After three weeks of discussions at the NPT RevCon, latest reports suggest that “a meaningful consensus document reviewing past implementation and outlining future commitments is far from assured.” Article VI of the NPT which requires State parties to achieve nuclear disarmament has remained a bone of contention at the conference. While nuclear weapon states have continued to claim that today’s security environment does not allow for disarmament, non-nuclear weapon states have questioned the progress made by the former towards fulfilling Article VI commitments.
We have argued previously that the NPT framework was unworkable from the beginning since it is based on an unfair bargain between nuclear weapon states and the rest. While the five nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT have pursued non-proliferation vigorously with respect to others, their commitments towards disarmament and reducing risks of nuclear war have been weak. Unsurprisingly, several states including India and Pakistan have gone their own way to acquire nuclear weapons and even in countries like Japan and South Korea, there have been debates about the desirability of going nuclear.
Since the last NPT RevCon in 2015, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has broken down and the US and Russia have withdrawn from the Open Skies Treaty. The nuclear deal with Iran - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) - has also fallen apart and the United States-led talks with North Korea have remained unfruitful. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which came into force in 2017 has no takers among the nuclear weapon states.
More importantly, NPT fails in reducing the risk of intended or accidental nuclear exchange. Six out of eight nuclear-armed countries, with India and China being the exceptions, retain the first use option. First use policies push these countries to expand and upgrade their nuclear arsenals and keep them at high states of readiness. The NPT does little to address the danger of first use policies and thereby, does not offer strong protection to the world from a nuclear catastrophe.
In this brief, we look at our past research on why nuclear weapon states must discourage and discard first use policy and instead, must strive towards a global no first use (GNFU) treaty which can reduce nuclear risks and offer a better deal than NPT.
First Use is Less Credible and More Dangerous
In the Takshashila Discussion Document - Nuclear First Use: A Critique, we discuss some of the oft-cited reasons for adopting a first use policy and how on closer examination, these reasons are untenable in reality:
Disarming first strikes are carried out to destroy the adversary’s nuclear strike capabilities in order to gain strategic advantage or pre-empt similar strikes.
The pressure upon the states to build swollen nuclear arsenals that survive initial hits goes up further.
Due to long-range missiles which can strike in relatively short periods of time, first use can require hair trigger alerts, which increase the risk of false alarms, as has happened several times in the past.
The use of new technology in weapons control and delivery such as artificial intelligence whose consequences are unpredictable can make matters worse during a crisis.
Large disarming strikes using nuclear weapons are likely to have catastrophic climatic consequences for the world.
Finally, the success of disarming first strikes is unascertainable as chances of retaliation by an adversary could always exist.
2. First strike option to deter conventional forces of an adversary by attacking its forces and signaling the potential for further nuclear escalation.
This does not really work against adversaries who possess nuclear weapons as second strike capabilities come into picture.
Nuclear first strikes launched against a non-nuclear adversary’s forces may not have the effects intended if those forces are sufficiently dispersed.
Even the economic argument that nuclear weapons are cheaper than maintaining conventional forces is weak since deploying them is a costly exercise and conventional forces will be required to guard them.
3. Extended deterrence means a guarantee by a nuclear weapon state to its allies to extend its nuclear umbrella, as seen in the case of US treaty allies, such as NATO member states.
This demands that deterring state convince sceptics from both the adversary and allies leading to over-compensation, and likely increasing the tensions in a conventional conflict involving an ally.
It opens up the allies to nuclear attacks by adversaries, and therefore, it is in the interest of the ally to lower the chances of nuclear weapons use.
4. Preventive strikes involve a nuclear weapon state attacking nuclear weapons facilities and infrastructure of an adversary to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities.
Using nuclear strikes to target nuclear facilities of another country has low military benefits but high diplomatic costs.
It may end up convincing an adversary the need for obtaining nuclear weapons at any cost.
While first use policy promotes nuclear arms race in peacetime, in times of crisis, it ends up heightening tensions, and raising the chance of accidents and miscalculations. Its credibility as a threat remains doubtful due to its disproportionate nature and high costs associated with first strike.
The Potential of GNFU
A no first use policy is committed to not carrying out a first strike and is focused on retaliation after an adversary has initiated a nuclear strike. No first use is a credible threat by its very nature, as it is a de facto policy of any nuclear weapon state to retaliate if subject to an attack. Therefore, it does not require states to expend significant cost, efforts and energy towards building credibility, contrary to what a first use policy requires them to do.
In Takshashila Research Note - The US & No First Use, we discuss how a GNFU treaty between the eight nuclear armed states will reduce both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. There are several benefits of adopting a no first use policy through a GNFU treaty:
Since the credibility aspect is already established, states need to focus only on survivability and diversification of nuclear strike capabilities to inflict unacceptable costs upon the adversary during retaliation.
States can shun nuclear arms races and instead focus on conventional deterrence which can give them an edge in limited conflicts.
A GNFU agreement will allow states to maintain smaller arsenals and retain reduced alertness levels. This will also achieve the cause of non-proliferation.
By slowing down nuclear competition and pledging that no nuclear weapon state will carry out a first strike, other non-nuclear countries have less incentives to go nuclear.
Moreover, traditional arms control agreements including the NPT are costly to enforce because they require regular verification of compliance. On the contrary, GNFU only requires a commitment towards no first strike and states are not required to forgo their nuclear programmes.
GNFU is a pragmatic solution to slow the spread of nuclear weapons and bring down risks of an accidental nuclear catastrophe. It is likely to foster better relations between nuclear weapon states and improve international security.
The NPT regime's efforts to achieve disarmament is an impractical goal in the short run, and instead the international community must focus on a prohibition of first use through a GNFU mechanism. NPT has run its course and GNFU is more realistic and suited to contemporary strategic challenges.
India, which is committed to a no first use policy, must take the lead on GNFU and engage with other nuclear powers. There is also scope for engaging with China which is the only other country with a similar policy.
Obviously, this is easier said than done. However, persuading nuclear weapon states to give up first use is more realistic than making them give up nuclear weapons altogether. And for this to happen, it is also important that India remains committed to a no first use policy and resist attempts to dilute it.
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