Pascal LTH
Last week’s announcement that the French government would send AMX-10 RC vehicles to Ukraine may have caused surprise in some quarters.
Over the course of the war, it became a common belief that France and Germany were equally reluctant to arm Ukraine. By extension, not many of the people expounding this belief would have expected France to lead in taking the next step in providing Ukraine with military hardware.
Yet it should not have come as a surprise at all and to see France and Germany in the same light is to fundamentally misunderstand France’s perspective and foreign policy goals.
At the root of this misunderstanding is an incorrect assessment of why France engages with Russia in the way it does.
Historically there has certainly been some closeness and exchange between the two countries at a political and cultural level and this does go some way to explain why France doesn’t see Russia in the same light as, say, Estonia.
But we shouldn’t go overboard with this – outside of the French far-right who are open fans of Putin, such history has little impact on today’s foreign policy.
For France it comes down to what many see as a pragmatic view that Russia is here today, Russia was here yesterday and Russia will still be here tomorrow. Very few in decision-making positions believe that the war can end in a peaceful and stable outcome without Russia signing up to the settlement in some capacity.
Many people misinterpret this as a desire in Paris for Russia to win the war or to be able to claim the territory it currently occupies. In truth, the French approach is outcome-agnostic as far as territory goes because it applies no matter what the final territorial borders look like.
So rather than trying to prepare Ukraine to give up its land, as France was often accused of doing, statements about not humiliating Russia were really a question of ensuring that Russia would be willing to accept losing. The logic went that if Russia was ‘humiliated’ then it would simply try to reignite hostilities in the near future or would continue to escalate the current war in drastic ways.
What French policy has therefore consistently wanted to avoid is a scenario where they believe that Russia would refuse to engage and would remain in an aggressive posture - even if it was to be pushed out of Ukraine’s borders. This is why the French government will talk about a new security guarantee with Russia included – they want Russia to feel there is a reason to talk to the West and to not simply keep on fighting.
At the start this meant engaging in dialogue. As the war has progressed, France has continued to deploy stronger measures against Russia, moving through the different steps of sanctions and weapons deliveries, in order to tip the balance of power more and more in favour of Ukraine and apply pressure on Moscow to start taking diplomatic engagement seriously.
In all probability, the French government will not stop offering to talk to Russia or putting forward ideas for joint settlements. No one should be surprised by this. But it is also true that no one should be surprised as France continues to back up these positions with more and more military force.
France doesn’t want Russia to win or Ukraine to surrender. But it does want Russia to to listen and to be ready to discuss an end to the war. As long as Russia holds out on this offer, France will increase its direct support to Ukraine.
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