Indian Strategic Studies: 12/16/22

16 December 2022

China And India: On The Brink Of A War?

Peter Suciu

A Sino-Indian Border Clash is Brewing – Even as the temperatures have fallen, tensions have heated up along the Chinese-Indian border – marking the first violent encounter in two years, when troops from both countries engaged in a brawl that left several injured and nearly two dozen dead.

According to multiple reports, troops from both sides “exchanged blows” on December 9 after hundreds of Chinese soldiers had transgressed the border.

The Indian Army said the clash occurred in the Tawang sector of the Arunachal Pradesh state at the eastern tip of India. Initial reports suggested that few soldiers from each nation suffered “minor injuries,” although the exact number is unclear.

“Both sides immediately disengaged from the area,” the Indian army said.

India's Middle East Strategy

Jon Alterman: C. Raja Mohan is a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute based in New Delhi. He has been writing about Indian foreign policy for decades and is a very thoughtful commentator on India in the world. Raja, welcome to Babel.

C. Raja Mohan: Thank you. It's great to be in the tower.

Jon Alterman: What is India's strategic worldview, and where does the Middle East into India's priorities?

C. Raja Mohan: It seemed that at the end of the Cold War, the Middle East was dropping off from India's agenda. There was a particular type of approach that India took to the Middle East immediately after independence. Out of solidarity, they worked for the Palestinians against Israel. In fact, for a long time, we were not allowed to travel to Israel, and the sense was that India was standing up against the residual Western colonialism and domination of the Middle East. Post 1973, as oil became important, India engaged the oil producing countries, but that engagement was largely on a mercantilist basis. There was no real strategic relationship with the Gulf. We had Indian labor moving to the Gulf in large numbers from 1973 to 1974. The remittances became very important, but India did not have a political, strategic view of the region by the end of the Cold War. Since then, we have come a long way. Today, I think India takes a far more strategic view of the Middle East, and the difference between the past and present can be understood by three important changes. Three forces that India kept a reasonable distance from during the Cold War was the United States, Israel, and the Arab Gulf. For us, the United States represented a legacy of Western domination of the Gulf, so we did not want to be associated with the United States. Israel was seen as the principal problem in the Arab-Palestine issue, so we kept some distance from them. And in the Gulf, we preferred the secular, socialist regimes, rather than the conservative kingdoms. But today, the United States is one of our best friends in the region. Israel is a major partner for India in a whole range of defense and security issues, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) seem to be very important partners for India.

Why the India-Pakistan Rivalry Endures

Sumit Ganguly

India and Pakistan have mostly been at odds since 1947, when both emerged as independent countries after decades of British rule. The two states fought a war in that year—and three more in the years since, in 1965, 1971, and 1999. (Their fleeting cooperation was largely confined to the 1950s.) The most recent crisis between New Delhi and Islamabad took place three years ago, following a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir; India followed with an aerial attack in Pakistan, leading to retaliation from Islamabad.

As that crisis underscored, the India-Pakistan relationship has deteriorated significantly in the last decade, especially following the election of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014. This decline stems in part from Pakistan’s continued dalliance with anti-Indian terrorist organizations, an unstated component of its national security strategy. In response, the Modi government has adopted an unyielding stance. India’s decision in 2019 to unilaterally rescind the special autonomous status of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir further undermined bilateral ties. Any recent progress in the relationship—such as India’s humanitarian gestures in the wake of devastating floods in Pakistan this year—has been largely cosmetic.

China’s Victory in Ukraine

Edward Lucas

Did you see our decision-makers quail as the Chinese tanks crunched through the streets of Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris, establishing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the arbiter of Europe’s security? Me neither. But according to Owen Matthews, a veteran Russia-watcher (and — full disclosure — an old friend of mine), that is, in effect, what has happened.

Most of his new book “Overreach” is an insightful account of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Unlike some other accounts, Matthews’s research includes in-depth reporting from inside the Russian power structures. He ably depicts the Kremlin’s paranoid, nihilist worldview, the suffering it has unleashed, and the still bleaker prospects that await us.

But half-buried in the book is a scoop, now gaining increasing attention, about a backstairs US-China deal not to “escalate” the conflict. The US administration apparently blocked Poland’s attempt to send elderly MiG-29 warplanes to Ukraine. In return, China agreed not to supply Russia with the equipment it desperately needed. It has also, apparently, sternly warned the Kremlin against nuclear escalation.

China’s Climate Security Vulnerabilities

Erin Sikorsky

Like the United States, China faces serious risks to its national security from climate change. From melting glaciers in the Tibetan Plateau to the effect of rising sea levels on the heavily populated Yangtze River Basin and Pearl River Delta, from record heatwaves and drought to unprecedented flooding from extreme precipitation—a range of climate hazards threaten critical Chinese civilian and military infrastructure, risk domestic political instability, including in already restive regions of the country, and challenge Chinese geopolitical interests abroad.

China’s senior leadership appears to recognize climate change as a national security threat. Under Xi Jinping, China has adopted a broad concept of national security that encompasses internal and external, traditional and non-traditional threats. It is unclear, however, the extent to which ecological and climate security topics have permeated Chinese military strategy and doctrine, though public documents and statements provide some indications that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is at least considering these climate implications.

Exclusive: China readying $143 billion package for its chip firms in face of U.S. curbs

Julie Zhu

HONG KONG, Dec 13 (Reuters) - China is working on a more than 1 trillion yuan ($143 billion) support package for its semiconductor industry, three sources said, in a major step towards self sufficiency in chips and to counter U.S. moves aimed at slowing its technological advances.

Beijing plans to roll out what will be one of its biggest fiscal incentive packages, allocated over five years, mainly as subsidies and tax credits to bolster semiconductor production and research activities at home, said the sources.

It signals, as analysts have expected, a more direct approach by China in shaping the future of an industry which has become a geopolitical hot button due to soaring demand for chips and which Beijing regards as a cornerstone of its technological might.

It will also likely further raise concerns in the United States and its allies about China's competition in the semiconductor industry, say analysts. Some U.S. lawmakers are already worried about China's chip production capacity build-up.

Stop Building a Military to Attack China

DAN GRAZIER

Scenes of thousands of Chinese citizens protesting the government’s draconian COVID restrictions must be a dagger in the heart of the D.C. establishment. For years now, members of Congress, government officials, military leaders, and think-tank talking heads have been issuing dire warnings about the imminent and existential threat posed by China. These warnings are frequently followed in the same breath with appeals for more military spending to keep pace with the “pacing challenge” of the 21st century.

Theirs is a well-known tactic used by the military-industrial-congressional complex called threat inflation. As we seemed to be finally putting the War on Terror behind us, the shadow of a rising China came along at just the right time for the defense spending hawks. Much like the Soviet Union before it, China now serves as a useful menace to be trotted out at hearings and press conferences while lawmakers and defense officials work to nudge defense budgets ever higher.

Just this past week, the House and Senate agreed to a deal that would add $45 billion to President Joe Biden’s already record-setting post-World War II defense budget. “Democrats and Republicans in both chambers backed large increases on the premise of addressing high inflation and keeping pace with China,” Politico wrote.

An open call to the visionaries in government to change DoD culture

Bonnie Evangelista

Whether you acknowledge it or not, all roads in the emerging technology race lead to contracts. Unfortunately, federal contracting is lengthy, overly burdensome and rigid. But it doesn’t have to be this way.

Disrupting traditional federal contracting is critical to advancing rapid acquisition, but it is only one step of many needed in order to forge a new path for the Department of Defense. Several leaders across the DoD have publicly displayed their frustrations over the federal acquisition malaise. Nick Chaillan is most notable for having “dropped the mic” as he left his position as the Air Force chief software officer, criticizing the military for refusing to advance IT modernization and agile acquisition.

The resignation of Defense Innovation Unit chief Michael Brown earlier this year is another reminder of how the DoD is slow to transform its technology acquisition processes. His chief complaint was the lack of support from the Pentagon when bridging the gap between the department and commercial technology.

After the CHIPS Act: The Limits of Reshoring and Next Steps for U.S. Semiconductor Policy

VISHNU KANNAN, JACOB FELDGOISE

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Congress’s recent success in passing the CHIPS and Science Act (informally the CHIPS Act) shows that legislators are united on one point: the United States needs to manufacture more semiconductors at home. This idea gained traction during the worst days of the coronavirus pandemic, when global shortages of semiconductors halted the manufacturing of automobiles, traditional consumer electronics, and other products that use semiconductors, such as household appliances.1 As demand for these products soared during the pandemic, the world experienced painful price inflation, which amplified the acute geopolitical tensions between the United States and China.2 U.S. policymakers, already worried that dependence on Taiwan for the most sophisticated semiconductors could imperil national security and economic security, saw an urgent need to act.3 And together, rising prices and geopolitical competition underscored the need to invest in domestic economic revitalization.

The CHIPS Act’s $52.7 billion investment in domestic semiconductor manufacturing (see table 1) aims to fulfill three main objectives: 1) reduce the likelihood that shocks abroad might disrupt the supply of chips, 2) boost American international economic competitiveness and create domestic jobs, and 3) protect semiconductors from being sabotaged in the manufacturing process. This paper argues that the CHIPS Act, by itself, will not fully accomplish any of these goals. The act is a major step forward, but it leaves multiple gaps that require additional government action. In particular:Policymakers must ensure that the $39 billion in CHIPS Act subsidies are usefully divided between fabrication and assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP).

How the US has helped counter destructive Russian cyberattacks amid Ukraine war

INES KAGUBARE

The U.S.’s increased efforts to assist Ukraine and other Eastern European countries in shoring up their cyber defenses amid Moscow’s war on Kyiv appear to have been successful in countering destructive Russian cyberattacks and mitigating their impact.

The U.S. and its European allies provided significant cyber expertise to Ukraine and other Eastern European nations prior to the war, but experts said those efforts seem to have increased following the invasion of Ukraine in February as the countries all geared up for Russian cyberattacks.

“My sense is that the U.S. and the U.K. have both been pretty helpful when it comes to hardening Ukraine’s cyber defenses during the war and have been reasonably successful at their counter maneuvers as well, including things like removing Russian malware from machines and helping thwart attacks on Ukraine’s electric grid,” said Josephine Wolff, an associate professor of cybersecurity policy at the Tufts University Fletcher School.

A Putin nuclear strike on Ukraine? A Chinese attack against Taiwan? How the US prepares for global nightmares.

John McLaughlin

For many of the dangerous situations confronting the United States today, there is precious little precedent and little guidance on how to respond. Look no further than the possibility that Russian President Vladimir Putin might use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or that China might invade Taiwan. Add the prospects of a seventh nuclear test by North Korea, Iran acquiring a nuclear capability and widespread unrest in China … well, you get the idea.

The potential for global surprises has rarely been greater. And surprise is the enemy of any nation’s foreign policy.

The challenge for U.S. policymakers is to prepare for all these traumas and game out how the U.S. would respond — not just in the moment, but in prolonged and escalating circumstances. For example, not just whether Russia would go nuclear in Ukraine, but what the U.S. would do and what next steps Russia might take. All this to avoid relying on improvisation and potentially chaotic responses, if and when the moment comes.

The good news? Such planning is happening now when it comes to the Taiwan and Russian situations. The bad news? Those are as complex and dangerous as any scenarios in recent memory.

Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World

JENNIFER KAVANAGH

SUMMARY

In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets.

Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics.They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down.

They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries.

Russia-Ukraine war reaches dark side of the internet

Niko Vorobyov

In April, German police, acting on a tip-off from their American colleagues, discovered the servers of the single-largest online bazaar for narcotics and other contraband on the planet.

From 2017, Hydra had dominated the illegal drug business in Russia and neighbouring countries. After taking control of the site, German authorities retrieved 23 million euros ($16.7m) in ill-gotten cryptocurrency.

But what likely caught the attention of Western law enforcement was not Russian drug dealers, doing business mainly in Russia.

Hydra also offered forged documents, hacking, and money laundering services, which could be used nefariously against Western interests or citizens.

While the takedown of Hydra was the result of an operation which had begun months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, the digital landscape it once dominated has become another, quiet front in the Russia-Ukraine war.

On China, Minerals, and Power Competition

Christian Géraud Neema Byamungu

As the world embarks on the energy transition, resource-rich African countries find themselves at the crossroads of geopolitical competition between China and Western countries led by the United States. But, with years of advance over the West in the extraction and supply and refining of minerals, China today is dominating the global supply chain.

In an effort to catch up, the United States and its allies are now using a number of restrictive policies (on national security grounds) and initiatives to counter China and curtail its domination as much as possible on the global supply chain.

The latest among these initiatives is the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) launched in June 2022, which aims “to ensure that critical minerals are produced, processed, and recycled in a manner that supports countries in realizing the full economic development potential of their mineral resources. The MSP will attract public and private investment, increase transparency, and promote high Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards throughout critical minerals supply chains.”

The initiative comes at a moment when African countries are seeking to move up the ladder of the global supply chain of these minerals and exporting countries seek to become refiners and battery makers. So, given its rivalry with China, how does the United States intend to engage with Africa in the extractive sector with the MSP framework?

A Roadmap for World Bank Evolution

Stephanie Segal

At the 2022 World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, shareholders called on World Bank Group management to produce a roadmap to guide the institution in meeting the most pressing challenges of the twenty-first century. In a decade marked by crises beyond the scope of individual nations to tackle, the push for global solutions is timely. Reforming development finance is necessary to successfully meet development needs.

Given its history, global reach, and near-universal membership, the World Bank is the right place to start reimagining the role of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in addressing global challenges. This briefing coauthored by E3G and The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggests actions for the roadmap, in the areas of vision, incentives, operations, and financial capacity. It also proposes timeframes and pathways for enacting reforms in 2023 that will be critical to the World Bank Group’s evolution.

Summary of recommendationsShareholders and management should move expeditiously in 2023 to agree the World Bank Group’s evolution to better integrate and scale lending and investment for global public goods (GPGs), in support of national development. This clarity of vision on the Bank’s strategic direction should be communicated in a statement by the Development Committee at the Spring Meetings for endorsement by the Board of Governors.

Estonia Builds Ukraine Military Cyber Facility to Fend Off Russian Hackers

JOE SABALLA

The Ukrainian military now has a bolstered capability to fend off Russian hackers.

Thanks to Estonia, a new military cyber facility has been established in the war-torn nation.

e-Governance Academy (eGA) and CybExer Technologies collaborated on the project as part of the European Union’s support for Ukraine.

According to the eGA, the consortium has been working closely with the Ukrainian military for more than eight months to help improve its cybersecurity skills.

“It will translate to enhanced digital skills of military professionals and contribute to building cyber resilience of Ukraine,” eGA official Hannes Astok said of the new facility.

Leveraging Experience

Kosovo Again

George Friedman

There have been skirmishes between armed ethnic Serb protesters and Kosovo police. The reason is that a while ago, Kosovo ordered that drivers surrender Serbian-issued license plates and replace them with Kosovo plates. On Dec. 10, Serbs living in northern Kosovo started erecting barricades. Kosovo residents confronted them, and Kosovo police blocked the border checkpoints. A traffic jam ensued, and so did a small shootout, including the use of a stun grenade. The shooting has died down but the threats have mounted.

A shootout over license plates may seem excessive, but this is the Balkans. It is a relatively small area with multiple nationalities, and the political borders don’t match the ethnic borders. In the 1990s, there was a brutal civil war among those ethnic groups. For example, Serbs are Christians and Bosniaks are Muslims. Serbs and Bosnians live in proximity to each other. The civil war that broke out included concentration camps, where some estimate that 100,000 Bosnians died – a number denied by the Serbians. However, no one doubts it was a blood bath.

The fighting threatened to extend to Kosovo, south of Serbia. The Kosovars are ethnic Albanians and Muslims living in an area that Serbia claims. When Serbian forces began to enter Kosovo, U.S. and European governments, aware of the slaughter in Bosnia, were concerned that another blood bath would take place in Kosovo. NATO aircraft, primarily British and American, carried out airstrikes to force the Serbians to leave. The bombing was extended to Serbia, and included strikes against the capital, Belgrade. Those strikes caused substantial casualties on Serbian citizens.

The World-Changing Race to Develop the Quantum Computer

Carl Burton

On the outskirts of Santa Barbara, California, between the orchards and the ocean, sits an inconspicuous warehouse, its windows tinted brown and its exterior painted a dull gray. The facility has almost no signage, and its name doesn’t appear on Google Maps. A small label on the door reads “Google AI Quantum.” Inside, the computer is being reinvented from scratch.

In September, Hartmut Neven, the founder of the lab, gave me a tour. Neven, originally from Germany, is a bald fifty-seven-year-old who belongs to the modern cast of hybridized executive-mystics. He talked of our quantum future with a blend of scientific precision and psychedelic glee. He wore a leather jacket, a loose-fitting linen shirt festooned with buttons, a pair of jeans with zippered pockets on the legs, and Velcro sneakers that looked like moon boots. “As my team knows, I never miss a single Burning Man,” he told me.

In the middle of the warehouse floor, an apparatus the size and shape of a ballroom chandelier dangled from metal scaffolding. Bundles of cable snaked down from the top through a series of gold-plated disks to a processor below. The processor, named Sycamore, is a small, rectangular tile, studded with several dozen ports. Sycamore harnesses some of the weirdest properties of physics in order to perform mathematical operations that contravene all human intuition. Once it is connected, the entire unit is placed inside a cylindrical freezer and cooled for more than a day. The processor relies on superconductivity, meaning that, at ultracold temperatures, its resistance to electricity all but disappears. When the temperature surrounding the processor is colder than the deepest void of outer space, the computations can begin.

Mobile, Autonomous 3D-printed Drone Manufacturing

Daniel Pereira

About The 2022 OODA Loop Series: Autonomous Everything

In a series of posts entitled Autonomous Everything, we explore automation in all its technological forms, including legacy working assumptions about the term itself. Autonomous Everything includes a broad autonomous future in areas such as Security Automation, Automation and the Workforce, Automation – or Augmentation – of the workforce, and Automation of AI/Machine Learning Training Models and Industry Standardization. Recently, we checked in with Junaid Islam, a well-known cybersecurity expert, to discuss security automation tools, the increased cyber risks enterprises face, and the emerging AI-based Zero Trust cybersecurity for Smart Energy, Transportation, and Manufacturing systems.

We now explore Orbital Composites’ work with United States Air Force to create mobile, autonomous 3D-printed drone manufacturing capabilities.

Cyber Warfare Hasn’t Made Sense in Ukraine – and Likely Won’t Anywhere Else

Activity in the cyber domain has failed to materialize as expected in the conflict in Ukraine. Some say it never really got off the ground, while others claim it was prevented through pre-conflict hardening and or that the cyber domain has in fact been active and effective. Opinions are all over the place, but the reality on the ground suggests that – at a minimum – kinetic operations have been far more impactful than those in the cyber domain.

Frankly, that shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Cyber operations have proved themselves a potentially effective tool in broader strategy – along with information and economic measures – but it has failed to become much more than a small part of the toolkit. Among the many reasons for this is an inherent constraint in the impact of cyber operations: Reversibility. Quite simply, except in certain extreme and potentially exotic cases, the effects of cyber events have failed to stick. Locking up systems doesn’t have the same impact as a missile strike. And over the past nine months, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated this. In particular, we’ll take a look at two examples of attacks

War in Ukraine Dominated Cybersecurity in 2022

Bree Fowler

Russia's war against Ukraine and the worries about possible cyberattacks against the country's allies, like the US, dominated cybersecurity news throughout 2022.

Even before Russia's February invasion, cybersecurity experts were gearing up for online attacks that some of them thought could potentially cross the line into cyberwarfare. Russia did have some success early on, but Ukraine showed it could not only rebound and rebuild, but also control the message coming out of the war zones, neutralizing Russian disinformation campaigns.

While the war continues to drag on, Western countries and their companies that do business in Ukraine seem to have, so far, escaped largely unscathed, though some experts say the potential for an attack remains.

Meanwhile, defenders of all kinds of computer systems continued to deal with the threat of ransomware, which increasingly hit American schools in addition to more traditional targets like critical infrastructure. And they wrestled with lingering issues stemming from a vulnerability in widely used open-source software and cyberattacks aimed at stealing data for profit.

The digital future requires making 5G secure

Tom Wheeler and David Simpson

From smart cities to smart cars, to smart factories, the future will be built on ubiquitous microchips connected by wireless networks. Fifth generation (5G) technology promises to bring the high-speed, low-latency wireless infrastructure necessary for the “smart” era. By some estimates, half of all worldwide data traffic over the next five years will be generated not by people, but by connected computerized devices requiring no human intervention.

Moving from promise to reality, however, will require those connecting networks to be secure. A new Brookings report examines the 5G promise, its cybersecurity challenges, and the policy decisions necessary to achieve the 5G promise. The report concludes that as China and Europe push forward with their 5G efforts, a domestic American emphasis on network security will both speed up 5G adoption and create a differentiated advantage for U.S. companies at home and abroad. Accomplishing such outcomes can be achieved through the implementation of well-known cybersecurity techniques, a program of federal oversight that eschews regulatory micromanagement in favor of a light-but-frequent review of 5G cyber risk mitigation activities, and appropriate government funding.

McAfee 2023 Threat Predictions

Cedric Pernet

McAfee reports that artificial intelligence-generated videos and images have been used more often in 2022 than in previous years to conduct fraud, as more applications offer the tool to users who don’t have any prior knowledge of AI. Also, victims might not know AI technology is now widely available and can be used against them in different scam schemes.

In addition to fraudulent use of video AI, AI used for fake voice has also risen, often used in vishing fraud to make phone calls seem more realistic and without leaking the fraudster’s real voice. All of the progress made in AI-generated content also provides benefits to cyber criminals interested in running influence campaigns to manipulate public opinion via fake videos.

2023 will probably see such operations of disinformation in the U.S. as the 2024 presidential election approaches. The only protection against this kind of threat is to fact-check and be wary of any content on the internet.

How 5G can help defend Taiwan: Commercial parts for military systems

BRYAN CLARK and DAN PATT

Will China invade Taiwan? It’s a question that comes up in almost every defense-related event in Washington, and the answers tend towards the pessimistic. But there may be a way to deter Beijing from action, using widely available technology, write Bryan Clark and Dan Patt of the Hudson Institute in this new analysis.

Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term as Chinese president began with widespread protests and an economic downturn as COVID restrictions and debt burdens took a toll on China’s social contract. Beyond the immediate impacts on global supply chains, US leaders worry the instability may accelerate Xi’s efforts to force unification with Taiwan before a combination of economic, demographic, and environmental problems constrict his options.

The timing couldn’t be worse for the Pentagon. Faced with rising costs for recruiting, maintenance, and equipment, US fighter, bomber, submarine, and destroyer fleets are all smaller and older than at any time since World War II. With new ships and aircraft taking more than a decade to build, the US military will need to improve the reach, survivability, and lethality of today’s force.

What is a hypersonic missile and which countries say they have them?

Iran claims it has built a hypersonic missile, sparking concern across the international community.

Although Tehran has not presented evidence to show a successful test of the advanced superfast weapons, Iran's opponents are concerned about a major escalation in arms.

The announcement came after Iran said that it had sent drones to Russia, but did so before the Ukraine war began in February.

What is this new generation of weaponry and who is developing it?

What are hypersonic missiles?