Eugene Chausovsky
At the same time, the war does not appear to be ending anytime soon, and there is no shortage of mixed signals on the outlook for the conflict in the coming year. On the one hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no willingness to back down on his war aims, stating earlier this month that the conflict could well turn into a “long-term process.” There are also rumblings of a new Russian offensive—potentially with the participation of Belarus—in the coming year, possibly as soon as January.
On the other hand, recent developments such as a high-profile prisoner swap between Russia and the United States, as well as the extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, show that diplomacy is still able to achieve tangible results, while Ukraine has ramped up its diplomatic engagements with the United States, France, and Turkey through high-profile calls and visits.
What, then, do these seemingly conflicting signs suggest about the broader outlook for the war in 2023? While the specific outcomes of the war this coming year may be difficult to predict, there are three primary factors that are likely to prove most influential.
First and foremost is Ukraine’s striking success on the battlefield. Ukraine has defied the expectations of many in its ability to withstand Russia’s full-fledged invasion that Moscow launched at the beginning of the year. Not only did Kyiv not fall swiftly to the Russians nor the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky collapse, but Ukrainian forces have in recent months launched their own counteroffensives and regained significant territory in key regions such as Kharkiv and Kherson. Ukraine has pulled this off thanks to a range of reasons, from sustained support from the West to Russian operational errors and political miscalculations to the resolve and dedication of the Ukrainian government, its military, and the public at large.
Ukraine’s fierce resistance has forced Moscow to shift its initial strategy in a number of different ways. Russian forces withdrew from the northern front of the conflict, focusing on southern and eastern Ukraine as a bridge between their preexisting positions in Crimea and Donbas. Moscow also pursued a partial military mobilization (something the Kremlin previously said it would not do) and declared the annexation of the four Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson to solidify its position there. Yet even these measures have not enabled Russian forces to establish a firm foothold in the country, with Ukraine regaining territory in these regions even after these moves.
These setbacks and complications have caused Russia to increasingly target Ukraine’s energy and other civilian infrastructure via missile and drone strikes in recent months, with Moscow attempting to inflict maximum economic pain against the country as winter sets in. The Ukrainian conflict has thus become more concentrated when it comes to ground warfare, while Russia’s air and drone campaign against Ukraine has broadened in scope, targeting energy infrastructure and leaving millions of homes without power.
Looking ahead, Ukraine is well positioned militarily to regain more territory in the south and east in the coming year, with the country proving an ability to use its own drones to hit at Russia’s military supply lines, including in Crimea and inside of Russia in cities like Kursk. However, the extent of the territory that Ukraine will be able to regain will depend partly on the West’s continued support in terms of military assistance, as well as financial aid to help the country protect and rebuild its critical infrastructure. Yet with Ukraine’s international backers pledging more than $1 billion in emergency aid for the winter season, as well as the U.S. decision to supply Patriot missiles to the country and the approval of a $45 billion aid package following Zelensky’s visit to Washington, this backing is likely to increase in the coming year.
The second critical factor in 2023 is Russia’s own level of international backing—or, if not backing, at least engagement. While the United States and NATO countries have proved their sustained willingness to support Ukraine and isolate Russia, this has not been matched outside of the West. Countries such as China, India, and Turkey have refused to take part in sanctioning Russia, with these states and several others in the non-Western world even increasing their economic and energy ties with Moscow since the conflict began. These relationships have enabled Russia to weather the pressure of sanctions from the West and avoid an economic collapse, thus allowing it to maintain its funding of the war effort and to continue to press on militarily despite its setbacks.
However, Moscow cannot take these relationships for granted, and the continued economic and political ties between Russia and the likes of China and India do not equate to full-fledged support of Russia’s invasion. While Chinese state media remain pro-Russian, the country has not officially taken a side, and India has been studiously neutral. Turkey, meanwhile, has actively spoken out against the war. Yet these states have a pragmatic interest in maintaining their imports of Russian energy and, especially in China’s case, in challenging the U.S. and Western-led order in a broader sense. If Moscow seriously escalated the conflict in the coming year—such as by following through on the hints and threats that it might use chemical or nuclear weapons—these countries would likely reconsider their level of economic and political cooperation with Russia. The lifelines on which the Russian economy depends are also constraining factors on what would likely be disastrous escalations.
Finally, there’s the domestic political situation in each country. So far, even under the pressure of a hugely unpopular conscription process, Putin has proved his ability to weather opposition to the war on the home front via crackdowns and restrictive legislation, while keeping the Russian Security Council and other major decision-makers in line. Zelensky has likewise proved his ability to not only stay in power but also secure a strong mandate.
But if neither side is able to achieve total military victory, which appears unlikely at this stage, then the economic, social, and political toll of the conflict is likely to grow over time and a diplomatic path could become more appealing. Yet the Kremlin continues to pour its efforts, however ineptly, into war, and the Ukrainian public wants to see the outcome resolved on the battlefield, with a recent opinion poll by the Rating Group revealing that 85 percent of Ukrainians are in favor of continuing the war until all territories are regained, including Crimea and the parts of Donbas it lost back in 2014.
The Ukrainian conflict is in for another difficult year with unexpected twists and turns, whether that comes in the form of further military escalations, political shifts, or diplomatic progress involving international mediation. Eventually, all wars must come to an end, either from a decisive military victory or a diplomatic resolution among exhausted parties. But the survival of Putinism, and the resistance of the Ukrainian people and state, means 2023 may see neither exhaustion nor victory.
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