Indian Strategic Studies: 09/24/22

24 September 2022

Here’s what the United Nations can and can’t do in response to the war in Ukraine

Joshua Keating

The very first images that many saw of the war in Ukraine were not raw footage from the battlefield or aerial bombardments, but two frazzled-looking, middle-aged men facing off across a conference table at the U.N. Security Council in New York.

On the night of Feb. 24, the council was in session at a meeting that had been called as a last-ditch effort to convince Russia to back down. For a time, Russia’s ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, who happened to hold the council’s rotating chair at the time, seemed unaware that the “special military operation” had actually begun, until his Ukrainian counterpart, Sergiy Kyslytsya, challenged him to contact his superiors in Moscow: “You have a smartphone. You can call.” He then asked Nebenzia to relinquish his chair, saying, memorably, “There is no purgatory for war criminals, they go straight to hell.”

It was one of the most dramatic moments in the history of a forum that has not lacked for drama in its 77 years of history. But the images of delegates continuing to talk about de-escalation at the very moment missiles were raining down on Kyiv, Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities could also serve as a metaphor for the U.N.’s irrelevance to the conflict in its early days.

Kharkiv Retreat: What Will Military Losses Mean for Russia’s Domestic Politics?

Tatiana Stanovaya

The retreat of the Russian armed forces from Ukraine’s Kharkiv region sowed panic, disenchantment, and bewilderment among pro-war activists. Their channels on the Telegram messaging app are brimming with anger at the authorities and questions about how such a setback came about. This is one of the most serious political challenges to the Kremlin since it set about decimating the non-systemic (anti-President Vladimir Putin) opposition.

The Russian authorities have always had a complicated relationship with the pro-war segment of the population. For many years it was marginal: only a small group of fans of the Novorossiya project—a hypothetical confederation of states in southeastern Ukraine stretching from Kharkiv to Odesa—followed the fighting in the Donbas, and they had little influence over the political agenda. However, the invasion of Ukraine didn’t just radicalize the party of war; it also bolstered it with political heavyweights. The conservative anti-Western mainstream—including the party of power, the siloviki (members of the security services), and the systemic opposition that doesn’t in fact oppose Putin—fully supported the president’s decision to invade Ukraine and even tried to get at the helm of the pro-war movement.

For a while, the gap between the pro-war opportunists in government and the traditional anti-Kyiv warmongers had almost closed, which created the perception of broad sociopolitical support for the war. In the face of failures, however, the two groups are again divided: the establishment tries to justify every decision of the Kremlin, while the pro-war activists complain, criticize, and even question the ability of the Russian armed forces to succeed.

Will deterrence have a role in the cyberspace ‘forever war’?Will deterrence have a role in the cyberspace ‘forever war’?

David Ignatius

At a time of growing concern about possible nuclear threats from Russia, some prominent defense strategists are arguing for a new theory of deterrence. They argue that military conflict is now so pervasive in cyberspace that the United States should seek to shift away from deterrence in this domain — and more aggressively exploit the opportunities it presents.

Beware, reader, in exploring this topic: Deterrence strategy is one of the wooliest and most abstract areas of defense analysis. In the early Cold War decades, it was the province of professors such as Herman Kahn at the Rand Corp., and Thomas Schelling and Henry Kissinger at Harvard — sometimes collectively known as the “wizards of Armageddon.” They “thought about the unthinkable” when it came to nuclear war, partly to dissuade the Soviet Union from ever launching an attack.

Times have changed, argues the new book “Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace.” Its three authors have all worked closely on cyber strategy for the Pentagon: Michael P. Fischerkeller as a cyber expert with the Institute for Defense Analyses; Emily O. Goldman as a strategist at U.S. Cyber Command; and Richard J. Harknett as a cyber expert at the University of Cincinnati and the first scholar-in-residence at Cyber Command.

US Weighs Escalation Risk As Ukraine Asks for Longer-range Missiles

PATRICK TUCKER

TALLINN, Estonia–While top U.S. administration and military officials praise Ukraine’s use of Western missiles, officials are showing no sign of fulfilling Kyiv’s requests for longer-range precision fires. The reason has to do with the Biden administration’s approach to escalation and even Russian threats.

Ukraine has captured the “strategic initiative” in its effort to retake key terrain and turn the tide of war, Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters traveling with him to Europe and the Middle East on Friday. Last week in Germany, Milley highlighted how well Ukraine was using U.S.-supplied HIMARS launchers and almost half a million rounds of 155mm ammunition, as well as Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, or GMLRS, rockets.

But Ukraine has been asking for the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, since February, a senior Ukranian military official confirmed to Defense One. The missile, which can hit targets more than 185 miles away, would enable Ukraine to strike key supply lines inside Russia or on the annexed Crimean peninsula.

US stance on Taiwan hardening amid China’s threats

MEREDITH OYEN

President Joe Biden has – not for the first time – suggested that the US would intervene “militarily” should China attempt an invasion of Taiwan._

In an interview with CBS’s “60 Minutes” on September 18, 2022, Biden vowed to protect the island in the face of any attack. Pressed if that meant the US getting “involved militarily,” the president replied: “Yes.”

The comments appear to deviate from the official US line on Taiwan, in place for decades. But White House officials said the remarks did not represent any change in Taiwan policy.

Meredith Oyen, an expert on US-China relations at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, helps explain the background to Biden’s comments and untangles what should be read into his remarks – and what shouldn’t.

Uncrewed aircraft are changing aviator identity, and the Navy must manage the transition to minimize resistance.

Ensign Sarah Clark

Picture a battlefield where a drone swarm swirls around enemy ground forces, deploying weapons and countermeasures as needed. Behind that swarm is another providing cover fire and backup. Patrolling thousands of feet above is a single uncrewed reconnaissance aircraft, collecting video footage of the action below. That footage is sent back to a command-and-control center for analysis. Simultaneously, the footage (including coordinates and targeting information) is sent to two crewed strike-fighters loitering nearby with an uncrewed refueling aircraft. Once assigned to targets, the strike-fighters proceed to the battlefield and destroy the enemy. Above, the reconnaissance aircraft still circles, constantly recording and relaying data.

What is missing from this scene? Pilots. No longer science fiction, this scene illustrates the U.S. military’s trajectory toward relying on uncrewed assets to conduct warfare. As in current publicly released naval planning documents, this description focuses on equipment capabilities instead of the humans involved.1 By removing humans from the battlefield—specifically, pilots from cockpits—naval aviation is ignoring the growing pilot identity crisis. The shift from crewed aircraft to a hybrid environment presents an opportunity for naval aviation to learn from past technological transitions and leverage the full potential of both technology and humans.

Russia and India: A New Chapter

RAJAN MENON, EUGENE RUMER

INTRODUCTION

The encounter between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the September 2022 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, captured the change that is occurring in the partnership between Russia and India. Speaking about the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, Modi, in what amounted to a public admonition, told Putin that he had spoken to him “many times before” about the need to rely on diplomacy and take the path toward peace to wind up a war that had caused food and fuel prices to soar.1 Xi Jinping, who also attended the SCO gathering, did not endorse Putin’s war, but neither did he overtly criticize it; Modi did. India, while it has long depended on Russia and still regards it as an important country, increasingly seeks to set the terms of their engagement.

Russia and India have enjoyed a long history of friendly, mutually beneficial relations. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union as a superpower had the upper hand in the relationship with India, which was part of the community of “developing” nations, albeit also one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Russia’s subsequent diminished international status shifted the balance in the relationship toward India, which had emerged as a major power transformed by the economic reforms initiated in the early 1990s and as well as a growing global presence. In the continuing friendly and extensive ties between Moscow and New Delhi, no observer would describe the latter as the junior partner.

Europe turns on China

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, author of Axios China

Once skeptical of America's increasingly hostile stance toward China, the EU and its member states are adopting a cascade of new measures that bring their policies closer in line with those of the United States.

Why it matters: Beijing's push for Europe to adopt "strategic autonomy" from the United States — in the hope the EU would maintain warmer ties with China — now looks like a moot point.

What's happening: Last week, the European Commission unveiled a proposed ban on products made with forced labor, after intense pressure from lawmakers and human rights activists concerned about forced labor in Xinjiang.European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also criticized Chinese funding of European research institutions and announced a new "Defense of Democracy" package intended to scrutinize foreign funding of European academic institutions in order to "bring covert foreign influence and shady funding to light."

The U.S. implemented an import ban on all products made in Xinjiang earlier this year, and the Trump administration placed greater scrutiny on foreign funding in U.S. universities.

Indian government accused of ceding land in Himalayas to China

Aakash Hassan

Indian people living near the country’s disputed Himalayan border with China have accused their government of giving away swathes of land after both sides agreed to withdraw troops from some contested areas and create buffer zones.

Earlier this month, Indian and Chinese troops, who have been locked in a tense border dispute since June 2020, began to draw back from the contested area of Gogra-Hot Springs after an agreement was reached to disengage.

The Indian government said the agreement restored the territory on both sides of the contested border, known as the line of actual control, to the “pre-standoff period”. In the newly created buffer zones, neither side will be allowed to patrol their troops.

Pentagon opens sweeping review of clandestine psychological operations

Ellen Nakashima

The Pentagon has ordered a sweeping audit of how it conducts clandestine information warfare after major social media companies identified and took offline fake accounts suspected of being run by the U.S. military in violation of the platforms’ rules.

Colin Kahl, the undersecretary of defense for policy, last week instructed the military commands that engage in psychological operations online to provide a full accounting of their activities by next month after the White House and some federal agencies expressed mounting concerns over the Defense Department’s attempted manipulation of audiences overseas, according to several defense and administration officials familiar with the matter.

The takedowns in recent years by Twitter and Facebook of more than 150 bogus personas and media sites created in the United States was disclosed last month by internet researchers Graphika and the Stanford Internet Observatory. While the researchers did not attribute the sham accounts to the U.S. military, two officials familiar with the matter said that U.S. Central Command is among those whose activities are facing scrutiny. Like others interviewed for this report, they spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive military operations.

Editor’s Introduction—Special Issue on the 20th Party Congress: The Xi Era Enters its Second Decade

John S. Van Oudenaren

On August 31, state media announced a determination reached at a Politburo meeting the previous day that the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), henceforth the 20th Party Congress, will commence in Beijing on October 16 (People’s Daily, August 31). During the week-long conclave, delegates will select the next Central Committee, the CCP’s de jure highest official body, which includes slightly over 200 full members and around 170 alternate members (Xinhua, October 24, 2017). The Central Committee will then determine the members of the Party’s de facto top leadership bodies: the (most likely) seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and the 25-member Politburo.

On September 9, the Politburo held another meeting, which included reviewing proposed amendments to the Party Constitution (not to be confused with the People’s Republic of China [PRC] state constitution, which was amended at the 2018 National People’s Congress to eliminate presidential term limits). According to the meeting readout, the amendments will update the constitution to fully “reflect the latest achievements in the modernization of Marxism in China and the new governance of the country proposed by the Central Committee” since the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 (People’s Daily, September 10). At the sixth Plenum in November 2021, the Central Committee passed a historical resolution lionizing Xi Jinping’s achievements in governance and ideology, which stated that “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” embodies “the best of the Chinese culture and ethos in our times and represents a new breakthrough in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context” (China Brief, November 12, 2021). In this context, the Politburo’s determination to revise the constitution indicates that the forthcoming amendments will further entrench the centrality of Xi Jinping Thought in contemporary CCP ideology. This and other signs, such as the recent full-throated revival of the personality cult surrounding Xi in state media and mass culture, as well as the comparatively early scheduling of the Party Congress during the traditional October-November time window, support the hypothesis that Xi is in a commanding political position, despite the panoply of international and domestic challenges facing the PRC (China Brief, September 9).

New CNAS Report: "Rewire: Semiconductors and U.S. Industrial Policy"

Chris Miller

Washington, September 19, 2022—Today, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a new report, "Rewire: Semiconductors and U.S. Industrial Policy," from author Chris Miller, associate professor at the Fletcher School and Jeane Kirkpatrick visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

The report explores current trends in the chip industry, and the history of industrial policy in the United States and abroad, to develop recommendations for policymakers about how to strategically implement industrial policy in the semiconductor sector.

The author argues that the U.S. government should focus policy toward the semiconductor industry around four main objectives:promoting technological advances;

guaranteeing resilience and integrity of supply;

retaining control of choke point technologies; and

working with allies to retain U.S. technological advantage versus China.

Ukrainian Success Will Not Be Catastrophic

Kori Schake

“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature,” Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his landmark treatise On War. “This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” The leaders of Ukraine and Russia have set simple, and wholly incompatible, goals in their current war: Volodymyr Zelensky has made clear that Ukraine is fighting for its freedom, and Vladimir Putin has made clear that Russia is fighting to destroy Ukrainian independence.

Right now, the Ukrainians seem most likely to get what they want. And the United States shouldn’t fear the consequences of their victory.

Zelensky has been indefatigable in communicating his aims, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the government has worked to connect the war to its human toll on Ukrainians. He grieves at the Bucha massacre, frets about the collapse of the Ukrainian economy, celebrates Ukrainian civil society, and somberly honors the military.

Japan, US Discuss Longer Range Missiles to Counter China

Thisanka Siripala

Japan’s Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu met his U.S. counterpart Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon on September 14, where both sides said Japan and the United States are planning to integrate defense strategies in response to worsening regional tensions over Taiwan.

From Washington, D.C., Hamada stated that Japan is considering “counterattack capabilities” to strengthen its defense capabilities as a part of a revised National Security Strategy. The Japanese defense minister is advocating for a drastic overhaul of Japan’s defense posture in the wake of five Chinese missiles landing in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) last month during Chinese military exercises around Taiwan.

During the 90-minute meeting, Austin expressed “strong” support for Japan’s plans. He stated that “China’s coercive behavior in the Taiwan Strait and the waters surrounding Japan is provocative, undermines stability and is unprecedented.”

Ukrainian strikes into Russia’s border towns compound Putin’s troubles

Mary Ilyushina

After a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the northeast of the country, the messy war that Russian President Vladimir Putin started is now being fought directly on his doorstep, with artillery strikes hitting military targets in Russia and Russian officials in cities and towns along the border ordering hasty evacuations.

On Saturday, a new round of strikes hit the Belgorod region in Western Russia, killing at least one person and wounding two.

On Friday, Ukraine reportedly struck the base of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division near Valuyki, just nine miles north of the Russia—Ukraine border. Russian officials did not acknowledge that a military target was hit but said one civilian died, and the local electrical grid experienced a temporary disruption.

Russia blamed the attacks on Ukraine, but Kyiv did not claim responsibility for striking targets in Russian territory.

Command by Lawrence Freedman review – inside the war room

John Simpson

There was a brief time, lasting from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, when even quite sensible people wondered whether major wars might become a thing of the past. This proved to be ludicrously wrong, of course. Since the late 1990s our age has been largely defined by war, beginning with Chechnya and the former Yugoslavia and intensifying with 9/11 and the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Now, after Vladimir Putin’s wholly unprovoked attack on Ukraine, we’re experiencing the scary feeling that nuclear war might be a real possibility, once again. And the Ukraine war is forcing us to ask the old, old question: whose finger is really on the trigger? Are the politicians or the generals in charge? The dictators or the duly elected representatives? The presidents and prime ministers or the people in uniform?

Prof Sir Lawrence Freedman is the dominant academic authority in Britain and the English-speaking world on the way modern wars have been fought. Rational, liberal-minded, clear-sighted, he has drawn on a lifetime of experience for his new book. It was, he accepts, a lockdown exercise. A purist might say some of the material could have been differently organised, with a clearer separation of the material by region, for example. But it is the quality of the narrative and the sheer intelligence of the judgment that count, given the subject’s vast sweep. Command takes in not simply the major wars – Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf and Afghanistan – but also France’s colonial wars in Indo-China and Algeria, the near-war created by the Cuban missile crisis, Pakistan’s hapless attempt to keep hold of Bangladesh, Israel’s disastrous invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Falklands, and Laurent Kabila’s vicious campaign in the Congo: an often shameful yet always illuminating parade of hardware, human inadequacy and death.

6 things to know as Xi Jinping moves to be China’s dictator for life

PHELIM KINE

In a few weeks, the Chinese Communist Party’s most senior officials will convene in the Great Hall of the People in central Beijing to put Xi Jinping on track to become leader for life — with power rivaling that of Mao Zedong.

Xi will likely emerge from the conclave with a third term, ensuring at least five more years in control.

But while Xi holds an unrivaled grip on the levers of state authority, the country he rules is paradoxically a lot more powerful — and more internally riven — than it was when he took office a decade ago.

Here are six things to know about Xi’s power grab at the mid-October 20th Party Congress — and the country’s complicated trajectory.

Beijing’s Communist black box

Party Congresses occur every five years and are exemplars of the CCP’s obsessive secrecy. The Chinese public’s awareness of the event is basically limited to its location and whatever hints the CCP opts to dole out via state media in the run-up to the event.

This year that includes the disclosure that the Party Congress will likely approve an unspecified amendment to the constitution. Note: it’s a constitution that Xi has already rewritten to allow for his unprecedented third term.

Beyond that, the specific agenda is a mystery. The proceedings aren’t open to the public and the results — including the approval of a work report that outlines the Party’s top priority policies for the next five years — often trickle out only weeks after the event.

For Russia’s Putin, military and diplomatic pressures mount

JON GAMBRELL

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin mounted on the battlefield and in the halls of global power as Ukrainian troops pushed their counteroffensive Saturday to advance farther into Ukraine’s partly recaptured northeast.

Western officials and analysts said Russian forces were apparently setting up a new defensive line in Ukraine’s northeast after the counteroffensive punched through the previous one, allowing Kyiv’s soldiers to recapture large swaths of land in the northeastern Kharkiv region that borders Russia.

Putin, at a high-level summit in Uzbekistan this week, vowed to press his attack on Ukraine despite the recent military setbacks but also faced concerns by India and China over the drawn-out conflict.

“I know that today’s era is not of war,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told the Russian leader in televised comments as they met Friday in Uzbekistan. “We discussed this with you on the phone several times, that democracy and dialogue touch the entire world.”

Ukraine Wants the U.S. to Send More Powerful Weapons. Biden Is Not So Sure.

David E. Sanger, Anton Troianovski, Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt

WASHINGTON — Flush with success in northeast Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky is pressing President Biden for a new and more powerful weapon: a missile system with a range of 190 miles, which could reach far into Russian territory.

Mr. Zelensky insists to U.S. officials that he has no intention of striking Russian cities or aiming at civilian targets, even though President Vladimir V. Putin’s forces have hit apartment blocks, theaters and hospitals in Ukraine throughout the war. The weapon, Mr. Zelensky says, is critical to launching a wider counteroffensive, perhaps early next year.

Mr. Biden is resisting, in part because he is convinced that over the past seven months, he has successfully signaled to Mr. Putin that he does not want a broader war with the Russians — he just wants them to get out of Ukraine.

For Vladimir Putin, This Is the Beginning of the End

WILLIAM M. ARKIN

The collapse of Vladimir Putin's Ukraine campaign has been so dramatic, U.S. intelligence officials who are normally gun-shy about making predictions are ready to look ahead. Three American government officials tell Newsweek that the Russian leader is in serious trouble at home as a result of Kyiv's successful counteroffensive. Angered by the rising cost of the war, by soldiers' deaths and the economic pain of sanctions, Russian politicians and social media influencers are speaking out openly in opposition. "Even pro-Kremlin voices—even state media—are questioning the war for the first time," says one high-ranking intelligence official. "[They're] pushing Putin into a corner."

Ukraine's victories are the beginning of the end for President Putin.

"The past week should convince even skeptics that Russia is done," says a second source, a senior State Department official who works on Russia issues. "Moscow might claim that it is just adjusting to focus more on Donbas, but even that campaign is finished." Back home, "in both men and materiel, the well has also gone dry."

A senior military official at the Pentagon agrees. Briefing reporters earlier this week, he said "we assess that Russian forces have largely ceded their gains to the Ukrainians and have withdrawn" from Kharkiv. But the official cautioned that Russia continues its offensive in Donetsk and western Kherson, including heavy use of artillery and airstrikes.

Is the Army Ready to Fight Behind Enemy Lines in Europe?

Kris Osborn

Thousands of U.S. and NATO soldiers are training for offensive airborne attack and seizure operations to ensure they are prepared in the event that they need to defend Eastern Europe. According to the Pentagon, around 4,400 participants from Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom are participating in the Saber Junction 22 exercise, which is being held in Germany and will run until September 20. The U.S. Army explains that the exercise aims to assess “the readiness of European-based units, like the 173rd Airborne Brigade ‘Sky Soldiers,’ to execute unified land operations in a joint, combined environment with participating Allied and partner nations.” The Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade practiced key aspects of air-land attack preparations, including by air-dropping an M119A3 howitzer and a tactical vehicle from a C-130 cargo plane.

It is not surprising that allies located near Russia are preparing for forward-positioned offensive operations, which would be key to any possible engagement with the Russian military. For instance, in a conflict between NATO and Russia, such maneuvers could even be necessary to take control of areas near or within Russia. Being able to use cargo planes to drop supplies, weapons, and assault forces behind enemy lines would be critical in any sustained offensive operation. In particular, a force capable of airdropping artillery platforms and tactical vehicles behind enemy lines or over uneven terrain can maneuver in ways that pose serious challenges to hostile forces.

Ukraine depends on morale and Russia on mercenaries. It could decide the war

Dan Sabbagh

The Ukrainian video begins with the Dunkirk beach scene from the film Atonement, the soldiers’ stirring rendition of Dear Lord and Father of Mankind. Until it transitions to several hundred Ukrainian troops, singing the country’s national anthem in the open air, ahead of last week’s successful Kharkiv offensive.

Life may be trying to imitate art, but in this case there is no clearer demonstration of Ukrainian national morale as the war heads towards the end of its seventh month. The unprovoked attack by their larger neighbour has unleashed a patriotic mobilisation that is having a transformational effect on the battlefield.

There is a stark contrast with the Russian defenders. Faced with a lightning Ukrainian attack that cut off the strategic city of Izium a week ago, some departed in haste, abandoning tanks and other munitions and engaging in looting generators, telephones, and computers they nominally withdrew from the frontline.

New Software Platform Advances Understanding Of Surface Finish Of Manufactured Components

Scientists from the University of Freiburg, Germany, and the University of Pittsburgh have developed a software platform that facilitates and standardizes the analysis of surfaces. The contact.engineering platform enables users to create a digital twin of a surface and thus to help predict, for example, how quickly it wears out, how well it conducts heat, or how well it adheres to other materials. The team included Michael Röttger from the Department of Microsystems Engineering, Lars Pastewka and Antoine Sanner from the Department of Microsystems Engineering and the University of Freiburg’s Cluster of Excellence livMatS, and Tevis Jacobs from the Department of Mechanical Engineering and Materials Science at the University of Pittsburgh’s Swanson School of Engineering. They presented the software platform in the journal Surface Topography: Metrology and Properties.

Topography influences material properties

All engineered materials have surface roughness, even if they appear smooth when seen with the naked eye. Viewed under a microscope, they resemble the surfaces of a mountain landscape. “It is of particular interest, in both industrial applications and scientific research, to have precise knowledge of a surface’s topography, as this influences properties like the adhesion, friction, wettability, and durability of the material,” says Pastewka.

Future Of Economy Past The Triple C Challenge: Climate, COVID and (War) Calamity

Petre Roman

The New Global Economy cannot be about molding society as if we can see far into the future. Why? Because the global economy is a complex, more often than not disordered system, because it is a dynamic system, which is a non-linear unpredictable one. The transformation we seek is towards a better, timelier and more rational decision making. Real-time revolution is also, or should be, about alternative and augmentative communication.

Complex behavior is all around us. The economy has many components, each with its own set of rules and all of them interacting in complicating ways. The behavior of the system is strongly sensitive to the initial conditions which are not, as a rule, under our control. It doesn’t mean that we are compelled to navigate without a compass. We can select the elements which drive the evolution of the system towards a more predictable behavior as well as knowing better the already present elements of it. While climate change is predominant in the global approach of the economy, we can’t say that it all comes down to this challenge and how to mitigate its consequences.

Transnational Organized Crime: A Threat To Global Public Goods – Analysis

Dr. Marina Caparini

In September 2021 United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the world stands at an ‘inflection point’, facing a stark choice between ‘breakdown’ and ‘breakthrough’. Societies and the planet are at risk from the compounding effects of climate change, increasing armed conflict, pandemics, and rising hunger, poverty, injustice and exclusion.

Our Common Agenda is the secretary-general’s response—a major initiative to reinvigorate multilateralism to benefit all people by advancing the global public goods of peace, a healthy environment, healthy populations and economic stability.

Guterres appointed a High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, co-chaired by former Swedish prime minister and new SIPRI Governing Board Chair Stefan Löfven and former Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, to develop an independent report on how to strengthen governance arrangements that can deliver on the core global public goods.

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