The Contemporary Global ‘Security for Hire’ Industry: An Overview

Sergey Sukhankin

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Introduction

The use of private security and paramilitary entities for achieving specific geopolitical and economic objectives experienced a resurgence between 2011 and 2020, being primarily attributed to Russia`s adventurist actions in the Middle East (Syria and Libya),[1] Central and Eastern Europe (Ukraine)[2] and Sub-Saharan Africa.[3] Having produced mixed results, Russia`s example did, however, draw the attention of other actors to the phenomenon of private military and security companies (PM/SCs).[4] Perhaps, most importantly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) started to demonstrate a much greater interest in the use of PM/SCs in areas where Beijing has developed significant economic and business interests, which are tightly knitted with geopolitical agendas.

This report—the first in a series of publications comprising the project “Guardians of the Belt and Road: The Role of Private Military Security Companies in Securing China’s Overseas Interests”—aims to provide a general description of the global “security for hire” industry. By analysing selected models, speculation will focus on an approach that is likely to be taken by the PRC in its increasing interests in the use of the aforementioned firms and entities. This broad goal will be pursued through the following research objectives:Explain the historical background and key milestones in the formation, development and increased sophistication of privatized security services,

Discuss the legal status and challenges associated with the use of legal PM/SCs, using the United States as an example,

Analyze the activities of illegal PM/SCs, discussing Russia’s experience.

The report employs a combination of primary and secondary data. In regards to primary data collection, I have interviewed four outstanding US-based experts and practitioners specializing in the PM/SC industry: Doug Brooks (founder and president emeritus of ISOA); Peter Singer (author of Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry[5]); Sean McFate (senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and professor of strategy at the National Defense University and Georgetown University); and Erik Prince (founder of Blackwater USA PMC).

Privatizing Force: A Historical Note

The use of private forces and non-state actors has a storied history. Arguably, the first officially recorded case—when mercenary forces served in the army of King Shulgi of Ur—dates back to 2094–2047 BC. In the 5th century BC, Greek mercenaries (so-called “Ten Thousands”) were hired to fight on the side of Cyrus during the Persian Civil War (401–400 BC). Following the unsuccessful Battle of Cunaxa, the mercenaries undertook an arduous journey back home—the story was described in Xenophon`s Anabasis.[6] The use of mercenaries was also common in the Orient: Mercenaries remained an essential part of the Chinese army for more than 500 years, ranging from the late Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD) to the end of the Sung Dynasty (960–1279).[7]

During the Middle Ages and early modern times, virtually all European countries and city-states heavily relied on mercenary forces in countless military campaigns and wars. In addition to the massive use during land-based operations, some states relied on PMCs for naval military operations, with the English monarchs extensively relying on this tool of war.[8] According to Peter Singer, contracted military companies (proto-PMCs) were widely used by both sides during the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453). At this stage, proto-PM/SCs, de facto acting like mercenary formations, were primarily performing military tasks, acting in many ways similar to regular armed forces.

Later, during the age of mercantilism, an important transformation of militarized non-state actors’ roles took place. This owed primarily to the rapid rise of colonialism, skyrocketing of trade and intensification of competition between large trade companies for critical natural resources (mainly precious metals) and commodities. These actors employed non-state actors in pursuit of their business and geo-economic objectives in various regions. Some sources argue that the Dutch East India Company and English East India Company not only employed large quantities of mercenaries on a permanent basis but also used them in offensive military operations (such as the recapture of Calcutta and the Battle of Bhaksar) and even territorial acquisitions (power projection over Bengal).[9]

While mercenary forces were also used in the 19th century, the revival of the phenomenon, in a somewhat different form, occurred in the second half of the 20th century (1960s–1980s) due to decolonization, which led—especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (frequently referred to as the “cradle of PMCs”[10])—to a series of bloody armed conflicts sparked by a combination of anti-colonial movements and the Soviet Union’s attempt to spread its influence.[11] A genuine revolution and profound transformation in privatization of forces occurred between 1970s and the early 2000s and was related to US participation in four regional conflicts and operations: Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Today, the growing popularity and increasing reliance on PM/SCs is typically attributed to the following main (general) factors:The post–Cold War “security gap” and changes in the nature of war and armed conflict ushered in an opportunity for private security to expand.[12]

Major economic transformation (in the West) resulted in the boom of the free-market model and even greater freedom of entrepreneurship, which included the paramilitary and security domains.[13]

PM/SCs—typically composed of top-notch experts and specialists—generally possess the ability to have a real impact on the pace, dynamics and outcome of limited-scale regional conflicts.[14] This argument is best exemplified by the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995), when activities of the Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI)[15] PMC—which played a decisive role in training and preparing Croat forces—became an undisputed success.

The emergence of the so-called “new war” phenomenon has also played a major role.[16] Experts argue that, unlike traditional wars, “new war” has a number of important characteristics. First, “new wars”—many of them waged in less economically developed or recently decolonized regions—are characterized by ethnic hatred, tribal violence and anarchy, frequently resulting in grave violations of human rights.[17] Importantly, these aspects are less visible to the international community; unfortunately, international peacekeeping efforts have frequently fell off their declared objectives, producing extremely limited positive outcomes,[18] which gives widened opportunities for non-state actors and the forces standing behind them.[19] Secondly, an explicit emphasis of “new war” is on an economic agenda over a political or military approach. Largely, “new wars” are waged in impoverished, politically unstable, non-secured and resource-endowed areas. Thus, many transnational and global companies tend to employ PM/SCs to protect their workers and investments in these areas.[20] In effect—and this project aims to demonstrate this using the PRC as an example—security concerns play a crucial role in China`s increasing attention to the consideration of using PM/SCs along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In retrospect, another main factor was the major military transformations after the end of the Cold War: Following the (formal) end of the East-West conflict, Western armies—primarily designed to wage large-scale sophisticated wars—turned out to be less prepared to operate effectively in low-intensity conflict permeated by ethnic or tribal agendas, inexplicit boundaries between combatants and civilians as well as loose military hierarchies.[21] As noted by Christopher Kinsey, “Contractors allow the military to concentrate on its core functions, fighting wars, by removing responsibility for the more mundane operations, which are no less important to maintaining operational efficiency and handing that responsibility to outside agents.”[22] This argument was further developed by Christopher Spearin, who argued that the use of PM/SCs—which perform various functions including food services, materiel management and distribution, communication and information systems, land equipment maintenance, health services, transportation, construction engineering services, power supply and distribution, water supply and distribution, waste management, roads and grounds, fire services, environmental management and ammunition support—allows armed forces to concentrate on their direct responsibilities.[23]

Contemporary PM/SCs

Rapid growth and expansion of the PM/SC industry is driven by yet another essential factor. In addition to its universality and flexibility in paramilitary application, the industry itself has become a gold mine, yielding huge dividends to its main stakeholders. According to some estimates, the global PM/SCs market is worth between approximately $100 billion[24] and $244 billion[25]—although some subject experts claim the number is much lower but still significant.[26] Nevertheless, despite being a lucrative business opportunity and an effective security instrument, many state and non-state actors are hesitant—if not overtly discouraged—to employ PM/SCs in pursuit of certain objectives.

Legal and Definitional Challenges and Misconceptions

One of the first issues with the PM/SC industry is the lack of a standard and universally accepted definition—both among policymakers and academics—that could capture and explain this phenomenon with sufficient depth.[27] The complexity and sophisticated nature of this industry is reflected in the following definition: “Military firms, military service providers, privatized military firms, transnational security corporations, and security contractors … [any] firms offering security- and military-related services.”[28] Another definition describes these entities as corporate bodies operating with a profit motive that “provide services outside their home states with the potential for use of lethal force, as well as training and advice to militaries that substantially affect their war-fighting capacities.”[29] Finally, the US government defines PM/SCs as “persons or businesses … that provide products or services [to the military] for monetary compensation.”[30]

These definitions—representing only a small fraction of the pool of terms that have been generated by both the policy and academic communities—are filled with ambiguity and do not clearly draw a dividing line between legal PM/SCs and illicit versions thereof, including mercenary formations. In many ways, this—and some violations of international laws—taint the public image and perception of legal PM/SCs. Regretfully, the broader public (and even many experts) erroneously equalize PM/SCs and mercenaries—actors that have been banned by the Hague Convention (1907), Geneva Conventions (1949) and so-called “anti-mercenary conventions” consisting of the Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1977) and the United Nations Mercenary Convention (1989).

Unfortunately, however, while defining the term “mercenary”—the definition is found in Additional Protocol I, Article 47 of the Geneva Conventions—and classifying this phenomenon, international experts left a great number of gaps that render this category to be equally applicable (under certain circumstances) to legal security providers, including PM/SCs. As argued by John Riley and Michael Gambone, “By outlawing mercenaries, the international community has inadvertently made effective regulation of PMCs all but impossible. More effective regulation would be possible if PMCs were formally legalized and a simple regulatory regime that charged the contracting actor with the responsibility of holding the PMC compliant with international humanitarian law was created.”[31]

An attempt to eliminate ambiguity was undertaken after the introduction of the Montreux Document (2008)[32]—an agreement between signature countries on their obligations to PM/SCs in war zones—which defines PM/SCs as “private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves.” In terms of services rendered by entities of this type, the document explicitly mentions “armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.” Yet, as far as subject matter experts are concerned, the definition’s ambiguity has not been fully eliminated. The final say on whether an actor can be classified as a mercenary is still to be found in Article 47 of Additional Protocol I, which, as stated, may be misleading at times, especially given the rapidly changing nature of war and armed conflict as.

Some experts, thus, argue that the best way to differentiate legal PM/SCs from illegal mercenaries is to define the former as “permanent business structures that have offices along with other kinds of assets. [PSCs] are companies with a legal personality. In this respect, they are subject to legislation, notably company law. Since they are companies, they adopt business practices including a doctrine represented in the form of company policy or culture, or both. [PSCs] are also business profit driven and not individual profit driven.”[33] In an interview, Peter Singer also underscored that the division between “corporate” and “individual” is the key criterion to be used when differentiating mercenaries from legitimate security providers. [34] That said, however, other examples—including Russia`s PMC, the Wagner Group—might challenge this approach.