Benjamin R. Young
At the U.S. Naval War College, a prestigious education institution in Rhode Island for the U.S. military, the famous works of military strategists are examined. Former Prussian Gen. Carl von Clausewitz’s On War serves as the cornerstone of the Strategy and War curriculum while former Chinese Gen. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is the lynchpin of understanding the importance of psychology in warfare. However, there is a third military strategist who is methodically studied by U.S. military officers: former Chinese leader Mao Zedong, whose works are offered as part of a class called Strategy and War.
The thought of intermediate-ranking American military officers studying the works of a Chinese communist may seem absurd. But Mao’s theories of warfare have had a profound influence on generations of so-called Third World insurgencies—even as they transformed into a set of rhetorical cliches at home.
Mao’s military philosophies grew out of his experiences as a revolutionary leader in the Chinese Civil War. Mao’s ragtag band of communist guerrillas was malnourished, poorly clothed, poorly armed, and poorly trained. As Chinese propaganda proudly states, the Red Army of the 1930s was constantly on the verge of starvation and dissolution but overcame these odds to become a mighty fighting force. In 1934, the National Army (also known as the Kuomintang) pinned communist forces in Jiangxi province. However, Mao led his forces in a strategic and difficult retreat into Yan’an in Shaanxi province. This arduous journey, known as the Long March, later became a key part of the hagiography surrounding Mao during China’s Cultural Revolution. In present-day China, Yan’an is referred to as “the cradle of revolution” and has become a key destination for China’s red tourism industry.
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