Relations between Russia and Iran have long been characterised by a degree of mutual suspicion. This is in part because of Russia’s historical ambition to control the Caucasus region, which led to a series of wars with Tehran that ended in the nineteenth century, and in part because the countries have conflicting interests in the present-day Middle East. But the two now share an important geopolitical objective: undermining what they view as a Western-dominated international order.Russia’s acquisition of Iranian uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct-attack munitions for use on the Ukrainian battlefield has been the most visible sign of their partnership since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia and Iran have also announced joint initiatives to circumvent Western sanctions. As Western countries increase their efforts to provide Ukraine with weapons and inflict economic pain on Russia, Moscow and Tehran appear to be setting differences aside to cooperate against a common set of adversaries.
In devising a strategy to confront the West, Russia and Iran may fall back on their shared experience of mounting a joint campaign in the Syrian Civil War to rescue the regime of President Bashar al-Assad from collapse. In 2015, Russia and Iran decided to operate jointly to secure Assad's survival. Militarily, Iran and Russia cooperated well: the former applied political cover, air power, missiles, artillery and a limited number of soldiers (including mercenaries), and the latter provided UAVs and manpower, mostly Shia militiamen recruited across the region and South Asia but directed by commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. By late 2015, their combined effort began to turn the tide of the war.
Whereas Russia and Iran had good reason to cooperate in Syria to save Assad, it is unclear whether Iran has any direct interest in partnering with Russia in Ukraine. In Syria, Russia obtained a port and a military airport, securing strategically important positions in the Mediterranean. Iran managed to preserve the land bridge that allows it to funnel militants and advanced weaponry to friendly militias at Israel’s doorstep, especially Hezbollah, for use in any future conflict. By contrast, Ukraine is of no special importance to Iran. Although it may see a tactical benefit in providing Russia with weaponry or cooperating with Moscow on sanctions evasion, it has little interest in tying its fate to Russia’s agonising military campaign in Ukraine. This is one reason that Iran’s foreign ministry did not offer clear support for the outcome of Russia’s 23 September referendums on the annexation of four regions in Ukraine, instead referring to the requirement that all countries ‘fully comply with the principle of the territorial integrity’.
The United Nations lifted its arms embargo against Iran in October 2020, which has allowed Tehran to import and export conventional military equipment for the first time in more than a decade. While analysts initially predicted Tehran might recapitalise elements of its armed forces by purchasing Russian equipment, Russia’s international isolation since February 2022 has instead led Moscow to turn to Tehran for some types of weaponry.
It appears that Russia has received the Shahed-136 direct-attack munition and the Mohajer-6 UAV, although additional types of equipment may also have been secured. The Shahed-136 is a delta-wing attack munition. The system, armed with a small warhead, appears to be designated as the Geran-2 in the Russian service. The Mohajer-6 is a medium-class UAV used for combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and can carry a payload of up to 150 kilograms. It likely entered service with the Iranian armed forces in 2018.
There are several possible reasons for Russia procuring Iranian direct-attack munitions and UAVs. Moscow may be running low on some of its own precision-guided weapons, while a new generation of tactical air-to-surface missiles likely has yet to enter the air force inventory in significant numbers. The Shahed-136, however, is by no means a replacement for this capability, but it does allow Russian forces to launch strikes using multiple direct-attack munitions at fixed targets. Russia also has fallen behind in the development and deployment of armed UAVs.
These sales to Moscow are notable as they appear to be the first instances of Iran supplying these types of equipment to a state, an opportunity Iran may use to advertise its products to other countries. Tehran’s willingness to provide weapons to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may also offer it insight into how these systems perform in a conventional, high-intensity environment. Furthermore, it is unknown whether Tehran will gain access to Russian weapons systems in return for its support to Moscow. Iran needs to recapitalise its combat-aircraft inventory, with some analysts speculating that Tehran could acquire 24 Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker M aircraft originally manufactured as part of a now-shelved Egyptian order.
The Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6 are relatively simple systems and are probably vulnerable to Ukrainian defences. But the Shahed-136, in particular, is small and comparatively difficult to detect. Furthermore, if multiple direct-attack munitions are used against a target, any air defences could risk being overwhelmed. There is evidence suggesting that Kyiv has utilised either its indigenous or Western-supplied defence systems to intercept the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6.
The West has enacted unprecedented economic and financial sanctions against Russia. These measures aim to trigger a liquidity crisis by denying Russia access to Western capital markets, impair Russia’s production capacity by depriving it of controlled Western technology, and ultimately degrade its industrial base. Russia has been adapting to this new reality, reaching out to several sanctioned states including Iran for assistance and coordination.
Iran and Russia share the objective of undermining Western sanctions, and since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they have announced a flurry of joint initiatives towards this end. They began trading in their national currencies in August, de-dollarising transactions to circumvent US financial sanctions. Iran and Russia may also be engaging in bartering arrangements that involve exchanging Russian metals for Iranian automobile parts and gas turbines. In addition, they held talks with Azerbaijan in September to revive the rail component of the International North–South Transport Corridor, a dormant project first announced in 2000 that the Russians have hoped would connect them to markets in Iran and India. In the energy sector, Iran is turning to Russia for help. In July, Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company and Russia’s Gazprom unveiled an ambitious plan for US$40 billion of Russian investments into Iran to sustain and develop its oil and gas fields, build liquified-natural-gas facilities and construct gas pipelines.
There are important limits to this cooperation, however. Most foreign countries will be unwilling to provide essential related technologies or financial assistance for developing the energy sectors in Iran or Russia due to sanctions and reputational risk. Although bartering arrangements and rouble–rial mechanisms may provide marginal trade and liquidity benefits, they are unlikely to constitute a major lifeline for the Russian economy in the near term. More significantly, Iran and Russia may become competitors in the clandestine market for access to Western technology. Iran has obtained controlled Western technology by working through networks of intermediaries in Western and Middle Eastern capitals, transhipping prohibited items through large ports and collaborating with Chinese state-owned companies such as Huawei. To circumvent Western export controls, Russia, whose indigenisation efforts have long fallen short of its needs, will probably soon come to rely on these same black-market channels, where supply is constrained.
Nonetheless, Russia’s decoupling from the West will probably accentuate its reliance on Iran’s well-developed sanctions-busting schemes. As Iran’s provision of UAVs and direct-attack munitions to Russia suggests, Iran may be able to fill gaps where Russia’s import-substitution policy has failed. For instance, the US has identified three Iranian cargo planes that flew to Russia carrying controlled equipment, including electronic components that Russia needs. If left unchecked, Russia and Iran may find new, more potent ways of working together to evade Western sanctions, making it less likely that the West will succeed in containing Russian aggression, Iran’s use of militias or its nuclear programme.
Iran and Russia’s relationship is transactional and tense. Iran shares as little ideologically with Russia now as it did with the Soviet Union. Their long-term visions of the Middle East are incompatible. Even in Syria, where they collaborated to rescue Assad, Iran and Russia have since competed to shape the regime’s orientation, build influence in the security services and armed forces, and assert control over the country’s mineral resources. Russia and Iran also differ in their attitudes towards Israel.
Even if their long-term visions do not presently align, Iran and Russia may nevertheless feel they have enough grounds for aligning over Ukraine. The regimes in Tehran and Moscow now share a defining narrative of resistance to the United States (and NATO). Tactical collaboration in a military theatre has form; it worked in Syria. And they are both veterans of managing sanctions. Nevertheless, Iran’s military and economic support for Russia seems unlikely to reverse Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine at this stage.
For Iran, pursuing this strategy with Russia has risks. Firstly, it could inflame the domestic anti-Russian lobby in Iran at a time when regime coherence matters in the face of internal unrest. Secondly, it will cost Iran what support it has in Europe for a pathway out of sanctions. By carefully wording its statements on Russia, the Iranian leadership may be intending to send a nuanced signal to the West and its domestic audience.
Sanctions on Iran have generally been inadequate and have failed to deter it from fighting through proxies or advancing its missile programme. Disruption, physical or virtual, of Iran’s capabilities has been more effective, but appetites for instability in Israel and the Gulf are limited. That should not deter Western actors from reminding Iran that continuing support for Russian President Vladimir Putin, as for ter
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