Elizabeth Lee, Jonathan Schroden, Heather Wolters
Special operations forces (SOF) are at an inflection point. Operationally, they are rebalancing from an overwhelming focus on countering terrorist groups to a mix of that mission and others designed to support the military’s new emphasis on integrated deterrence of China. Generationally, SOF are now composed of a sizable fraction of millennials, and they are beginning to welcome members of Generation Z into their ranks. As popular narratives surrounding millennials make clear, younger generations of adults may have leadership styles and preferences that differ markedly from those that came before them. Given that SOF are a multigenerational force, we sought to understand how senior special operators think about leadership, what young adults want from their leaders, and how the qualities of military leadership may need to change to match the challenges of future battlefields. Ultimately, our study at the CNA Corporation is meant to help senior special operators better understand the needs of younger SOF and the strengths and weaknesses of different leadership styles across generations.
To understand if or how leadership styles may need to change to motivate younger generations of special operators, we conducted about 30 discussions with current and past senior SOF leaders and experts on special operations. These individuals ranged from colonels to four-star generals and admirals, as well as the civilian equivalents. We reviewed empirical and theoretical research, as well as popular narratives and informed opinions, about younger generations' characteristics, traits, and attitudes. And we reviewed writings by military strategists and futurists on projected requirements of military leadership on future battlefields. We then compared leadership traits identified as important to SOF, important to younger generations, and important to success on the future battlefield using a model known as the “paradoxical trinity of leadership.” In this model, leadership is considered through the combined lens of leaders, followers, and the context in which they interact.
By comparing views of SOF leadership across the three elements of this model, we identified 11 leadership traits that spanned all three categories, as shown in the figure below. These 11 traits are character, creativity, flexibility, determination, competence, being a relationship builder, trustworthiness, being a problem-solver, approachability, empowerment, and being a risk-taker. While our research remains preliminary and should be viewed as suggestive—as opposed to conclusive—to our knowledge, this is the first time anyone has codified a set of leadership traits for U.S. special operations forces.
Comparison of SOF leadership traits across the leadership trinity
In addition to identifying the set of traits that overlap the three elements of this leadership model, we arrived at five additional findings about the current state of SOF leadership in our study.
Our first finding is that SOF do not appear to have a consistent philosophy of leadership. The operators and experts we interviewed were roughly split regarding whether they believed SOF have a consistent theory of how best to lead their troops. The most prevalent philosophy cited by those who thought SOF had one was mission command, but this was named by less than a third of our interviewees. Two additional facts support the idea that there is no single special operations philosophy of leadership. First, while doctrine pertaining to special operations exists within each of the military services, these publications do not address leadership of SOF or special operations. There is also a joint publication for special operations, but it similarly does not discuss SOF leadership. Second, special operators are professionally developed as members of both the SOF enterprise and their military service (e.g., Army, Navy)—and there is no overarching philosophy of leadership spanning the services either.
Our second finding is that SOF do not have a codified set of leadership traits. Our comparative analysis identified 11 traits that span the SOF leadership trinity, but even the most cited trait (character) was named by less than half of the special operators and experts we interviewed. This lack of consensus runs counter to the Army and Marine Corps, each of which have very detailed doctrinal publications that address their desired leadership traits (in contrast, the Air Force has a less detailed nondoctrinal publication on leadership and the Navy lacks formal guidance on its desired leadership traits).
While the 11 traits that we identified as spanning the SOF leadership trinity model do not constitute an official set, our third major finding was that they nonetheless align well with the traits we identified as being applicable to leading millennials and Gen Zers, as well as traits deemed likely suited for success on future battlefields. The top four (character, creativity, flexibility, and determination) and seven of the top 10 traits cited by operators and experts also appeared in our literature reviews for followers and context, the other two elements of the trinity model. Thus, even though SOF do not have a formally articulated set of desirable leadership traits, we found that those they informally describe as being important to them seem generally well aligned to the future of the SOF leadership trinity.
That consistency of traits notwithstanding, our fourth finding is that development of SOF leaders is notably inconsistent across the force. For example, the special operators with whom we spoke had as mixed a set of experiences with professional military education (PME) as could be imagined. Some had received extensive PME, while others had little to none. Some described the PME they received as high quality and helpful, while others described it as essentially useless. Further, roughly half of the operators we interviewed said they had mentors who helped them through their careers, while the other half described learning by doing and emulation of leaders they admired as mechanisms for their development. Our research suggests that this inconsistency in leadership development is misaligned to the expectations of millennials and Gen Zers, who are the most well-educated Americans in history. Millennials and Gen Zers are also reported to desire mentor/teacher-style leaders and organizations that invest substantially, directly, and clearly in them as individuals. Experts writing on the demands of the future battlefield identified a requirement for military leaders to become more intellectual, analytic, and technically knowledgeable to be successful. These demands also suggest a requirement for deliberate, continued education and mentorship of future SOF leaders.
Our fifth finding is that the evolution of SOF leadership traits is aligned only partially with the requirements of younger generations and the future operating environment. Some of the experts we interviewed thought that interpersonal skills, the ability to build relationships, intelligence, and awareness of special operators had improved over the course of their careers, and that SOF are more transparent today in explaining what they do and why they do it, both privately and publicly. Others said SOF leaders have gotten worse at holding operators—and each other—accountable for their actions. These leaders also cited a decrease in good order and discipline, overemphasis on the special or elite nature of SOF, and over-reliance on throwing resources at problems rather than thinking creatively or unconventionally about solving them, as negative trends in SOF leadership.
In comparing these responses to what the literature had to say about how to lead younger generations and the requirements of the future operating environment, we found that the perceived improvements cited by SOF leaders align well to future requirements for operators who are more educated, analytic, perceptive, collaborative, and transparent in what they do. The perceived shortfalls they cited, however, do not align. In particular, the perceived decline in SOF accountability runs counter to the emphasis of millennials and Gen Zers on ethical, values-driven leadership. Additionally, while increased emphasis on the elite nature of SOF may appeal to younger generations—based on research showing steadily increasing rates of narcissism—some of the operators we interviewed saw the focus on the elitism of SOF as a negative trend. Other negative trends cited by some SOF leaders, such as declines in good order and discipline and less creative (more resource-centric) problem-solving tendencies, also appear to run counter to future battlefield requirements.
Based on these findings, we offer four specific recommendations for consideration by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Pentagon’s office for civilian oversight of SOCOM—the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, (ASD(SO/LIC)).
First, we recommend that SOCOM identifies and publishes a leadership philosophy for special operations. Given the general disunity among responses that we got from SOF experts on this topic, SOCOM could, in principle, start virtually anywhere in creating such a philosophy. Based on our work, however, we recommend that it consider moving beyond mission command—which focuses primarily on a hierarchical approach to leadership—and develop a leadership philosophy more akin to the “Team of Teams” approach articulated by retired Gen. Stanley McChrystal and his co-authors in their book of that title. Such an approach, which is more aligned to collective models of leadership, seems more likely to be optimally suited to the ways in which SOF typically operate, to the complexity of the future battlefield, and to the less hierarchical and more decentralized leadership preferences of today’s younger generations.
Second, we recommend that SOCOM develops and codifies a set of desired leadership traits focused on the SOF leadership trinity. Our study represents an initial exploration into what these traits should be, so we suggest that SOCOM should build on those in the context of its own analysis of future SOF operating concepts, future battlefield requirements, and future leadership preferences of young special operators. We recommend that as SOCOM does so, it examines some of the noteworthy findings of our comparative analysis and their implications for SOF leader development. One of these is the presence of transparency as a desired leadership trait in the followers and context categories of the leadership trinity but the absence of it in the traits cited to us by special operations leaders. SOCOM should then use this list of leadership traits to drive its efforts (and those of its subordinate elements) to develop future SOF leaders in a consistent, coherent, and deliberate way.
Third, we recommend that ASD(SO/LIC) assesses the adequacy of SOF PME and mentorship opportunities. By law, SOCOM relies on the military services for formal PME and it has little sway over the content of those programs. That should not prevent it and the ASD(SO/LIC) from assessing the adequacy of those programs for the needs of special operators and leveraging forums such as the Pentagon’s Special Operations Policy and Oversight Council to advocate for necessary changes. A formal review of available PME could also help the Joint Special Operations University further tailor the courses that it offers to fill gaps specific to special operations that these schools are missing. We also recommend that ASD(SO/LIC), in conjunction with SOCOM, catalog and assess the adequacy of mentorship programs across the SOF enterprise. We did not detect a desire from any of the sources we examined for a formal assignment of mentors to new special operators; the general view was that mentorship relationships are best developed organically. However, the formation of such relationships shouldn’t be left to chance, since there are ways to encourage their development (for example, developmental networks and “mentoring constellations”).
Finally, we recommend that SOCOM reinforces efforts to improve accountability. Fixing the conditions that led to consistent ethical lapses and making lasting changes to SOF culture—as described in SOCOM’s Comprehensive Review completed in 2019—require sustained attention. In reviewing literature pertaining to the desires of millennials and Gen Zers, we identified a focus on accountability and values-based leadership as being critically important. Accountability was also one of the five leadership traits articulated in a recent high-level publication by joint and service enlisted leaders as being required for future senior enlisted service members. Such accountability is likely to be demanded by Congress, and it also seems likely to be demanded by younger generations of special operators. It is, therefore, worth addressing now for special operations.
If ASD(SO/LIC) and SOCOM take the steps we recommend here, the force would be on firmer footing for the deliberate, thoughtful development of future SOF leaders. Gen. Richard Clarke stated in his 2022 congressional posture hearing that SOCOM’s “commitment to high ethical standards, engaged leadership, and maintaining accountability within SOF is critical to sustaining the trust earned over decades.” These findings and recommendations should help the SOF enterprise as it seeks to maintain that commitment by developing and sustaining high-quality, relevant, and effective future leaders.
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