Russia Planned a Major Military Overhaul. Ukraine Shows the Result.

Neil MacFarquhar

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Army vehicles were so decrepit that repair crews were stationed roughly every 15 miles. Some officers were so out of shape that the military budgeted $1.5 million to re-size standard uniforms.

That was the Russian military more than a decade ago when the country invaded Georgia, according to the defense minister at the time. The shortcomings, big and small, were glaring enough that the Kremlin announced a complete overhaul of the military to build a leaner, more flexible, professional force.

Russia Keeps Losing Tanks in Ukraine: Here’s Why

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Russia reportedly has lost more than 650 tanks and about 3,000 other armored vehicles and heavy equipment so far in its invasion of Ukraine. Experts put the losses down to the advanced anti-tank weapons given to Ukraine by Western countries, poor strategy, low morale, and important design flaws.

While it is impossible to obtain comprehensive reports on military equipment that has been destroyed, abandoned, or seized in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, evidence circulating on social media and messaging services can provide some insights into the situation on the ground.

As Challenges Mount, Can Europe Correct Its Course?

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The liberal European order that emerged after World War II and spread after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been under attack from both within and without in recent years. The European Union—the ultimate expression of the European project—had long been a convenient punching bag for opportunistic politicians in many of its member countries, as anti-EU sentiment was integrated into the broader populist platform of protectionism and opposition to immigration. But the European debt crisis in the early 2010s, followed by the refugee crisis in 2015, fueled the rise of far-right and populist parties across Europe, and for a time raised questions about the union’s long-term survival. The shocking outcome of the U.K.’s Brexit referendum in 2016 added to those concerns.

Although the populist wave that once seemed like an existential threat to the union has since subsided, vestiges of it remain. Illiberal governments hold power in Hungary and Poland, and a far-right candidate once again reached the second round of France’s presidential election this year.

Preparing for a Cyberattack Starts at the Local Level

Clara Decerbo, Grace Hindmarch, Aaron Clark-Ginsberg

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The ongoing Russian war in Ukraine has highlighted the need for federal, state, and local level emergency managers to prepare to respond to a “cyber–Pearl Harbor”—a cyberattack with widespread impacts that significantly disrupt critical infrastructure. Although the war today is mostly being fought on the ground, Russia has been waging cyberwar against Ukraine for years—including an attack in 2016 that shut down much of its power grid, and attacks in 2017 that disrupted its hospital systems and banks. Such acts of aggression have given rise to growing concerns that Russia could successfully launch similar attacks across the United States and other Western nations. In the past, Russian state-sponsored actors have targeted government agencies, election organizations, and critical health care, pharmaceutical, defense, energy, nuclear, water, aviation, and manufacturing infrastructure in the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, and other countries. In fact, at the end of last month, President Biden issued a warning that the Russian Government is exploring options for cyberattacks on the United States.

Many Hands in the Cookie Jar

Quentin E. Hodgson, Yuliya Shokh, Jonathan Balk

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Cyber-enabled espionage against the United States has been a challenge for more than 20 years and is likely to remain so in the future. In the aftermath of the 2020 SolarWinds cyber incident that affected U.S. government networks, policymakers, lawmakers, and the public asked: "Why does this keep happening, and what can the United States do to prevent it from reoccurring?" It is these questions that motivate this effort. Specifically, this report summarizes three cases of Russian cyber-enabled espionage and two cases of Chinese cyber-enabled espionage dating back to the compromise of multiple government agencies in the late 1990s up to the 2015 compromise of the Office of Personnel Management. The purpose of this inquiry is to address whether U.S. responses have changed over time, whether they led to changes in adversary behavior, and what the United States can learn from these cases to inform future policymaking. The authors show that policymakers typically consider a narrow set of response options, and they often conclude that not much can be done beyond trying to improve network defenses, because the United States "does it too." The authors suggest that the U.S. government could broaden its policy response options by increasing focus on diplomatic engagement, including working with partners and allies to call out malicious cyber behavior; expanding the use of active defense measures to root out adversaries; and employing more-sophisticated counterintelligence techniques, such as deception, to decrease the benefits that adversaries derive from cyber espionage.

Key Findings

Available response options are not limited to the cyber domain, and no one should expect them to beThe response options that U.S. policymakers consider for cyber espionage cases do not appear to have changed much over the past two decades — and, in some respects, they may be even more constrained today.

The benefits of cyber-enabled espionage continue to outweigh any perceived repercussions for such countries as Russia and ChinaThe historical record suggests that the United States has felt constrained in its ability to respond vigorously against Russia or China because of the notion that cyber espionage is a standard and accepted practice by nations.

The record also suggests that the United States would not want to take steps to constrain its own ability to engage in similar intelligence activities in cyberspace.

U.S. policymakers have assessed that breaches of confidentiality, although damaging in the long term, did not rise to the same level of acute damage to national security that another, more destructive form of cyber operation might entail.

The United States has proved especially vulnerable to cyber incidents, and a lack of response appears to have emboldened the Russians and Chinese to continue and expand their cyber espionage activities over the years.

Improving the U.S. ability to deter by denial — by strengthening the cybersecurity of the U.S. government — remains an elusive but vital priority.

Recommendations

The United States should pursue expanded diplomatic efforts, including with its partners and allies, to call out indiscriminate cyber espionage and establish guardrails for acceptable cyber espionage.

The United States should also expand its use of active defense measures on U.S. government networks to hunt for adversary activity and offer similar support to partners and allies.

The United States should make better use of counterintelligence, particularly deception operations, to reduce the benefits that countries might derive from cyber espionage.

The role of diplomacy should not be diminished, and more-recent multilateral efforts to call out malicious cyber behavior have the potential to lay a foundation for shaping international norms.

Geostrategic Consequences of Russia's War Against Ukraine

William Courtney and Peter A. Wilson

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After two months of fighting in Ukraine, some longer-term geostrategic consequences are coming into focus. Russia may emerge as a massive loser. Aggression in Europe may be even riskier and costlier than once thought.

Aggression in Ukraine Has Dimmed Russia's Future

Despite an ebbing “correlation of forces,” an economically stagnant Russia has launched a costly war in Ukraine not unlike Stalin's decision to launch the Korean War in 1950. A faltering USSR likewise erred in 1979 by invading Afghanistan. In the future Russia could be more wary of the potential costs of overt military aggression.

China's latest economic data shows lockdown's toll

Matt Phillips

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China's lockdowns continue to punish the world's second-largest economy, with a fresh round of data suggesting a worsening outlook for growth.

Why it matters: China is the single largest contributor to world growth, so its slowdown will ripple out in the form of lower economic activity and corporate profits worldwide.

Driving the news: New data out Monday showed retail sales activity collapsed in April, with unemployment rising and exports and industrial production slowing sharply.Retail sales fell 11.1% in April, compared to the prior year, with considerable declines in major categories like restaurant spending and auto sales (a total of zero vehicles were sold in Shanghai).

The U.S. is expanding its goals in Ukraine. That’s dangerous.

Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge

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Ukraine has surprised the world with its ability to hold back Russian aggression. Yet its success in doing so appears to be prompting Western leaders to expand their goals for the war in ways that may carry extraordinary, underappreciated risk. The earlier hope was that a robust Ukrainian defense would ensure the country’s right to exist as a sovereign and independent state while minimizing the loss of territory in the south and east. But now, many political and military leaders are laying out much loftier goals, backed by an unprecedented infusion of military aid.

“Ukraine’s victory is a strategic imperative for all of us,” British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss recently proclaimed. “… We are doubling down. We will keep going further and faster to push Russia out of the whole of Ukraine.” Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.), who traveled with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) to Kyiv, made a similar point: “The United States is not interested in stalemates. We are not interested in going back to the status quo. The United States is in this to win it.”

Ukraine Fatigue Is on the Rise

MARK DAVIS 

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You can feel it in the reduced appetite for hourly updates on troop movements. You can see it in emerging doubts about the heavy sums of American money cobbled together on the fly, with little scrutiny. And you can sense it in a growing mood that we are in for a long struggle of uncertain result.

These are the early stages of Ukraine fatigue, and it has ramifications for America, Europe and the world. Our once-rapt attention to Russia's invasion now feels more like a passing daily interest, as news reports continue to offer images of the latest Putin atrocity or the most recent act of spirited Ukrainian resistance.

It's not that we have lost our overall wish for Putin to be thwarted in his designs to absorb Ukraine back into Mother Russia; but as the weeks pass, as inspiring as the Ukrainian resistance has been, more Americans are starting to wonder about the cost and duration of our involvement.

Road to Damascus The Russian Air Campaign in Syria

Michael Simpson, Adam R. Grissom, Christopher A. Mouton

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The introduction of Russian airpower in Syria has been widely cited as a turning point in the Syrian civil war. To assess the strengths, weaknesses, and adaptations of Russian airpower in Syria, the authors developed a database that integrates operational histories, Russian airstrikes, and disposition of Russian aircraft from September 2015 to March 2018. In this report, the authors use these resources to analyze the relative effectiveness of Russian airpower against the Syrian opposition and ISIS. The authors also compare the application of airpower in Syria by Russia and the U.S. Coalition.

The authors find that Russia's employment of airpower was significantly more effective in engagements against the opposition than in conflicts against ISIS. They conclude that although Russia made key adaptations in Syria in joint operational planning, concepts of employment, forward basing, and advanced capabilities, it is unclear how effectively Russia might be able to export its expeditionary capability to other theaters. This research was completed in September 2019, before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has not been subsequently revised.

We don’t write the rules anymore, and when we try, we make things worse

Gordon Adams

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Ukraine has been very much on my mind. I have written little on it because I want to avoid being swept up in the emotionality of war and suffering and the fool’s gold of chest thumping patriotism.

In my view, we need to start preparing for the war to end and what should happen next. The direction policy is going now risks creating an end-game that will only increase insecurity in Europe.

Let me put that in context. I have been arguing for at least three decades that U.S. primacy in the world is fading. The signs of this relative decline have been clear for all that time: in China’s rise, in the emergence of international institutions the U.S. does not “control” — like the Shanghai Regional Cooperation Organization and even the G-20 — in the inability of the U.S. to impose its will in Iraq and Afghanistan.

SEVEN (INITIAL) DRONE WARFARE LESSONS FROM UKRAINE

Zachary Kallenborn

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The ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia has seen significant drone use on both sides. Ukraine has made extensive use of drones, from the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2 to hobbyist drones supporting civil resistance. Although evidence of Russian drone use early in the conflict was limited, Russia appears to have stepped up its efforts, employing systems like the Orlan-10 and the KUB-BLA loitering munition. Drones have been used in a wide variety of roles from carrying out strikes to guiding artillery and recording video that feeds directly into information operations.

The conflict offers at least seven initial lessons that should influence the thinking of US planners, policymakers, and military leaders about the future of the United States’ own drone capabilities. While the conflict is ongoing and some of these lessons may change, the basic points are general enough that even radical changes are likely to add nuance to these points, rather than rendering any of them less meaningful.

USMC Force Design 2030: Threat Or Opportunity?

Robert Work

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It is important to understand which aspects of war are likely to change and which are not. We must stay abreast of the process of change for the belligerent who first exploits a development in the art and science of war gains a significant advantage. If we are ignorant of the changing face of war. We will find ourselves unequal to its challenges.[i]

These words are drawn from Warfighting, the capstone doctrinal document of the U.S. Marine Corps. They help explain an important cultural attribute of the Corps’s ethos, that of anticipatory adaptation to the changing character of war. And they also help explain what animates the actions of General David Berger, the current Commandant (senior military officer) of the Marine Corps. He is convinced the organization, training, equipment and posture of the service–its overall force design–is not keeping up with the evolving character of war and needs to be changed as a matter of some urgency.

Time to Start Asking the Tough Questions on Defense

Miguel Alejandro Laborde

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Fortunately for America, it now seems like we are fully emerging from the pandemic and things are finally starting to look normal again. Even in Washington D.C. – which was one of the holdout regions to remain under some degree of pandemic-related restriction – things are thankfully starting to hum again. This is both good and timely, because the country is facing serious concerns both at home and abroad, and policymakers in both Congress and the Administration are playing catch-up on several fronts.

One of the key areas of U.S. national policy that has suffered in this regard is the strength and health of our military. And for numerous pressing reasons, it is time for Congress to get back to business and start asking the tough questions on the state of our nation’s defense. Let’s face it, over the past two years, a lot of really important matters have been ignored, set aside, or pushed to the back-burner due to the pandemic. This has resulted in a notable lack of oversight, in-depth understanding, and detailed review of several defense programs and challenges facing the joint force. No service is immune to concern or attention – and the topics are many.

Preparing Taiwan for a War With China

Yao-Yuan Yeh, Charles K. S. Wu, Fang-Yu Chen & Austin Horng-En Wang

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As the Ukraine-Russia war passes the two months mark, the tide on the battlefield has fundamentally changed. Rather than staying on the defensive, Ukrainian forces have shifted their strategy, with NATO’s assistance, to expel Russia from its current occupation. While the final outcome of this war seems elusive, most observers believe that the successes of Ukrainian forces lie partially in employing an asymmetrical strategy. The employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as Stinger missiles, Bayraktar TB2, switchblades, NLAWs, and new technology such as SpaceX’s Starlink has disproportionately damaged Russian forces, paving the foundation of Ukraine’s current military posture against Russian invasion.

The Clock’s Ticking on Pakistan’s Economic Bailout

Niha Dagia

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There is a meme on the internet showing three children playing a videogame but only two have their controller cords plugged into the console. The third child, who appears to be the youngest, is being deceived into believing he has stakes in the game.

Pakistan’s social media perceives the youngest child to be the country’s incumbent Finance Minister Miftah Ismail.

Despite repeatedly asserting that fuel subsidies are unfeasible, Ismail announced on Sunday that due to changing circumstances and international oil prices, the Shehbaz Sharif government “may have to revisit…soon” its decision to not increase the price of petrol.

Strengthening the France-India Partnership

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in France recently as part of a three-nation visit to Europe that also included Denmark and Germany. Modi tweeted to say that even though his visit to Paris was short, it was “fruitful.” He also characterized France as “one of India’s strongest partners,” cooperating across a number of strategic sectors including nuclear, space, and defense. French President Emmanuel Macron and Modi discussed a range of bilateral and global issues.

The joint statement issued during Modi’s visit captured the essence of the France-India partnership, one that is rooted on mutual trust, commitment to international law, vision for a “multipolar world shaped reformed and effective multilateralism.” Both leaders also reiterated their commitment to the core principles of the liberal international order including democracy, fundamental freedoms, rule of law and human rights.

Time’s Up: Cryptocurrency Has Become a National Security Issue

Benjamin R. Young

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Last month, the FBI announced that North Korean hackers had stolen more than $600 million in cryptocurrency from an online gaming company, Axie Infinity, in March 2022. The North Korean hacker unit, the Lazarus Group, has recently focused its cyberattacks on blockchain technologies, stealing an estimated $1.75 billion worth of cryptocurrency in recent years. North Korea’s cyber operations have been well documented in recent years, and the Lazarus Group itself has been heavily sanctioned by the U.S Treasury Department. However, questions remain about how Pyongyang’s cyber agents transfer stolen cryptocurrency into fiat currency for the Kim family regime. There are also allegations that Pyongyang uses stolen digital currency to bolster its nuclear arsenal. If these allegations are true, international sanctions have done little to stem the cryptocurrency-funded advancement of North Korea’s nuclear program. Instead, a tailored securities regulation plan to stem North Korea’s money laundering scheme should be implemented by the United States and its allies.

Museveni’s Apparent Succession Plan Is Raising Alarm in Uganda

Michael Mutyaba

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Last month, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, celebrated his 48th birthday with a series of public parties. The events were widely viewed as the thinly veiled launch of a political project that would see Muhoozi succeed his father. The move follows years of similar, albeit more subtle, maneuvers—particularly Muhoozi’s rapid rise through the ranks of the country’s military; the apparent purge of potential contenders within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party; increased public appearances; and, more recently, his flurry of meetings with various diplomats and heads of state.

It is not yet clear what is prompting the apparent acceleration of the “Muhoozi Project,” as the succession plan is commonly referred to in Uganda. Throughout the four decades of his rule, Museveni has always been extremely possessive of power. However, his age—officially, he is 77 years old, although some pundits put him at 85—combined with the country’s demographics and the NRM’s current internal dynamics offer some possible clues as to why the plan is gaining steam.

Across Drones, AI, and Space, Commercial Tech Is Flexing Military Muscle in Ukraine

Gregory C. Allen

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The early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine generated significant admiration for the quality and performance of the United States’ military technology and the defense industry that makes it. Ukraine’s success in using U.S.-built Javelin anti-tank munitions is so ubiquitous in news coverage and social media memes that “Javelin” is approaching household name status. Meanwhile, the poor reliability and accuracy of Russian weapons provides new evidence that Russia’s military industrial base is so plagued by corruption that investments more often build bureaucrats a new luxury home rather than functional facilities or weapons.

It would be a mistake, however, for the U.S. national security community to view the Ukrainian conflict as evidence that all is well with the United States’ defense industry. While access to highly capable U.S. military technology has played an enormous role in Ukraine’s success, so has Ukraine’s ingenuity at rapidly turning commercial technology into military capability. Across drones, artificial intelligence (AI), and space, commercial technology is flexing military muscle to a greater extent than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The Department of Defense (DOD)—which has launched dozens of various commercial tech-related initiatives with limited success—should take note.

Intelligence Sharing and Ukraine: The Jus in Bello

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In recent days there has been increasing focus on intelligence sharing arrangements with Ukraine. The legal question that has primarily been addressed is at what point an intelligence sharer becomes a party to the ongoing conflict. As Milanović and Schmitt have made clear, there is a distinction to be drawn between types of intelligence, and thus there is a certain level of complexity in establishing the legal rules. This piece takes the debate on intelligence sharing somewhat further, and instead of discussing when a state becomes a party to an international armed conflict, it questions the accountability issues under IHL during armed conflict; who is accountable for intelligence validity and verification? I suggest that any intelligence being shared with Ukraine places on them an obligation to verify it to comply with principles of IHL. Furthermore, whilst those states sharing intelligence may not immediately be held accountable for civilian casualties resulting from this intelligence, it is overly simplistic to apportion the sole blame to the triggerman.

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 9

Jacob Zenn

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When compared to the Syria and Iraq provinces, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) is the Islamic State’s (IS) most prolific wilayah in terms of attacks, but it is also undergoing an operational expansion unseen in a decade. In 2012, ISWAP’s predecessor, Jamaat Ahlus Sunnah Li-Dawa wal-Jihad (JASDJ), also known as “Boko Haram,” began carrying out suicide attacks in central Nigerian states, such as Kaduna, Niger, and the Plateau states and even as far as Sokoto in northwestern Nigeria and the capital Abuja (vanguardngr.com, July 8, 2013).

However, from 2015 onward, JASDJ and then ISWAP, which succeeded JASDJ, conducted virtually no attacks outside of northeastern Nigeria or neighboring parts of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Thus, ISWAP’s two claims in the Nigerian state of Taraba on April 20 and April 23, 2022 and one claim in the state of Kogi on April 24, 2022, are a notable development (Twitter/@SimNasr, April 20; HumAngle, April 23; thecable.ng, April 24). The Taraba attacks targeted two bars in two different cities, with ISWAP claiming more than 40 total casualties. The Kogi attack targeted a police station, with ISWAP alleging five police officers were killed. IS’s al-Naba magazine also attributed previous attacks to ISWAP in Kogi and Taraba that had originally gone unclaimed as well.

Interim security insights and implications from the first two months of the Russia-Ukraine war

John B. Gilliam and Ryan C. Van Wie

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Russia’s ongoing struggles during its invasion of Ukraine have led some to suggest that the Russian military lacks the capability to credibly threaten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member states. However, narrowly focusing on Russia’s tactical and operational struggles, while omitting the flawed Russian strategic decisionmaking which underpinned the invasion, is a dangerous approach. While Russia’s significant losses in this war will clearly degrade its ability to conduct large scale offensive operations against NATO in the short term, it is too soon to write off the medium to long-term threat posed by Russia. Therefore, as the Russian invasion enters a new phase, it is useful to determine what lessons should and should not be derived from this conflict.

Ranking the World’s Major Powers: A Graphic Comparison of the United States, Russia, China, and Other Selected Countries

Anthony H. Cordesman

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The Emeritus Chair in Strategy at CSIS is circulating a major update of its working draft of a graphic overview of the comparative strength of the world’s three major powers: The United States, China, and Russia. It has been updated since the first working draft and is again being circulated as a working draft in the hope that readers will make additional detailed comments and suggest additional graphics, tables, and maps. These should be addressed to Anthony H. Cordesman at acordesman@gmail.com.

The current draft highlights the radically different spending patterns and resources of each major power and the balance each state has established between the size and development of its economy and the size and cost of its military forces.

Where the West and China Find Common Ground

Maria Tatar

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With their cannibalistic witches lurking in spooky forests, beanstalks leading to real castles in the air, and disagreeable gnomes bent on making treacherous bargains, fairy tales have a coefficient of weirdness so high that they can seem like one-offs, singular inventions rooted in one specific time and place. There’s the classic French “Sleeping Beauty,” the British “Jack the Giant Killer,” and the German “Snow White.” Then along comes the translation of a collection of Chinese fairy tales written down nearly a hundred years ago. And, presto, it becomes clear that Little Red Riding Hood is not a French or a German invention, but a universal child wearing different disguises as she makes her way through a wilderness, always the innocent target of a monster with an outsized appetite for young flesh.

The ‘Silicon Shield’ Is a Danger to Taiwan and America

Christopher Vassallo

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Efforts to erode Taiwan’s chip-making dominance should accompany the provision of arms for the island’s defense.

Taiwan’s “silicon shield”—the name for a strategy that entrusts the island’s defense to both Chinese and American reliance on its semiconductors—is an outmoded concept that burdens the United States, emboldens Taiwan, and fails to deter China. Its obsolescence risks being exposed in a crisis.

Since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, American defense strategists have pressed Taiwan to upgrade its military defenses. One important task has been to tailor the provision of defensive weapons to the needs of Taiwan’s military—procuring Stingers and Javelins rather than Abrams tanks and Seahawk helicopters.

Vladimir Putin’s Pyrrhic Choices in Ukraine

Zalmay Khalilzad

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Having failed in his initial plan to conquer Ukraine, Vladimir Putin decided to go for half a loaf: control of Eastern Ukraine. However, he is now also failing there as well. The burning questions before us are what will Putin do next and what must we do?

Putin’s failure in Eastern Ukraine is manifesting itself on the battlefield. The continued stiff Ukrainian resistance in Mariupol has become a source of embarrassment for Russia: the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva; the killing of a dozen or more Russian generals; and the successful Ukrainian push to liberate Kharkiv … all speak for themselves.

No Marshall Plan for Ukraine Geography and Geopolitics Dictate a Different Reconstruction Model

Benn Steil

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Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Marshall Plan, the massive U.S. program to rebuild Western Europe’s economy after World War II, is the endless desire to repeat it. Daunting geopolitical challenges invariably spawn appeals for new Marshall Plans to foster stability and prosperity. The global financial crisis seeded in 2008 brought forth calls for a Marshall Plan in southern Europe. The Arab Spring did the same in the Middle East. Ditto the civil war in Syria.

Today, Ukraine, victim of horrific mass brutality and destruction, is only the latest in a procession of stricken countries spurring calls for the legend’s reapplication. “There will be a new Marshall Plan for Ukraine,” declared Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in March. European Council President Charles Michel concurred, announcing that a May donor conference was “the starting point for [a] kind of European Marshall Plan for Ukraine.”

Finland, Sweden, Turkey, and NATO

ANDREW STUTTAFORD

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As suspected, Turkey’s objections to Finland and Sweden joining NATO were the first moves in a bargaining process (accepting new members into NATO requires the unanimous approval of all existing members), which I reckon will not be confined to Turkey (Hungary next?).

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on Sunday outlined demands for Finland and Sweden which seek membership in NATO in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Speaking with Turkish reporters after a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin, he said that Sweden and Finland must stop supporting terrorists in their countries, provide clear security guarantees and lift export bans on Turkey.

Ukraine invasion ‘reinforcing’ Army’s work on secure networks, comms

JASPREET GILL

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PHILADELPHIA: The Russian invasion of Ukraine has underscored the importance of communications, logistics and “baked-in” cybersecurity, reinforcing the concepts the Army is pushing forward with its network capability set development, according to service officials.

Speaking to reporters at the sidelines of an Army Technical Exchange Meeting, Maj. Gen. Rob Collins, the service’s program executive officer for command, control, communications-tactical (PEO C3T) said Tuesday the invasion has brought the Army “back to the basic blocking and tackling of transmission security [and] communications security.”