Talal Mohammad
On Sept. 16, 2022, a young Kurdish Iranian woman named Mahsa Amini died after being arrested by Iran’s morality police for allegedly wearing her hijab incorrectly. Protests have rocked the country ever since. Initially centered on demands to abolish the compulsory hijab and disband the morality police, the popular movement has in recent months broadened its scope to seek minority rights and, in some cases, independent states for Kurdish, Baloch, Azeri, and Arab groups in Iran. Amini’s death gave a common platform to these minorities’ long-festering grievances and led some Iranian opposition groups to call for regime change that could give way to a post-Islamic Republic Iran.
In heavily Kurdish regions of Iran, there have been armed confrontations between Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Kurdish separatist groups. Tehran has targeted Kurdish separatist bases in neighboring Iraq and accused these groups of seeking to secede from Iran. The Iranian regime has also accused the Saudi government of influencing, funding, and masterminding separatist activity within Iran.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have been archrivals since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which toppled Iran’s monarchy. At the time, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for exporting the revolution, sending shivers down the Saudi royal family’s spine. Since then, a series of direct and indirect confrontations between Tehran and Riyadh have shaped the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East—and the Gulf in particular. Each power today has numerous proxies that form regional spheres of influence. Most (but not all) Iran-affiliated groups are Shiite, while Saudi-linked groups are Sunni.
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has forged much of recent Middle Eastern history. Riyadh supported former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in his eight-year war with Iran in the 1980s. In 1982, Tehran helped establish, fund, and train the newly created Hezbollah militia, which has exerted increasing control over Lebanese politics ever since. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Hussein saw Iran seek to exert Shiite influence over the country in a struggle that has in many ways endured to today. The Saudi-Iranian standoff has also defined post-Arab Spring conflicts in Syria and Yemen. Iran’s support for Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and Yemen’s Houthis is the cornerstone of the Tehran-Riyadh rivalry today.
Though the two states experienced episodes of détente and rapprochement in the 1990s, the 2005-13 presidency of Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ongoing rise of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and 2021 election of ultraconservative Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi have erased any progress on this front—and instead led both to intensify their rhetoric toward the other. The 2016 Saudi execution of Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr led Iranian protesters to storm the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and was a nadir in the two states’ diplomatic history.
Though Iran and Saudi Arabia have held talks since 2021 in Iraq, the bulk of their relationship remains belligerent. In 2017, Mohammed bin Salman explicitly threatened to confront Iran by taking the war to Tehran: “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we’ll work so that the battle is for them in Iran.” Two years later, in 2019, the Iranian-aligned Houthis in Yemen claimed responsibility for striking Saudi Aramco oil installations in Saudi territory. Now, Tehran is threatening Saudi Arabia with outright war, with the IRGC chief warning that Riyadh will “pay the price” for allegedly supporting secessionist activity.
Riyadh has so far responded to Iran’s accusations of meddling in the protests with cautious silence. Meanwhile, the kingdom’s state-controlled media arm has given the demonstrations generous airtime. The Saudi-funded, London-based channel Iran International has broadcast videos and images from within Iran as well as hosted opposition figures, members of anti-government militias, and Azeri and Kurdish separatists.
In this context, one might assume that Saudi Arabia ultimately seeks the demise of Iran’s clerical regime. After all, Saudi King Abdullah, before his death in 2015, reportedly asked the United States to “cut off the head of the snake,” referring to Iran’s nuclear program. But all this may be a verbal facade: There is ample evidence that the current Saudi administration is rational—and does not actually wish for the Islamic Republic to fall. Instead, Riyadh seeks to weaken Tehran enough to extract key geopolitical concessions. These might include Iranian compromises on its nuclear program, noninterference in Arab affairs, and cessation of support to its regional allies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas.
There are two reasons a full-scale collapse of the Iranian regime is not in Riyadh’s interest. The first relates to Saudi identity. Saudi power arguably exists only because of the presence of an Iranian other. Just as Tehran for many stands for global Shiite leadership, Riyadh positions itself as emblematic of Sunni leadership. Without Iran at the helm of Shiism, Saudi Arabia’s assumed identity as the world’s Sunni protector would cease to exist.
Then there is the danger of a domino effect. If the Iranian protests are successful and lead to the demise of the Islamic Republic, they could have regional repercussions akin to the Arab Spring in some Arab states, particularly the Gulf. There is precedence for this: Iran’s 2009 Green Movement protests served as a precursor to the Arab Spring two years later. At the time, Gulf states—particularly Saudi Arabia—fought hard to quash protests in their countries. Riyadh responded to demonstrations in the country’s Shiite-heavy Eastern province with a mix of economic, political, and security measures. In Bahrain, the threat was greater: A group of Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia sent in forces to put down Shiite-led protests. Today, Iran’s ongoing protests could similarly inspire women across Saudi Arabia and minorities in the Shiite-dense east in particular to protest.
Though unlikely, it is worth considering what the fall of the theocracy could mean for the future of governance in Iran. If clerical leaders are ousted, the country would likely either be governed by IRGC military leadership or become fragmented à la Syria or Libya. This division could take different forms, creating rival governments (as in the case of Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya) or territorial division along ethnic lines. The former may witness a clash of legitimacy between groups that prefer a republican Iran and those that demand the return of the monarchy ousted in 1979. The latter could include ethnic territorial states governed by Kurdish, Arab, Azeri, and Baloch governments.
Either case would have serious security implications for Riyadh and the wider Gulf region. A military-led Iran could be extremely confrontational toward Riyadh. A few days after the IRGC threatened Saudi Arabia last October, Riyadh informed Washington that it had received intelligence that Iran was preparing to strike the kingdom. Though it has not yet come to pass, the ordeal was reminiscent of the Saudi Aramco strikes in 2019.
The Arab Spring fragmented major Middle Eastern states such as Syria and Libya and helped birth terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, that have destabilized the region. Something similar could unfold with Iran’s separatist factions if Tehran is weakened. This could spell danger and turbulence at a time when Gulf states are developing megaprojects to diversify their economies away from fossil fuels. These endeavors are dependent on foreign investment—which requires state cohesion and stability.
Despite its links to regional armed groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, the regime in Tehran seeks to balance its regional influence opposite that of Gulf Arab states and the U.S. military. This allows it to maintain its image as a regional power and safeguard its interests while extracting concessions from its neighbors. A total collapse of the Islamic Republic might weaken these affiliated armed groups, but it could also cause them to escalate and be of higher risk to Riyadh and its neighbors. Without a central command, members of these groups could turn into lone-wolf mercenaries, which could further destabilize the region. This sort of heightened volatility could rejuvenate Shiite-led movements around the region, such as in Iraq’s south—on the border with Saudi Arabia—and among Houthis in Yemen.
Rather than provoking it to collapse, Saudi Arabia would instead prefer to slowly defang Iran without ever engaging in direct military confrontation. As Tehran faces global pushback for its response to the ongoing protest movement, accusations of collaborating with Russia in Ukraine, and the unsettled nuclear deal, Riyadh’s approach seems to be working. Mohammad bin Salman wants Iran to be weak enough that it is forced to make concessions on its nuclear program and regional influence—but a totally destabilized Tehran would do the kingdom more harm than good.
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