Tanvi KULKARNI
The report synthesizes insights and conclusions reached by a special research project jointly launched in 2021, and from two days of closed policy discussions held among panels of experts earlier this year. The report summarizes the outcome of those discussions for the first time, including panelists’ policy recommendations for leaders in China, India, and Pakistan to review as they consider how best to navigate the evolving nuclear security picture in the region.
The author of the report, APLN Policy Fellow Dr Tanvi Kulkarni says ongoing efforts to increase nuclear weapons stockpiles and modernize nuclear weapons could see Southern Asia’s three nuclear weapons powers stumbling into a crisis. As Dr Kulkarni puts it, “The ‘nuclear trilemma’ involving China, India, and Pakistan in Southern Asia is a low-risk but high-impact, and still relatively understudied, geopolitical threat.”
Key findings of the report include:Disagreement on the nature of the nuclear security situation in South Asia: Some see a situation of ‘two asymmetric dyads’ – China-India and India-Pakistan – dominating the countries’ security arrangements. Others see the three countries trapped in a “nuclear chain”— where China adopts a more aggressive nuclear weapons posture in response to moves by the United States, and India responds to China’s moves, further prompting Pakistan to respond to India’s moves. Other policy professionals argue that the three nations are locked in an ‘evolving nuclear trilemma,’ one that is rife with tensions and contradictions.
A less volatile Sino-Indian deterrence equation, as compared to the India-Pakistan equation. One view is that nuclear developments in India and China are tenuously related to each other even if there are linkages and reciprocal arming. The absence of a nuclear crisis between these two countries has denied them the mutual learning about deterring each other. These experts argue that coherence in the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad, on the other hand, comes from reciprocity, nuclear learning about deterrence, and negotiated CBMs that place nuclear weapons in a well understood context. Another view is that it is not the absence of nuclear dialogue or crises, but the low salience of nuclear weapons in their bilateral relations which characterises the Sino-Indian deterrence equation as less volatile as compared to the India-Pakistan equation.
Low risk of a deliberate nuclear incident in Southern Asia: New dynamics in the region are, however, poised to change the calculus. The ongoing efforts to increase nuclear weapons stockpiles and modernize nuclear weapons could see Southern Asia’s three nuclear weapons powers – China, India, and Pakistan – inadvertently stumbling into a crisis. The main drivers of conflict between India, Pakistan, and China in Southern Asia include unresolved territorial disputes, use of terrorism by one nuclear state against another, perception of the other’s relationship with third countries, and perception of the other’s intent.
Strategic risks exacerbated by new disruptive technologies: Technologies including drones, hypersonic systems, anti-satellite capabilities, and cyber and space-based capabilities, can drive misperceptions about others’ intentions and capabilities and increase the chances of accidental nuclear use, especially if they are used for risk manipulation. Improved military infrastructure in conflict zones is likely to accelerate mobilisation on Indian and Chinese sides and lead to greater misreading of the other’s strategic orientation.
Role of External actors: The United States and Russia – play an important role in the security dynamics of Southern Asia. The United States is not geographically a part of Southern Asia but has relatively greater influence, orientation, and interests in the region. The rapidly changing international situation also impacts Southern Asia – specifically new geopolitical alignments like the QUAD, BRI and AUKUS carry military implications for the region as well as for bilateral relations in Southern Asia.
The report puts forth ten clear policy recommendations for leaders that, if adopted, would greatly reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange between India and China or India and Pakistan. Some of the key recommendations include:Bilateral/multilateral dialogue: As it stands today, there is no mechanism for nuclear weapons diplomacy between China, India, and Pakistan. The report stresses that this deficit must be corrected urgently.
Strategic risk reduction measures: These would include multilateral steps aimed at avoiding nuclear war. The author points to the mutual security agreements been the US and USSR during the Cold War as an example.
Updating existing bilateral agreements: This includes updating the agreement that India and Pakistan have to inform one another of nuclear accidents or incidents. New bilateral pacts between China and India should also be considered.
Naval CBMs: The three nations’ bids to advance their naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean highlight the need for three-way confidence-building measures such as incidents-at-sea agreements.
No first use (NFU) agreement: China and India already have stated no nuclear first use policies. Pakistan should join them, and the three governments should align to formalize bilateral NFU policies.
Sharing best practices: This would involve trilateral meetings to discuss and share best practices on safety at both military and civilian nuclear facilities. Such talks could even be expanded to “other military and non-military strategic technologies like space-based systems and space debris, cyber-weapons, lethal autonomous weapons, hypersonic, and dual-use platforms,” Dr Kulkarni writes.
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