Tom Rogan
Often left out of the discussion over Ukraine is the consideration of specific U.S. strategic objectives. So what should the U.S. aim to achieve with its massive provision of financial and armament aid to Ukraine?
First off, we need to identify why Ukraine's fate matters to the United States. It's actually quite simple. Vladimir Putin's escalated invasion is designed to subjugate a sovereign democracy in service of a reconstructed Russian imperium. Aside from the moral interest of standing with a free people who love America, the U.S. cannot allow Putin or his friend Xi Jinping to perceive Western tolerance for the attempted annihilation of a democracy. This cuts to the heart of the post-World War II democratic international order. It is an order which has made Americans freer, safer, and more prosperous.
What should the specific U.S. objectives be?
In my mind, three outcomes: the dislocation of Russian forces from Ukraine's mainland territory, the assurance of Ukraine's long-term democratic right to freely pursue its international relations, and the consolidation of the rule-of-law-based government of Kyiv that rejects autocracy and corruption. The Kremlin's propaganda aside, none of these outcomes would pose an existential threat to Russia. The pursuit of these objectives thus provides space against escalation which leads to a direct U.S. conflict with Russia.
The dislocation of Russian forces from mainland Ukraine, including the eastern Donbas region, must be the central objective. By arming the Ukrainian military, supporting Ukraine's economy, and funding the Ukrainian government, the U.S. has enabled Ukrainian combat forces to seize the initiative. The results are clear. Russian forces now lack the means of conducting major combined arms defensive operations, let alone combined arms offensives. Russian forces are depleted in number, materiel, morale, and leadership. And Putin's recent draft cannot redress this crisis because Russia cannot adequately train, arm, supply (soldiers need reliable food and shelter), and motivate its conscripts. Added supply requirements may mean the conscripts actually worsen rather than improve Russia's combat strength in Ukraine. Indeed, Russia's only advantage may now be the rain and approaching winter freeze which will slowdown Ukraine's offensive momentum.
Hence why Putin is now throwing missiles into Kyiv and dangling the threat of nuclear strikes. Putin rightly senses that he must choose between retreat and escalation which isolates Russia even from friends like China and India. But as it relates to U.S. support for the liberation of Ukraine's mainland, Washington must not yield to Putin's nuclear threats. By education and impulse, Putin's calculus is born of the Soviet tradition. Which is to say, he is ruthless but rational. He can be stared down.
There should be some caveats to U.S. action, however.
Enter Crimea. The U.S. should enable Ukrainian attrition strikes against Russian forces in Crimea (via Ukraine's striking of bases, supply hubs, and bridges, for example). Still, just as it does not allow U.S. weapons to be used to target Russia proper, neither should the U.S. arm a Ukrainian ground offensive to retake Crimea.
There's a difference between helping Ukraine degrade Russia's use of Crimea as a stronghold with which to project force, and arming a Ukrainian ground offensive to retake Crimea. Ukraine, of course, has every right to conduct a ground offensive. But the U.S. should recognize that the loss of Crimean territory would pose an existential threat to Putin's rule. Crimea has long held an almost theological value to Russian leaders. Because of its Crimean War and World War II sieges, for example, the Russian Black Sea fleet's headquarters at Sevastopol will be seen by Putin as a near-sacred citadel of his political identity.
Were the U.S. to arm a Ukrainian ground offensive into Crimea, the risks of escalation with Russia would increase without a commensurate justification of the U.S. national interest. The way to remove Russia from this territory it has stolen is to retain Western sanctions on Moscow until it agrees to a Crimea-inclusive accord. If Russia is loath to reach an accord, the U.S. can keep helping Ukraine enforce Crimea's supply isolation from Russia. That strategy will make the costs of Russia's maintaining control over the peninsula nearly intolerable.
The second caveat comes via the money.
While the U.S. should continue to give billions of dollars in arms support to Ukraine, that support cannot come as a blank check. Although U.S. aid oversight efforts in Ukraine are only now ramping up, you can bet that some hefty chunks of U.S. taxpayer money will soon be found to have gone missing. Evinced by his lethargic and piecemeal anti-corruption reforms, President Volodymyr Zelensky's reputation as an anti-corruption reformer is overrated. Ukraine's political culture remains deeply corrupt. This does not mean that Ukraine is not a democracy worthy of support, as it is. But corruption bears U.S. attention.
European allies must also step up for Ukraine's defense. Unfortunately, most European Union members are freeloading off U.S. aid commitments to Ukraine. The Biden administration should thus work with allies in London, Warsaw, and the Baltic States (all providing their own large commitments to Ukraine) to publicly shame Berlin, Paris, Rome, and Madrid into greater support for their neighbor.
The utility of this strategy is clear.
By enabling Ukraine to dislocate Russian forces from its mainland territory, while bearing close attention to how U.S. aid is spent, the U.S. can secure Ukraine's democratic sovereignty and demand its improved governance. Ukraine will then find the confident space to pursue its international relationships as it, rather than Moscow, sees fit. In turn, the U.S. can enforce Putin's understanding that wars of conquest against periphery states are far too costly for his rule. But by recognizing the special status of Crimea and the Russian mainland, the U.S. can credibly pursue these objectives with the confidence of avoiding a direct confrontation.
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