As we highlight in a new report, a transition to net-zero emissions would entail an economic transformation that would affect all countries and all sectors of the economy, either directly or indirectly. This transformation comes with both opportunities and risks. Here are eight charts from recent McKinsey articles and reports that show what the net-zero transition could look like, as well as some of the challenges leaders—and the global population—could confront.
3 May 2022
Adding years to life and life to years
Erica Coe, Martin Dewhurst, Lars Hartenstein, Anna Hextall, and Tom Latkovic
This is a decisive moment in the history of human health.
In many respects, health is a remarkable success story. Over the past century, life expectancy has dramatically increased in most parts of the world. But the portion of life we human beings spend in moderate and poor health hasn’t changed, meaning we spend more years in poor health than at any point in history. Moreover, significant inequity continues to exist across and within countries.
We can do better—quickly.
Humanity mobilized against COVID-19 at a speed and scale previously unseen. While far from perfect, our success should inspire us to challenge what we think is possible. At its best, our response to COVID-19 demonstrates that when resources and motivation coalesce, scientific breakthroughs and large-scale behavior change are possible in very short periods of time.
The rising risk of a global food crisis
Daniel Aminetzah and Nicolas Denis
The pandemic. Supply chain strains. Climatic events. Converging disruptions have sent food prices soaring—and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one of the world’s six breadbasket regions, risks tilting the food system into global crisis. In this episode of The McKinsey Podcast, Daniel Aminetzah, leader of McKinsey’s Chemicals and Agriculture Practices, and partner Nicolas Denis talk with global editorial director Lucia Rahilly about the vital roles that Ukraine and Russia play in the global food system, as well as what is at risk as the war continues. This conversation was recorded on April 4, 2022. The following transcript has been edited for clarity.
Lucia Rahilly: Let’s start with some context. Access to food is clearly of urgent concern for the millions of Ukrainians in the throes of this tragic invasion, so I first want to acknowledge that vital frontline priority. But the war in Ukraine also threatens to disrupt the food system globally, well beyond the conflict zone. Daniel, help us understand what that means.
Daniel Aminetzah: As you rightly recognized, our attention is primarily on the immediate conflict in Ukraine, including the food crisis. As we look at the broader global food supply chain, we clearly see this conflict shaking important pillars of this system in an already disturbed context.
The rising risk of a global food crisisApril 19, 2022 | Podcast
By Daniel Aminetzah and Nicolas Denis
The rising risk of a global food crisis
The war in Ukraine poses a looming threat to the worldwide food supply. Here’s what’s at stake—and what might be done to help.
DOWNLOADS
The pandemic. Supply chain strains. Climatic events. Converging disruptions have sent food prices soaring—and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one of the world’s six breadbasket regions, risks tilting the food system into global crisis. In this episode of The McKinsey Podcast, Daniel Aminetzah, leader of McKinsey’s Chemicals and Agriculture Practices, and partner Nicolas Denis talk with global editorial director Lucia Rahilly about the vital roles that Ukraine and Russia play in the global food system, as well as what is at risk as the war continues. This conversation was recorded on April 4, 2022. The following transcript has been edited for clarity.
The McKinsey Podcast is cohosted by Roberta Fusaro and Lucia Rahilly.
The global food supply at risk
MOST POPULAR INSIGHTSWhat is the metaverse—and what does it mean for business?
The rising risk of a global food crisisApril 19, 2022 | Podcast
By Daniel Aminetzah and Nicolas Denis
The rising risk of a global food crisis
The war in Ukraine poses a looming threat to the worldwide food supply. Here’s what’s at stake—and what might be done to help.
DOWNLOADS
The pandemic. Supply chain strains. Climatic events. Converging disruptions have sent food prices soaring—and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one of the world’s six breadbasket regions, risks tilting the food system into global crisis. In this episode of The McKinsey Podcast, Daniel Aminetzah, leader of McKinsey’s Chemicals and Agriculture Practices, and partner Nicolas Denis talk with global editorial director Lucia Rahilly about the vital roles that Ukraine and Russia play in the global food system, as well as what is at risk as the war continues. This conversation was recorded on April 4, 2022. The following transcript has been edited for clarity.
The McKinsey Podcast is cohosted by Roberta Fusaro and Lucia Rahilly.
The global food supply at risk
MOST POPULAR INSIGHTSWhat is the metaverse—and what does it mean for business?
Lucia Rahilly: Let’s start with some context. Access to food is clearly of urgent concern for the millions of Ukrainians in the throes of this tragic invasion, so I first want to acknowledge that vital frontline priority. But the war in Ukraine also threatens to disrupt the food system globally, well beyond the conflict zone. Daniel, help us understand what that means.
Daniel Aminetzah: As you rightly recognized, our attention is primarily on the immediate conflict in Ukraine, including the food crisis. As we look at the broader global food supply chain, we clearly see this conflict shaking important pillars of this system in an already disturbed context.Lucia Rahilly: Let’s start with some context. Access to food is clearly of urgent concern for the millions of Ukrainians in the throes of this tragic invasion, so I first want to acknowledge that vital frontline priority. But the war in Ukraine also threatens to disrupt the food system globally, well beyond the conflict zone. Daniel, help us understand what that means.
Daniel Aminetzah: As you rightly recognized, our attention is primarily on the immediate conflict in Ukraine, including the food crisis. As we look at the broader global food supply chain, we clearly see this conflict shaking important pillars of this system in an already disturbed context.
China’s 2022 Defense Budget: Behind the Numbers
Amrita Jash
At the fifth session of the 13th National People’s Congress in early March, the Chinese government announced a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (about $229 billion) for fiscal year 2022, which is a 7.1 percent year-on-year increase from 2021 (Xinhua, March 5). After years of double digit increases in the 2000s and early 2010s, this is the seventh consecutive year that China’s defense spending has grown by single digits. Nevertheless, China has moved up in the global defense spending rankings, and is now second only to the United States in expenditures. In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s military spending increasingly dwarfs that of its neighbors. For example, China now spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India combined (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 2021). For instance, at $229 billion, China’s military spending is three times that of India’s $70 billion figure for 2022 (The Economic Times, March 5).
The Storms to Come: China and Natural Disasters
John S. Van Oudenaren
The Chinese government is currently focused on sustaining its “dynamic clearance” zero-COVID strategy, while also mitigating the negative externalities of this approach, including shortfalls in food supply and access to medical services in Shanghai and other major urban centers (China Brief, April 8). Last Friday, netizens temporarily overwhelmed censors on WeChat to widely share the video- “Voices of April” (四月之声, si yue zhi sheng), which highlights the nightmarish lockdown experiences of many Shanghai residents (China Digital Times, April 23, 2022). Mounting popular frustration with the government’s pandemic response underscores how environmental factors, which include not only diseases but also natural disasters, threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political standing. Water-related disasters such as the severe flooding that devastated Henan province last summer, and the extended drought that hit southeast China beginning in late 2020 are a rising risk due to climate change and extensive environmental degradation in China (Xinhuanet, July 31, 2021; Sina, December 9, 2021).
Why China Funds Renewable Energy at Home, but Invests in Fossil Fuel Projects Overseas
Lars Oehler, Mathias Lund Larsen
Across the world, energy investments are gradually shifting towards renewables as part of commitments to curb global warming. In this trend, China is seen as both a climate hero and a climate criminal – the country is simultaneously by far the largest investor in both renewable energy and coal power (IEA, June, 2021). As China’s global role expands, its energy investments have an increasing impact outside its borders. However, there is a significant difference in the proportion of fossil fuels and renewables in China’s domestic energy development, and in its overseas energy investments. China invests in both renewables and fossil power generation domestically, but a clear majority of its investment is in clean energy. Yet, overseas, fossil fuel power generation comprises the majority of Chinese investment (Fudan University, February 2). According to a recent study by the authors, an often overlooked reason for this disparity is the nature of the Chinese financial system. This highlights the need for Chinese government intervention to align energy investment with the goals of the Paris Agreement. [1] This discrepancy is also particularly notable as Chinese President Xi Jinping stipulated in his September 2021 UN General Assembly address that China would cease construction of new coal power plants overseas, but did not provide a timeline for doing so (State Council Information Office. October 27, 2021; CGTN, September 22, 2021).
The Quad at a Crossroads
BRAHMA CHELLANEY
NEW DELHI – When the Quad was first conceived as a strategic coalition of the Indo-Pacific’s four leading democracies, many doubted that it would amount to much. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mocked it as a “headline-grabbing idea” that would dissipate “like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean.” But continued Chinese expansionism, combined with former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s determination to build broad resistance to it, has produced an increasingly consolidated group, with real potential to bolster regional security. The question is whether it will deliver.
One thing is certain: all four Quad members – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are essential to realize the vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” introduced by Japan in 2016 and affirmed by the US in 2017. While the Quad took some time to get off the ground – it was resurrected during US President Donald Trump’s administration but leaders’ summits began only after Joe Biden took office – it has gained considerable momentum. Its members have held three summits since last year (two of them virtual) and are set to meet in person in Tokyo on May 24.
Ukraine Can Show Taiwan How to Win a Cyberwar With Chi
Omree Wechsler
With the amassing of Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders in January and February 2022, many observers believed that the world was about to witness the first true cyberwar. Despite these predictions, however, the Russian invasion was not accompanied by any major, successful cyber blows to Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and Russian distributed denial of service (DDoS) and wiper attacks largely failed to curb Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.
Prior to the invasion, many had warned that China was closely watching the events in Ukraine and, if Russia invaded, may be prompted to attack Taiwan. Given many Russian military failures, observers pointed out the challenges that China could face if and when it decides to attack Taiwan. While the Ukrainian case study shows that cyberwarfare is not to be paralleled with traditional kinetic warfare, it is worth asking whether Taiwan will face similar attempts to sabotage and disrupt its infrastructure and services.
New tools for electronic warfare: multispectral operations and mission-adapting sensors
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is usually described in terms of playing offense: the OODA loop, the kill chain, and sensors to effectors. Defense is inherent in the “C2” part of JADC2 but it’s not what comes to mind first.
To use a football analogy, it’s the quarterbacks that get the attention but it’s the teams with the best defense — against both the run and the pass — that usually make it to the championship.
In the world of electronic warfare (EW), think of the electromagnetic spectrum as the playing field and the battle playing out upon it being waged both offensively through tactics such as targeting and spoofing and defensively through what’s known as countermeasures.
How US intel worked with commercial satellite firms to reveal Ukraine info
THERESA HITCHENS
SPACE SYMPOSIUM: Russia’s war in Ukraine has shown the power of open-source geospatial information in pre-conflict and war, both for deterrence, actually prosecuting military operations and disproving false propaganda. It’s an information victory (so far) that US intelligence officials said they helped coordinate with private satellite firms that have provided prompt imagery to friendly nations, news organizations and the public.
But experts say that relationship also raises questions about what it could mean in a future conflict — whether with China, which is likely learning its own lessons about the information war from Russia’s failings, or a conflict in which the US government might not be so keen on satellite imagery being so readily accessible.
Incentives, Not Orders, Will Strengthen American Cybersecurity
Yameen Huq
This past month, President Joe Biden signed into law a $1.5 trillion omnibus bill that contained the “Strengthening American Cybersecurity Act,” one of the largest cybersecurity reforms in nearly two decades. Title II of the bill, the “Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022,” contains new requirements for companies involved in federally-designated critical infrastructure—broadly defined as including everything from banks and hospitals to power grids—to provide cybersecurity incident reports to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in a timely manner. Incident reporting is vital for a secure economy; we can’t expect to protect our most important assets if we do not understand the battlefield.
Unfortunately, the regulations in this act are not the most effective way to achieve these aims. Congress should revise it in a future bill to promote incident data production and consumption through improved incentives, not just directives. Such a law must address the three kinds of market failures present in the market for cybersecurity incident data—free-riding, externalities, and adverse selection—with targeted solutions for each: knowledge subsidies, negligence fines, and voluntary certifications.
A Year of Hacks and Cyberwar: How Biden Is Tackling Cybersecurity
Timothy H. Edgar
When Joe Biden took office as president in January 2021, he faced a cybersecurity crisis. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community, the threat environment was “acute.” Foreign adversaries were using “cyber operations to steal information, influence populations, and damage industry, including physical and digital critical infrastructure.” More than a year later, the situation is still dire. The good news is that Biden’s team is on it.
Donald Trump’s behavior contributed to the crisis. After the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Agency (CISA) stated that U.S. election of 2020 was “the most secure in American history,” Trump fired its first director, Chris Krebs—a man he had appointed—for refuting his wild and false claims of hacked voting machines. This followed Trump’s previous decisions to abolish high-level cyber positions at the White House and at the State Department.
Russia warns of nuclear, hypersonic deployment if Sweden and Finland join NATO
Guy Faulconbridge
LONDON, April 14 (Reuters) - One of Russian President Vladimir Putin's closest allies warned NATO on Thursday that if Sweden and Finland joined the U.S.-led military alliance then Russia would deploy nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles in a European exclave.
Finland, which shares a 1,300-km (810-mile) border with Russia, and Sweden are considering joining the NATO alliance. Finland will decide in the next few weeks, Prime Minister Sanna Marin said on Wednesday.
China Will Be Deglobalization’s Big Loser
MINXIN PEI
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA – Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine has accelerated the division of the world into two blocs, one comprising the world’s democracies, and the other its autocracies. This, in turn, has exposed the risks inherent in economic interdependence among countries with clashing ideologies and security interests. And although the coming deglobalization process will leave everyone worse off, China stands to lose the most.7
Of course, China was headed toward at least a partial decoupling with the United States well before Russia invaded Ukraine. And it has been seeking to ensure that this process happens on its terms, by reducing its dependence on US markets and technology. To that end, in 2020 China unveiled its so-called dual-circulation strategy, which aims to foster domestic demand and technological self-sufficiency.
Free Advice for Putin: ‘Make Peace, You Fool’
Thomas L. Friedman
As Vladimir Putin embarks on his Plan B — a massive military operation to try to grab at least a small bite of eastern Ukraine to justify his misbegotten war — I thought: Who could give him the best advice right now? I settled on one of America’s premier teachers of grand strategy, John Arquilla, who recently retired as a distinguished professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. When I called Arquilla and asked him what he’d tell Putin today, he didn’t hesitate: “I would say, ‘Make peace, you fool.’”
This is also known as the first rule of holes: When you’re in one, stop digging.
Arquilla did not pluck his phrasing from thin air. After the D-Day landings on Normandy on June 6, 1944, it became quickly obvious that the Germans could not contain the Allies’ beachhead. So after a German counterattack near Caen failed on July 1, the top German commander on that front, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, phoned Berlin to report the debacle to the army chief of staff, Wilhelm Ke
The clock runs out on Imran Khan as Pakistan’s prime minister
SIMON HENDERSON
Source Link
While Americans admired the cherry blossoms in Washington, Pakistan had a weekend of political confusion. For two days, the 220 million population of the nuclear-armed Islamic republic did not have a prime minister. The national assembly in the early hours of Sunday removed Imran Khan, the one-time international cricketer-turned-politician, via a no-confidence vote. The assembly met again today and voted in his successor, the opposition politician Shahbaz Sharif, but there could be challenges or delays, rather than a smooth transition. Last night there were large pro-Khan demonstrations in cities across Pakistan.
While Americans admired the cherry blossoms in Washington, Pakistan had a weekend of political confusion. For two days, the 220 million population of the nuclear-armed Islamic republic did not have a prime minister. The national assembly in the early hours of Sunday removed Imran Khan, the one-time international cricketer-turned-politician, via a no-confidence vote. The assembly met again today and voted in his successor, the opposition politician Shahbaz Sharif, but there could be challenges or delays, rather than a smooth transition. Last night there were large pro-Khan demonstrations in cities across Pakistan.
Going Nordic: What NATO membership would mean for Finland and Sweden
Atlantic Council
As they watch Russia unleash total war against a European neighbor, Sweden and Finland seem to agree: It’s finally time to join NATO.
With public opinion turning strongly in favor, both countries are inching closer toward formally joining the Alliance. Just this week, their prime ministers publicly telegraphed their strong support for such a move, though Finland appears more certain than Sweden and likely to move first.
But what would that look like? For answers we reached out to Leo Michel, a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, who previously served as director of NATO policy at the Pentagon. Check out his responses to our questions below.
The Battle For Donbas Will Be A Tough Fight For Ukraine
Daniel Davis
Why the Battle for Donbas will be very different: While the world nervously awaits the opening salvo of the Battle of Donbas, many in the West are optimistic. Others believe that the exceptional military performance demonstrated by the Ukraine Armed Forces (UAF) in repelling – and then driving out – Russian forces around Kyiv, will reprise their effort and again blunt Russia’s offensive in the Donbas and eventually outright win the war.
A careful – and honest – assessment of the situation on the ground in Ukraine, however, should dispel such notions.
The longer Kyiv and its Western backers persist in maintaining the belief that Ukraine can win the Battle of Donbas and eventually the war, the more bitter the result if the UAF eventually proves incapable of driving the Russians from the field.
Nuclear Proliferation Is Not the Answer to the War in Ukraine
Steve Cimbala Lawrence J. Korb
All wars have unexpected consequences. One potential impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine is the distinct possibility that more states will be interested in developing or deploying nuclear weapons. Under the protocols of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty were guaranteed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Russia has now violated this agreement twice: first in its 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of the Donbas and again, in its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
It’s easy to see how states could look at Ukraine’s experience and determine that even a small nuclear deterrent is necessary in an era of renewed great power competition and simmering regional conflicts. Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya were deposed by force, yet North Korea’s small but growing nuclear arsenal increases the costs and risks of launching a military intervention to depose the Kim dynasty. Iran’s overall policies and nuclear weapons ambitions reflect its desire to dominate the greater Middle East, but the Iranian leadership may likewise view a nuclear arsenal as an insurance policy against military intervention, either to overthrow the ruling elites or in response to Iran-sponsored terrorism.
The Dangers of China’s Decline As China’s economic miracle fades, its leaders may become more inclined to take risks.
Hal Brands
Decline is a tricky concept. The term makes us think of a country that is falling like a rock—one whose power and capabilities are dropping across the board. But a country can be in relative decline vis-à-vis a fast-growing adversary even if its own power is still increasing. It can be surging forward in some areas, such as military might, even as its underlying economic strength starts to wither. And decline doesn’t always lead a country to scale back its objectives—the sense of urgency it creates can cause ambitious powers to grab what they can before the clock runs out.
How Elon Musk might shift Twitter content moderation
Mark MacCarthy
Elon Musk’s takeover of Twitter raises the issue of social media content moderation in an especially urgent form. Despite the regulations looming in the United Kingdom and the European Union, to which Musk’s Twitter must conform, no legal requirement will prevent Musk from running Twitter according to whatever editorial policy he chooses to adopt. It’s his candy store.
How is this possible? Can it really be true that the content moderation policies of such a powerful forum for public discourse should depend on the whims of its new billionaire owner? Evan Greer, a political activist with Fight for the Future, speaks for a lot of us when she says, “If we want to protect free speech online, then we can’t live in a world where the richest person on Earth can just purchase a platform that millions of people depend on and then change the rules to his liking.”
Multiple battlefields in time and space
Aaron Klein
With today’s update of the Brookings Sanctions Tracker, it is more clear than ever that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a global response. Many of the world’s major democratic nations are engaging in economic warfare against Russia by implementing “the most comprehensive set of multilateral economic sanctions ever applied to a major global economy.”
America is helping lead the charge, exercising its unique power of controlling access to the dollar, effectively the world’s reserve currency. Understanding how the war is progressing is complicated enough given the asymmetric battlefields between physical and economic war.[1] It is further complicated as the conflict unfolds across three time horizons: the present, future, and the current expectations of the future. Understanding how these different time horizons affect dimensions of the conflict is critical to deciphering how the war is going and what lies ahead.
Javelin Missiles, Stinger Missiles and Drones Keeping Ukraine in Pitched Battle with Russia
Kris Osborn
Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, artillery, drones, armored vehicles and ammunition are all taking a toll on Russian forces which have struggled to accomplish any of their apparent objectives as of yet.
The Pentagon says the major weapons systems being provided are having a substantial impact upon the war, citing the many objectives Russian forces have been unable to accomplish.
What is a hypersonic missile and how does it work? An aerospace engineer explains
Russia used a hypersonic missile against a Ukrainian arms depot in the western part of the country on March 18, 2022. That might sound scary, but the technology the Russians used was not particularly advanced. However, next-generation hypersonic missiles that Russia, China, and the U.S. are developing pose a significant threat to national and global security.
I am an aerospace engineer who studies space and defense systems, including hypersonic systems. These new systems pose an important challenge due to their maneuverability all along their trajectory. Because their flight paths can change as they travel, these missiles must be tracked throughout their flight.
Is Weakening Russia a Bad Idea?
Emma Ashford
Matthew Kroenig: Hi, Emma. It is good to be back debating you in print. The last time we did this was on FP Live.
Emma Ashford: Turns out I have a terrible poker face. Better to do it this way, where my face doesn’t give me away when you say something outrageous!
MK: Apparently, you are not the only one who finds my utterances outrageous. Last week, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sanctioned me, along with 28 other Americans, including Kamala Harris and Mark Zuckerberg, for advancing “Russophobic” policies. I am honored to be included in such distinguished company, but there goes my summer vacation in Sochi.
The NATO Accession Sweden Never Saw Coming
Elisabeth Braw
On May 17, President Sauli Niinisto of Finland is scheduled to arrive in Sweden. He’ll meet with King Carl XVI Gustaf and the Swedish government before leaving the next day. And sometime during his visit, Sweden and Finland are expected to announce they’re both applying for membership of NATO. Finland has—remarkably—taken the lead, and Sweden is likely to follow, simply because if Finland joins there’s really no reason to not to do the same. Sweden is, in fact, NATO’s luckiest-ever joiner, a country swept into the alliance without having to lobby for membership and without its government even expressing a desire to join.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, Finns took note. By April 11, support for NATO membership had skyrocketed from its usual domains in the neighborhood of 20-28 percent to 68 percent. Many seem to have taken their cue from Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin, who in their clearly coordinated New Year’s addresses highlighted Finland’s right to decide its fate for itself. In mid-April, the Finnish government presented to parliament a report on the pros and cons of NATO membership (it was mostly pros), and Marin traveled to Stockholm for a meeting and press conference with Sweden’s prime minister, Magdalena Andersson. Finland’s decision whether to apply for membership will be “a matter of weeks,” she declared.
Russia’s Resource Grab in Ukraine
Robert Muggah
Russia’s motives for invading Ukraine vary from security fears to revisionist historical claims that a Ukrainian national identity does not exist. Energy security also looms large—in particular, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to ensure the continued flow of Russian oil and gas to European markets, including through Ukraine’s pipelines. But the far bigger prize eyed by Russia may be Ukraine’s extraordinary resource riches, including some of the largest energy, mineral, and agricultural assets in the world.
With the exception of agriculture and coal, many of Ukraine’s resources remained underdeveloped and unexplored during the Soviet and much of the post-Soviet era. More recently, Ukraine has sought to increase its economic and energy security by developing these resources and diversifying its exports away from Russia. It launched a major oil and gas privatization effort in 2013, but this was interrupted by Russia’s 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea and military intervention in the Donbas.
How the Rajapaksas Destroyed Sri Lanka’s Economy
Amita Arudpragasam
On April 12, a prolonged economic crisis came to a head as the Sri Lankan government temporarily halted payments to international creditors. This is the first time Sri Lanka has defaulted in its post-independence history, and it comes as no surprise to those who have followed the government’s incredible economic mismanagement since the election of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in November 2019.
Sri Lanka’s economy really began to unravel a long time ago—when Gotabaya’s brother Mahinda Rajapaksa was president between 2005 and 2015. After the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows from global capital markets poured into the country. This was facilitated by Chinese capital surpluses and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, after which loose global monetary policy meant that Sri Lanka was able to borrow easily.
Drones Have Come of Age in Russia-Ukraine War
Jack Detsch
Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region is flat, open, and streaked with cloudy skies, terrain that Western officials believe has already limited Russia from carrying out the withering air and missile strikes that characterized the first two months of the war in Ukraine. And as the battlefield shifts east, drones are becoming a dominant—if not the dominant—feature of the conflict, former U.S. officials and experts told Foreign Policy.
With persistent clouds likely to make flying Russian and Ukrainian fighter jets out of missile range more difficult, both sides are turning to a two-pronged drone strategy: using cheap, off-the-shelf drones to keep a watchful eye in the sky and to flag targets for artillery to take out tanks. Experts believe the U.S. provision of hundreds of kamikaze-like loitering drones that can hunt targets for hours before dropping down to detonate a deadly munition, complemented by a fleet of drones that can be bought off the internet as low-cost eyes in the sky, could give the Ukrainians a one-two punch from above.
Missile Identification and Assessment
Ballistic missiles are viewed by many states as a means to project power and are an important element in many national deterrence doctrines. Understandably, specialists and policymakers working in the field of arms control and technologies are increasingly focused on identifying and assessing these capabilities and their possible implications. This technical analysis provides analysts and policymakers with a beneficial understanding of the technology that underpins and influences ballistic-missile design and with tools to draw initial conclusions about a ballistic missile’s capabilities. This should benefit the quality of debate, provide a better understanding of missile technology and give those interested a simple method of conducting an initial missile analysis.
What Comes Next in the Standoff Between the U.S. and Iran?
In May 2018, when U.S. President Donald Trump followed through on a campaign promise to withdraw the U.S. from the 2015 multilateral deal limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment program, Tehran initially reacted by adopting a posture of strategic patience. But after European attempts to keep the deal afloat failed to deliver any respite from the U.S. campaign of “maximum pressure,” and amid increasingly bellicose rhetoric out of Washington, Iran shifted gears.
Beginning in early 2019, Iran gradually announced a series of what it called reversible breaches of its obligations under the nuclear deal, exceeding limits on its stockpile of enriched uranium and the level to which it is enriched. By this March, the International Atomic Energy Agency, responsible for documenting Tehran’s compliance with the agreement, reported that Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium had reached 1,000 kilograms—an amount that, if further enriched to much higher levels, provides enough fissile material for a nuclear warhead. The nuclear deal placed a verifiable cap of 300 kilograms on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles.
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