CHRISTINA MACKENZIE
PARIS — France’s new strategic review, designed to inform the 2024-2030 military program law (MPL) due to be submitted to parliamentarians early next year, was presented by President Emmanuel Macron in a major speech aboard the Dixmude helicopter landing ship in the Mediterranean port of Toulon.
Speaking for nearly 45 minutes Wednesday to an audience largely made up of military personnel, Macron explained that the MPL “will, through its articles, figures and engagements, have to paint a picture of a united, strong France, autonomous in its appreciations and sovereign in its decisions, robust and credible, respected for its status as a nuclear-power, motor of European strategic autonomy, an exemplary ally in the Euro-Atlantic space, a dependable and credible partner.”
Aboard the newest of the French navy’s three Mistral-class helicopter landing ships (the biggest vessels in the navy after the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier), the president remarked that “the period is not one of calm weather but stormy seas.” And while France’s 2017 edition of the review was updated just last year, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced a more radical rethinking.
“What is being played out [in Ukraine] is not only an illustration of tendencies that were already at work, but a massive acceleration and, to a certain extent, a clarification of other aspects through its tens of thousands of dead, its rigors, its scale, through technological developments with new weapons whose trumpeted performances are not always proven and older ones for which new, lethal uses have been found,” Macron said. “And finally because this war clarifies the state of the world in which we live, the collapse of norms and taboos, the abuse of power, it qualifies that dangerous moment where the old balance is being contested but the new one is not yet established.”
The strategic review itself is a 52-page document [PDF] in three parts. The first and second are a strategic analysis and the challenges to meet, both summarized by Macron in his speech. The third part sets out 10 strategic objectives:
1. Maintain a robust and credible nuclear deterrent. The conflict in Ukraine “demonstrates the need to maintain a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to prevent a major war,” one that is “legitimate, effective and independent” whilst confirming “the need to maintain a capacity to understand and constrain the risk of escalation.”
2. Strengthen resilience to both military and non-traditional (information manipulation, climate change, resource predation, pandemics, etc;) security challenges by promoting the spirit of defense and ensuring national cohesion. To this aim France is implementing a national resilience strategy to strengthen its ability to withstand any kind of damage to the normal life of the country. In addition, universal national service will be ramped up in some undefined way; Macron said he would reveal more about this in the first quarter of 2023.
3. Ensuring that French industry can support a war effort over the long term by constituting strategic stocks, relocating the most sensitive production lines and diversifying suppliers. This would seem to be a continuation of the idea of a “war-time economy” that Macron first brought up at the Eurosatory conference in June.
4. Improving cyber resilience. “There are no means available to create a cyber shield that would thwart every cyber-attack on France, but strengthening its level of cyber security is essential to prepare the country for more threats,” the document states. To do so “efforts undertaken in the public and private sectors must be amplified.” Of note, the document states that “notwithstanding the important work already undertaken, the State’s cybersecurity has significant room for improvement” and “the level of cybersecurity of all public services needs to be raised significantly.”
5. NATO’s key role in the defense of Europe, France’s role within it and strengthening the European pillar. The document states that “France intends to maintain a unique position within the Alliance. It has a demanding and visible position because of the specificity and independence of its defense policy, in particular because of its nuclear deterrent.” It adds that based on its operational credibility, its rapid response ability and its financial contribution, “France intends to strengthen its influence and that of the European allies in order to weigh on the major changes in NATO’s posture and the future of strategic stability in Europe.” The document notes that France “excludes an extension [of membership] to other geographical areas, in particular the Indo-Pacific.
6. Strengthen European sovereignty and develop Europe’s defense industry. “European strategic autonomy depends on robust European defense industrial capabilities that meet its own needs,” and to this end “France supports the setting up of a short-term instrument for the joint acquisition of European equipment.”
7. Be a reliable partner and credible security provider. The document mentions a deepened relationship with Germany, key partnerships with Italy and Spain, strategic partnerships with Greece and Croatia, its capability partnership with Belgium, mentions Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia and notes that a “constructive dialogue” must be “quickly re-established with the UK.” The strategic partnership with the United States “will remain fundamental, and must remain ambitious, lucid and pragmatic.” Relationships with African nations, the Arabian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and the Indo-Pacific region are all mentioned.
8. Improving intelligence. France must continue the in-depth reforms of its intelligence services and have an “ambitious” human resources policy to attract and retain staff. It also needs to invest in new technical tools that “will have to use the potential of quantum computing and artificial intelligence.”
9. Defending against and acting in hybrid fields (deliberately ambiguous combinations of direct and indirect, military and non-military, legal and illegal, often difficult-to-attribute modes of action). A more agile, responsive and integrated organization will be adopted to “identify, characterize, trigger appropriate protection mechanisms (…) but also to retaliate effectively.” It is also developing tools to counter private military companies used as proxies by hostile powers. It is also prioritizing the protection of critical infrastructures.
10. Freedom of action and ability to conduct military operations. This is a list of statements concerning the readiness of France’s armed forces to engage not only in high intensity combat but also to deploy at short notice and be first on the battlefield “with our without possible support from allied countries.”
Macron spent a considerable part of his speech on France’s relationships with other countries, notably mentioning that “our engagement alongside our partners in Africa will henceforth be centered on cooperation and support for their armies. That will translate into a lighter presence which is more integrated.” He added that in the next few days, discussions with African partners, allies and regional organizations would be held in order to “together work on evolving the state, format and missions of the current French military bases in the Sahel and in West Africa in order to build with the interested parties a common ad shared organization and instruments to support the region’s armies.”
The president also announced that “our interventions must be better confined in time right from the start. Our vocation is not to remain engaged ad infinitum in our foreign operations.”
Both these points seem to reflect Macron’s February decision to withdraw forces from Mali, where France had been engaged in operations for over nine years — with over 50 casualties during that period.
In addition, Macron acknowledged the difficulties of a strategic review that is both for the present threat and the future of conflict — a familiar struggle for any NATO nation’s defense planning at this moment. “We have to find answers both for today’s problems and tomorrow’s keeping at the forefront of our mind that the army of 2030 that we need to build, its women, its men and its capabilities, must not be the ideal army that we would have wanted in 2022 but the army we need to have in 2030… .”
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