Assessing the Biden 2022 Nuclear Posture Review

John R. Harvey, Franklin C. Miller, Keith B. Payne

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President Biden, as have his predecessors early in their first term, has conducted a wide-ranging review of U.S. nuclear policies, posture, and programs. That review—the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—was completed early this year. After substantial delay, an unclassified version of the report was issued on October 27 on which we offer our joint assessment. Each of us, serving Presidents from both parties, have led in developing and implementing nuclear deterrence and arms control policy since the 1980s.

Making the 2022 NPR somewhat more complex is that it was carried out in the midst of the crisis in Europe caused by Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s increased nuclear threats to the West, China’s sprint from a minimum deterrent force to nuclear peer status, and Beijing’s increasingly strident threats to take Taiwan by force. At issue is whether the 2022 NPR goes far enough in addressing these evolving threats.

The 2022 NPR should be lauded for the many elements of continuity with past U.S. policies, which we support. For example:It affirms the necessity of a strategic Triad of land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers, along with European basing of U.S. nuclear bombs carried by NATO aircraft. These capabilities provide the basis for deterring war and assuring allies of continued U.S. commitments to their security.

It recognizes Russia’s and China’s coercive strategies of limited nuclear threats to advance expansionist goals, and the need for tailored, flexible U.S. deterrence capabilities to defeat those strategies.

While giving proper priority to deterrence, it recognizes the United States must also be prepared for the possibility of an opponent’s first use of nuclear weapons, either limited or large scale, and to restore deterrence.

It affirms that deterrence is not based solely on the existence of nuclear forces but, rather, on their ability to hold at risk assets most valued by an enemy. Thus, force numbers and capabilities matter, and have regularly been adjusted in light of evolving threats.

It calls for restoration of a nuclear weapons R&D and manufacturing base capable of responding promptly to unanticipated technical problems with warheads or delivery systems, or to adverse geopolitical changes such as those cited above. Correspondingly, to its credit, the Biden administration is fully funding infrastructure modernization.

It affirms, taking into account allies’ views, long-standing policy that deterring a nuclear attack is the fundamental but not the sole purpose for U.S. nuclear weapons. They also deter major conventional war and catastrophic non-nuclear attacks that could result in mass U.S. or allied casualties approximating those inflicted by a nuclear strike.

It reiterates traditional negative security assurances.

It affirms a willingness to work with Russia to reduce nuclear dangers, when and if (a big if!) Russia is prepared to work to that end and adheres to New Start Treaty limits, but also points out Russia’s contemporary deployment of novel strategic nuclear capabilities outside New Start limits.

It reaffirms that the United States will not pursue policies that purposefully target innocent civilians.

Very importantly, the 2022 NPR largely carries forward the modernization program begun under Obama and continued by Trump: to replace our nuclear forces that have aged well beyond the end of their planned service lives; upgrade the nuclear command and control system; and rebuild aging and degraded warhead production infrastructure some of which dates to the 1940’s and 1950’s. Biden’s 2023 budget request is fully consistent with this NPR commitment.

These aspects of the 2022 NPR should garner broad bipartisan support notwithstanding spirited debate on the details. That said, and with deserved respect for the review’s authors, many of whom are colleagues and friends, the Review does not go far enough in addressing the dramatically new threat environment with concrete responses to Russia and China.The rapid emergence of China as a potential adversary (as described in the administration’s National Security Strategy) and nuclear peer is touched on as a prospect for the 2030s. The NPR does not describe the need to deter both China and Russia simultaneously or how to do so (particularly in light of the Xi-Putin Joint Statement of February 2022); it simply states that “a near simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.” This is insufficient.

In this regard, the unasked and unanswered question is: “Can the U.S. continue to deter China, an aggressive Russia, or possibly a threat from both at the same time, with existing nuclear forces, or will it need to increase the force?” The 2022 NPR rightly calls attention to pieces of this problem but does not offer solutions. Several of us are on record as calling for an expanded U.S. force to deter Russia and China simultaneously. In the near term, U.S. forces could be augmented, if necessary, by uploading reserve warheads to existing delivery systems. In the longer term—a decade and more—the ongoing modernization program offers opportunities to extend “warm” production lines for warheads and delivery systems. If existing trends in China’s nuclear expansion continue, the choice may become when, not whether, to implement such options.

The Review eliminates “hedge against an uncertain future” as a formal role for nuclear weapons. This role has long been recognized on a bipartisan basis as critical for sustaining deterrence. In a dynamic threat environment that includes many increasing uncertainties, why is the administration not reaffirming the long-standing task of hedging against those uncertainties as a formal role for nuclear weapons? There are many good reasons to retain hedging against uncertainties as an important, formal mission. That said, the Biden administration states that it seeks to ensure that the U.S. is “capable of pacing threats, responding to uncertainty, and maintaining effectiveness.”

The document refers to the need to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons,”—a term it leaves undefined—citing its plans to cancel the SLCM-N program and retire the B-83 bomb. It does not explain why or how, in a world in which Moscow and Beijing have shown no interest in ‘reducing the role,’ and in fact have increased their reliance on nuclear weapons, this is to be otherwise accomplished.

The NPR rightfully declares that a “sole purpose” policy is not appropriate for the current security environment—a point driven home to multiple U.S. administrations for decades by NATO and Pacific allies. It then states that the U.S. ultimate goal is moving to “sole purpose.” After declaring that our alliances are the key factor which strengthens us, compared to Russia and China, this suggestion calls into question the administration’s expressed desire to build allied trust and confidence.

The Review comments positively on the role played by the W76-2 warhead in deterring limited nuclear attack (and even uses it as a justification for ending the SLCM-N program) but in its final pages—without explanation—suggests that the administration will examine ways to replace it. To some of us this inconsistency is troubling.

The Review points to arms control on numerous occasions as the best means to increase strategic “stability” yet does not indicate how arms control can contribute to “stability” in a threat environment that in many ways is more dangerous than the past. Neither does it set forth what U.S. arms control goals should be. It also states that arms control is the most effective way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. This appears to subordinate deterrence to arms control when they must be integrated. It would have been worthwhile for the review to have called attention to strong bipartisan congressional support—which we subscribe to—that any future treaty account for all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, including medium- and short-range weapons as well as exotic new weapons in development. These goals must be included in the discussion of arms control.

The National Defense Strategy calls for strengthened extended deterrence to allies. To achieve this, nuclear modernization, in itself, is necessary but not sufficient. After all, much of the ongoing modernization program was established more than a decade ago, when the global security environment was much more benign, and was intended to replace, not increase, existing nuclear forces. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are alarmed. The NPR is generally silent on this critical issue. Follow-on work should examine, in the emerging threat environment, more and perhaps different capabilities needed to continue deterring war.

Along these lines, rightly noted in the report, recent concerns focus on the threat that an adversary may introduce limited first use of low-yield nuclear weapons to an ongoing conventional conflict as means to achieve a more favorable outcome. No adversary should ever come to believe that such use would not risk a U.S. nuclear response because it perceives that the U.S. lacks timely and proportional weapons options that can penetrate to critical targets. Moreover, inattention in achieving such capabilities could cause allies to call into question U.S. resolve to come to their defense if the only alternative involves escalation to strategic attack on U.S. territory. Allies may decide either to accommodate regional adversaries or develop their own nuclear weapons, both contrary to long-standing U.S. interests. Accordingly, a wider range of options is needed to strengthen deterrence of enemy limited first use and further assure allies. In this regard, the decision to cancel SLCM-N should be reconsidered. SLCM-N provides unique capabilities, not replicated by other nuclear weapons systems, for both deterrence and assurance. Further engagement with allies, particularly in Asia, is needed to assess any further nuclear burden sharing including possible demonstration of capabilities to introduce overseas basing of U.S. dual-capable aircraft in countries where they are not currently deployed.

The NPR and overarching National Defense Strategy emphasize a need to embed nuclear deterrence into an overall strategy that brings in the other elements of U.S. power including conventional military capabilities, cyber capabilities, space dominance, diplomacy, and economic sanctions. So-called integrated deterrence is a commendable goal and should be pursued. As a first step, regional combat commanders must do more in adapting their conventional war plans to include the possible limited first use of nuclear weapons by an enemy. A nuclear response may not be necessary but related planning regarding response options is. It is important to redress this longstanding shortfall.

In summary, the central tenets of the 2022 NPR are clearly in the mainstream of U.S. nuclear policy and offers numerous important points that advance U.S. policy. For these, it clearly deserves full bipartisan support. At the same time, we identify a few critical shortfalls and urge the Biden team, over the coming year, to address and hopefully resolve them, among other ways, in its planned upcoming revision to U.S. nuclear employment policy.