising on the modern multirole J-10C and J-16 designs and the advanced, low-observable J-20. In April 2022, it was reported that the 111th Air Brigade in the Western Theatre Command had received its first J-20s, and in September 2022, a PLAAF spokesman appeared to confirm that all five theatre commands now have at least one brigade equipped with the J-20. This rate of deployment suggests that over 100 such aircraft are currently fielded.
While the PLA Army has not been the priority recipient of platform modernisation, their armoured vehicle fleets have to a large degree been standardised with modern equipment. By 2022, roughly 70% of the PLA’s 5,400 main battle tanks listed in service could be classified as modern, while the ZTQ-15 light tank has now also been fielded with at least four combined-arms regiments and brigades in southern and western China. By mid-2022, over 60% of the PLA Army’s heavy and medium combined-arms brigades had also been equipped with modern tracked or wheeled infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).
Modernisation, diversification and growth of China’s conventional and nuclear missile forces continues apace. In addition to the three main services, the PLA Rocket Force has been equipped with several new strategic and theatre-range missile systems, some of which were unveiled at the 2019 National Day parade in China, including the DF-41 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-31A(G) ICBM, the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle/medium-range ballistic missile and the supersonic CJ-100 cruise missile. In 2021, reports also highlighted the construction of at least three new missile silo fields in northern and western China with the capacity for several hundred ICBMs. For the moment, Beijing is still mostly reliant on its land-based nuclear forces for deterrence, due to the limitations of its nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and lack of credible air-launched systems. However, the PLA is looking to develop a complete nuclear triad, consisting of air-, ship-, and ground-launched missiles, initially by fielding a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic-missile design.
In 2021, the United States’ Department of Defense (DoD) reported in its annual China Military Power Report that the PLA was accelerating the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal to up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2027 and at least 1,000 warheads by 2030. While the DoD believes that China may potentially move away from its policy of no first use and intends to move to a launch-on-warning posture to improve the peacetime readiness of its missile forces, the position of Chinese officials has not changed. China’s conventional-missile forces form an essential component of keeping adversaries at bay and preventing outside interference in key military contingencies – such as a war with Taiwan. The PLA’s nuclear missiles also play an important role in China’s strategy of deterring adversaries, using nuclear threats to prevent the escalation of a conflict and providing a counter-strike capability. At the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2022 in Singapore, China’s Defence Minister and State Councillor General Wei Fenghe confirmed that a July 2021 launch had been a test of a weapons delivery system, and not a reusable spaceplane as it had previously been claimed. This weapon is believed to have the characteristics of a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), placing warheads in a fractional low-earth orbit, before de-orbiting them towards their targets. Since these warheads would use a different approach path to those deployed by traditional ballistic missiles, they could pose additional challenges to existing detection and early-warning systems. If China were to deploy a FOBS, this would likely complement rather than transform China’s first- or second-strike options.
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