Elizabeth Buchanan and Christopher Kourloufas
The enduring tendency to “center the United States” in foreign affairs analysis—both in the United States and, increasingly, in Australia—is limiting real understanding of Southeast Asian strategic perspectives at the staff officer level. The bulk of Defence strategy work is done by those who are not country or even region experts, and at the staff-officer level, there is very little awareness or understanding of non-U.S. perspectives. This misunderstanding might yet drive miscalculation in the region, particularly when considering the trajectory of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
ASEAN plays an important role in facilitating a peaceful, stable, and resilient neighbourhood favourable to Australian national interests. Australia-ASEAN ties date back to 1974, but an uptick in domestic commentary and analysis highlights an evident gap in Australian understanding of ASEAN.[1] Our collective understanding of ASEAN has been shaped by Australian and U.S-centric views, assumptions and ideals rather than political realities on the ground.
This has become particularly evident through our Defence research unit work across the Sea Power Centre and the Air and Space Power Centre.[2] Our centres host valuable insight into ASEAN military-strategic thinking via the ASEAN Visiting Fellowship initiative. Launched in 2014, the program serves to deepen people-people relations between Australia and ASEAN partners with a specific focus on strengthening military educational ties.
When it comes to ASEAN, Australian military professionals, analysts, and commentators are largely missing adequate insight into two central topics: ASEAN strategic concerns (the problem set) and ASEAN-led solutions (the response). In this essay we reflect on some key takeaways of the ASEAN Visiting Fellowship in an effort to shine a light (and centre) upon ASEAN strategic views of Australia’s backyard.
THE PROBLEM SET: ASSUMING ASEAN STRATEGIC CONCERNS
“[T]he rise of material powers, i.e. economic and military, requires avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game.”[3]
ASEAN assessment of Indo-Pacific strategic competition is somewhat at odds with the western liberal-democratic conception of great power competition.[4] A view in which Chinese aggression and unavoidable great power competition between Beijing and Washington are headline acts. However, our visiting ASEAN fellows have tended to minimise the uniqueness of great power competition in terms of articulating security challenges facing their nation.[5] When it comes to ASEAN security concerns, most fellows cite transnational crime, terrorism, piracy, and, Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing, as the leading security challenges facing their nations. Indeed, ASEAN fellows are largely concerned with how these matters manifest as domestic security crises—e.g., arms trafficking increasing the level of armed citizens. This is a reality which Western countries with warfare-centric navies tend to miss.
A VIEW IN WHICH CHINESE AGGRESSION AND UNAVOIDABLE GREAT POWER COMPETITION BETWEEN BEIJING AND WASHINGTON ARE HEADLINE ACTS.
The perspective that we have come to appreciate from ASEAN fellows is that security co-operation brings prosperity, confidence and trust among neighbours. There is opportunity for the region to collectively alleviate poverty and elevate living standards of millions of people, regardless of national borders. Further, one must view Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as closely integrated and interconnected—politically, economically, social-culturally, and environmentally. There is potential for misunderstanding the complex interconnectedness of concerns if we hold ourselves to a narrowly-defined, reductionist mindset of security, warfare, and military power. ASEAN conceptions of security differ between the nations, but our U.S.-centred assessment of the region assumes cookie-cutter concerns and this essentially leads to inappropriately designed responses.[6]
A clear example is the illusive grey zone. An artefact of the western way of thinking, the broad term seems to have become a synonym for complex, ambiguous, or opaque—a category of situations that don’t fit neatly or are difficult to understand. Listening to our ASEAN Fellows’ perspective has made us consider whether grey is just the norm for the region. We are likely the ones complicating things by expecting the clear black-and-white that comes with a traditional western-focused understanding of ASEAN and a reductionist view of security, warfare, and military power. The reality of interconnected complex relationships is that it is mostly grey. Of course, where ambiguous relationships and ill-understood boundaries exist, adversaries can exploit a seam, exposing crucial partnerships that take decades to mature to increased risk of being undermined. This is what the west is at risk of.
Increasingly, Australian analysts note there are concerns from ASEAN states surrounding AUKUS developments—specifically the acquisition by Australia of nuclear-powered submarines.[7] While fellows agree that this capability development would alter the strategic balance of the Indo-Pacific, in our people-people engagement over many coffees, fellows are quick to underscore that ASEAN concern stems from the potential of nuclear-armed submarines, not necessarily the acquisition of submarines per se. This position is in line with ASEAN political stance on nuclear weapons: in that, nations seek to maintain a region of nuclear-free arms (and proliferation).
A POTENTIAL RESPONSE: AVOIDING MISCALCULATING ASEAN SOLUTIONS
Our person-to-person engagement via the ASEAN fellows program has also prevented the misinterpretation of the ASEAN Way, referring to a mode of cooperation between nations that places national interests and national sovereignty first. This is often used in conjunction with ASEAN centrality, the process through which national interests and sovereignty are protected by non-interference and upheld via decision-making, which is based on consensus and non-confrontation principles. Our Defence research centres work with counterparts at Defence’s International Policy Division and ASEAN policy officers throughout government to host research conferences to showcase the work (and thought) of our ASEAN military fellows.
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The research led by our ASEAN Fellows has revealed a wealth of opportunity for ASEAN and Australia to co-operate and collectively respond to challenges in our region.[9] Importantly, the solutions proposed are nuanced and aim to strengthen existing multilateral agreements within the region. By doing so, local empowerment is emphasised, leadership remains within the ASEAN community and Australian offerings contribute to the broader response. In particular, Australia’s experience with integrating across services and government agencies is a significant capability that can be shared within the region.
Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong recently reminded ASEAN nations “ASEAN centrality means that we will always think about our security in the context of your security.”[10] Our experience in learning from ASEAN visiting fellows indicates that our own staff officers and strategy makers have not yet adequately grasped ASEAN’s own security context. Continued tendencies to frame ASEAN challenges and opportunities in terms of centering on Australian or U.S perspectives is a behaviour we must unlearn. It feeds miscalculation of ASEAN strategic concerns and potentially reinforces a more contested strategic environment, or at least the view that we are living in one.
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