Activity in the cyber domain has failed to materialize as expected in the conflict in Ukraine. Some say it never really got off the ground, while others claim it was prevented through pre-conflict hardening and or that the cyber domain has in fact been active and effective. Opinions are all over the place, but the reality on the ground suggests that – at a minimum – kinetic operations have been far more impactful than those in the cyber domain.
Frankly, that shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Cyber operations have proved themselves a potentially effective tool in broader strategy – along with information and economic measures – but it has failed to become much more than a small part of the toolkit. Among the many reasons for this is an inherent constraint in the impact of cyber operations: Reversibility. Quite simply, except in certain extreme and potentially exotic cases, the effects of cyber events have failed to stick. Locking up systems doesn’t have the same impact as a missile strike. And over the past nine months, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated this. In particular, we’ll take a look at two examples of attacks
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