Stephanie Halcrow
COVID-19 highlighted the importance of a robust and resilient supply chain. Suddenly, Americans were personally aware of the impact of supply chains interruptions in everyday items like toilet paper. The importance of the supply chain for strategic and critical materials is not as well appreciated. Even less appreciated is our country’s dependence on foreign sources for these strategic and critical materials in everyday items like cell phones, vehicles, and even microchips. Imagine a scenario where cell phones and vehicles were as scare as toilet paper was in 2020.
This is not a new problem. In 1939, Congress determined certain strategic and critical materials in the United States were deficient for common defense. Congress directed not only the acquisition of stocks but also encouraged the development of mines to decrease the “dangerous and costly dependence” on foreign nations. Congress gave responsibility for the acquisition of stocks to the Secretary of War (now the Secretary of Defense) and the responsibility of the “development, mining, preparation, treatment, and utilization of ores” to the Secretary of the Interior. Over time, Title 50 was amended placing responsibility of these efforts with the President who was charged with making “scientific, technologic, and economic investigations concerning the development, mining, preparation, treatment, and utilization” for new domestic sources of supply. Even with this elevation of responsibility, the United States is more reliant on foreign sources of strategic and critical materials than it was 83 years ago.
The federal government is aware of the “dangerous and costly dependence” on foreign nations. In 2019, the Department of Commerce issued a Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals with six Calls to Action, 24 goals, and 61 recommendations. The Government Accountability Office recently reported on the effectiveness of this federal strategy and found room for improvement.
In 2021, the Department of Commerce published yet another review of critical minerals and materials in its report Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth. This review leaned heavily on the 2019 Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals echoing the same challenges and outlining similar recommendations. Surprisingly, the review was led by the Department of Defense which bears responsibility over stock piling activities but none over developing new domestic sources.
There are two problems with our current approach to ending our country’s reliance on foreign sources of strategic and critical materials. The first is the preference for the short-term solution of stock piling without pursuing corresponding comprehensive long-term solutions to conserve existing and develop new domestic sources of strategic and critical materials. Commendable, but not comprehensive, are sections in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act emphasizing the importance of maximum efficiency and effectiveness in the Federal permitting process for developing new domestic sources as well as research and development funding for recycling of critical minerals for energy technologies. Also, applaudable are recent efforts of the Senate Armed Services Committee to authorize $1 billion for the National Defense Stockpile and both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees’ highlighting the diminishing stockpile of antimony. Antimony being one of the strategic and critical materials the United States is 100% reliant on foreign sources for primary production yet there are domestic sources of the material available for mining.
The second problem is relying solely on the Department of Defense to solve this problem. The responsibility to ensure our country’s independence lies with departments other than Defense. With a recently enacted statutory and longstanding environmental regulatory frameworks, other entities within the Federal government are tasked with the responsibility to secure our supply chains and focus on developing domestic production capabilities. The Department of Defense cannot do it alone.
Concerned about the dangerous and costly dependence on foreign sources of semiconductors, the federal government advocated, and Congress passed in 2021 the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America (CHIPS Act). The 2021 CHIPS Act authorized, and funded in 2022, federal incentives for semiconductor fabrication, assembly, testing, advanced packaging, and research and development. Instead of stockpiling semiconductors, the CHIPS Act focused on a comprehensive approach to developing domestic capacity. Instead of placing responsibility under the Department of Defense, the CHIPS Act falls under the Department of Commerce.
As CHIPS Act focuses on downstream development capabilities, upstream development - essentially domestic mineral production - is subject to longstanding National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) permitting processes. Congress has attempted to streamline, yet maintain the integrity of, these processes statutorily, but true reform has always been met with stiff resistance from the environmental community. It is incumbent on the White House and the leadership involved in NEPA processes to adhere to strict timelines to bring domestic mining projects online.
Following the CHIPS Act blueprint, and through NEPA accountability, the federal government should advocate, and Congress should authorize, and fund, a comprehensive approach to conserve existing sources and develop new domestic sources of strategic and critical materials. It is time to stop stockpiling and start developing.
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