On october 17th nato began a fortnight of nuclear exercises in Belgium called Steadfast Noon. Later this month, nato expects Russia to hold its own nuclear drills, called Grom, for the second time this year. Steadfast Noon, involving 60 aircraft from 14 allies—including B-52 bombers flown from America—is “a routine, recurring training activity” unconnected to the war in Ukraine, nato maintains. Yet the context is very far from routine; this week, nato will be practising nuclear attacks during a major European war that some analysts fear could lead to nuclear escalation.
The timing might seem alarming, but the risks still look small. The more Russia’s forces are pushed back, however, the greater the fear that its president, Vladimir Putin, will use nukes in Ukraine, as he has from time to time threatened to do. As President Joe Biden put it, the world faces the greatest threat of “Armageddon” since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
Early in the war, America postponed the test-launch of a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile for fear that it might be deemed escalatory. The mood has darkened since then, with the West feeling it necessary to warn Russia of “catastrophic” consequences if it uses nukes. Jens Stoltenberg, the nato secretary-general, said that to cancel Steadfast Noon would be to show weakness. For Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, a think-tank, the situation is a “textbook example” of escalation, in which both sides want to show they are serious about deterrence and cannot climb down for fear of looking weak.
Will the world get any warning if Mr Putin is about to go over the nuclear brink? Probably, say Western spooks. To judge from their foreknowledge of Russia’s invasion, they seem to have good insight into the Kremlin’s decision-making. As for satellites and other technical means, much would depend on which weapons it decided to use.
Russia’s and America’s arsenals of long-range “strategic” weapons are closely monitored under the New start treaty, which limits each side to 1,550 deployed warheads on missiles, bombers and submarines. The trouble is that many of these are held at high readiness and can be fired without warning. Satellites and ground radars would spot and track ballistic missiles only after they were fired; low-flying cruise missiles would be harder to detect. Using these weapons is unlikely, though, because they carry a much higher risk of provoking a war with nato, given that they could be mistaken for an attack on the West. nato will be closely watching the Grom exercise, which has in the past involved tests of submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles.
A more feasible option would be a limited nuclear strike using one or more of Russia’s 2,000-odd “tactical” weapons, which generally have a smaller explosive power and a shorter range. nato has about 100 such weapons stored in Europe.
Russia’s tactical warheads are held in several dozen storage sites, separate from the planes and missiles that would be needed to deliver them. Preparations for their use should thus be detectable. The key is to watch by satellite and other means for the movement of warheads from the storage sites. The warheads would be transported by train or lorry, guarded by elite units of the 12th Main Directorate, which is responsible for maintaining warheads, and accompanied by fire-engines and special recovery vehicles. Military units that would use the weapons might also show unusual activity. All this would probably generate more intense electronic chatter.
Western countries know the tell-tale signs because, after the cold war, they worked for decades with Russia to improve the safety of its nuclear arsenal under the Co-operative Threat Reduction (ctr) programme. Some of Russia’s specialist equipment and procedures were designed with the help of Western experts.
William Moon, a veteran of the ctr, says a large movement of warheads would be almost certain to be spotted. But, for a limited tactical demonstration, Russia could try to slip out one or two warheads concealed in ordinary lorries. Detecting a move like this would be “a coin-flip” he says.
Pavel Podvig of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, a think-tank in Geneva, notes that once mounted on mobile missile-launchers and hidden in forests, tactical nukes would be hard to find. But, he adds, “Russia will not know whether it is being watched. It will never have certainty.”
In any case, argues James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment, another think-tank, hiding the movement of warheads would be against Russia’s purpose: “Putin would want us to know he is preparing for nuclear use. He would much prefer to threaten to use nuclear weapons and extract concessions than actually use them.”
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