Brennan Deveraux & John Thomas Pelham IV
U.S. Army Modernization Efforts and the Changing Character of Warfare
Is it time to challenge the U.S. Army’s long-standing maneuver-centric culture in light of the recent conflicts in Azerbaijan and Ukraine? While emerging Multi-Domain doctrine appears to be shifting the force towards a more effects-based warfare approach, Army echelons—particularly divisions and below—remain organized and equipped for maneuver operations. In this time of peace, a modern-day inter-war period, the U.S. Army must ask if it is on a viable modernization path for its vision of a future conflict or if the service needs to adapt to the changing relationship and corresponding primacy of maneuver and fires.
Whether from loitering munitions in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or anti-tank guided missiles in the current Ukraine crisis, the changing environment has limited the success of armored formations in their current form. However, the subsequent debate has remained hyper-focused on the continued relevancy of mechanized vehicles—particularly the survivability of tanks in modern warfare. In turn, while land forces globally will continue to adapt the roles of specific systems to each unique conflict, pundits have overlooked a fundamental factor regarding the U.S. Army’s approach to warfare: its emphasis on maneuver.
Historically, the U.S. Army has built its identity around the infantry and cavalry (later armor) branches. Under this model, fires enable mounted (later mechanized) and light infantry formations to “close with and destroy enemy forces” or “seize and retain terrain.” Even with the proliferation of massed fires necessitated by the positional stalemate in the First World War and the significant advances in responsive fire-support capabilities in the Second World War, the U.S. Army continued to view maneuver forces as the decisive element on the battlefield. On the other hand, the fires branch remained a supporting member of the combined arms team. However, with the evolution of long-range and rapid-firing artillery, rockets, missiles, and other joint fires assets, maneuver’s traditional primacy amongst Western armies may be diminishing, if not ending altogether.
Few can deny that the proliferation of sensors, unmanned aircraft systems, man-portable missiles, and long-range fires have made modern and future battlefields increasingly lethal to any massed formation, including large combat vehicles and troop concentrations. However, any potential lessons should be properly contextualized to avoid drawing false conclusions that could lead to a premature divestment of critical capabilities. For example, rather than summarily judging mechanized maneuver forces as obsolete, military professionals must examine their application in respective conflicts to distill distinct lessons.
Having done so, researchers can then determine what potential lessons apply to future warfare writ large and which are unique only to a particular conflict, region, or circumstance. Additionally, it is the military analyst’s responsibility to look beyond individual components of warfare, like the relevancy of a particular system, and broaden the observations to the character of war as a whole and the efficacy of existing approaches to conducting it. For example, do modern battlefields always necessitate the need to close with an enemy to destroy them? Perhaps instead, the proliferation of indirect fires and effects across domains offer more opportunities than ever before to impose one’s will upon an enemy. For the first time in decades, the U.S. military has the opportunity to learn from the mistakes and successes of other nations in places such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, validating or challenging warfare assumptions.
The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan highlighted the challenges associated with the changing character of war, as conventional maneuver forces on both sides sustained considerable casualties from the combined effects of unmanned aerial systems, ground sensors, loitering munitions, and massed indirect fires. Azerbaijan successfully leveraged emerging technology to create a near-transparent battlefield that exposed Armenian armored vehicles like T-72 and T-80 tanks, even in defensive or built-up positions. The exploitation that followed with armed drones and exquisite Israeli-made HARPY loitering munitions highlighted the vulnerability of maneuver forces and how effectively modern fires capabilities can shape the battlefield. Overall, these advancements in fires technology—both to sense and destroy targets—put into question the survivability of military vehicles, and thus the viability of most maneuver warfare means on a modern battlefield, regardless of whether they are armored.
The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War supports a similar narrative regarding the diminishing efficacy of mechanized maneuver forces. Ukrainian information campaigns have capitalized on the significant losses inflicted on Russian tanks and various other fighting vehicles by Ukrainian drones, all-source sensors, and anti-tank guided missiles. Imported U.S. and NATO anti-tank guided missiles in the hands of the Ukrainian military have proven highly effective against Russian mechanized forces, to be sure. In fact, it is hardly surprising that plentiful, modern anti-tank guided missiles employed in a defensive context are performing so well; however, this success against mechanized forces in the current conflict does not arbitrarily portend the obsolescence of mechanized maneuver forces writ large. However, it demonstrates the increasing lethality of dismounts, inherently limiting the ability of mechanized forces to control terrain in certain operating environments. Additionally, it is incumbent upon military professionals to determine how much of the observed phenomena is the result of poor Russian leadership, crew proficiency, or tactics, techniques, and procedures.
While there is still much that the U.S. Army must learn from these modern engagements before adapting its organization or equipment, three observations on warfare’s changing character are apparent. Observations that the service must consider sooner rather than later.First, the battlefield is becoming increasingly transparent, exposing armored vehicles to advanced fires weaponry, and limiting any sanctuary that a mechanized formation might need to conduct logistics operations like refueling or resupplying. Consequently, the democratization of intelligence—assets and information—will dramatically improve friendly and enemy targeting capabilities from the tactical to the theater-strategic levels of war.
Second, precision munitions are no longer relegated to only a few select nations or high-priority missions. Instead, precision munitions—both to grid location and target guided—are becoming commonplace and will continue to proliferate, endangering any target that a belligerent deems high value.
Third, improvements in man-portable systems have increased the destructive capacity of dismounted forces in both the close and deep fights. Hard to detect small infantry squads dispersed around a battlefield with anti-tank missiles and loitering munitions can mass effects against convoys, ammunition holding areas, bulk fuel areas, or other critical targets essential for mechanized warfare.
Synthesized, these observations paint a grim picture for a military that prioritizes its maneuver operations over all else. They foreshadow a future battlefield with high casualties, where mechanized forces are easily identifiable, are increasingly vulnerable to direct attacks and indirect interdiction by targeting logistic assets, and present a high-value targets that elevate an adversary’s strategic narrative if destroyed on camera. Regardless, none of the above-mentioned scenarios suggests the outright obsolescence of mechanized maneuver forces.
Suppose land forces still require the ability to maneuver at the tactical and operational levels of war in an offensive context. In that case, they will still require the mobility, protection, and firepower provided by mechanized forces in all but the most severely restricted operating environments. Instead, the resurgence and evolution of unique fires capabilities could signal a shift in primacy from maneuver to fires in land warfare similar to the resurgence of positional warfare over Napoleonic maneuver for much of the First World War.
However, armies will still require forces to maneuver to seize positions of advantage from which to employ systems of choice (fires systems or otherwise). Therefore, mechanized maneuver forces will remain a critical requirement. The question then becomes how best to organize, train, and equip mechanized forces to increase their survivability on the modern battlefield and adjust their role to support fires better, not whether mechanized maneuver forces are becoming obsolete. Therefore, as the Army continues modernizing its equipment, organization, and doctrine, it must assess whether fires will continue to enable maneuver or give way to a fires-centric force enabled by maneuver.
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