Paul Huang
MAIN ARGUMENT
Security is only as strong as its weakest link. In the case of Taiwan’s defense against a potential attack from China, the loss of air power following a missile attack is the single point of failure that would likely cause a general collapse of Taiwan’s overall defenses. To mitigate this threat, Taiwan must rethink and reformulate its defense strategy by investing in survivable platforms that can sustain the island’s defense for a meaningful period of time even in the face of a modern and ever-expanding People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Taiwan’s air force, with only conventional fighter jets, would likely be knocked out of action at the onset of a conflict with China as the few available runways on the small island are bombarded and paralyzed by PLA ballistic missiles and other long-range munitions.
Due to Taiwan’s own limitations, yielding air and sea space completely to China is not an option. The loss of air power is expected to lead to a cascading failure of Taiwan’s military defenses in the air, the sea, and across the theater.
To prevent a quick collapse and capitulation, Taiwan’s defense planners must find ways to preserve some form of air power.
A fleet of short takeoff and landing aircraft, such as the F-35B, could improve the currently unfavorable offense-defense balance. Despite many difficulties involved, Taiwan and the U.S. should consider this as the most viable option for building Taiwan’s future force structure.
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