Janusz Bugajski
The assassination in Moscow of the daughter of an influential Russian imperial ideologue, Alexander Dugin, has confirmed that the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine is rebounding back into Russia. The FSB, Russia’s security service, quickly blamed Ukrainian operatives for the Moscow attack, but this may be aimed at disguising something even more serious for the regime.
There are three potential explanations for the assassination of Darya Dugina, all of which intensify the Kremlin’s domestic crisis: a Ukrainian attack, a growing armed rebellion, or an internal power struggle. Kyiv has denied involvement in the Moscow bombing, even though FSB accusations will elevate respect for the capacities of Ukrainian special forces and raise morale in the country in defiance of Russia. Dugin’s daughter was a propagandist on state television who vehemently supported the murder of Ukrainian civilians and will be seen as a valid target.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s purpose in blaming Kyiv may be to lay the groundwork for mass military mobilization, a step that he has thus far avoided because it would be an admittance of military failure. Moscow is running out of capable recruits as military losses continue to mount, while mass mobilization will place the economy on a war footing to divert more resources to weapons production.
The Kremlin prefers to blame an external enemy for the Moscow car bombing than admit to the possibility of an internal rebellion or a regime power struggle. Either of these two scenarios would make the allegedly invincible “power vertical” seem vulnerable to disruption. Soon after the Dugina assassination, a group styling itself as the National Republican Army claimed responsibility for the attack and stated that it was part of a sustained campaign to bring down the Putin regime.
The car bombing is the most dramatic incident to date, but the shadow war inside Russia has intensified over recent weeks with dozens of cases of sabotage and arson reported from diverse regions. The bombing of arms and fuel depots close to the Ukrainian border is evidently the work of Ukrainian special forces, but strikes against military recruitment offices in far-flung regions, the derailment of military trains, and other acts of sabotage appear to be the work of a growing internal resistance movement.
A third explanation for the Moscow attack is an escalating power struggle among Russia’s political and economic elites. Putin’s security henchmen may be sending a signal to militants such as Dugin to stay in lockstep with the Kremlin and not criticize its conduct of the war. Intra-elite opposition may become increasingly divided between hawks who want a full-scale war with Ukraine and factions seeking to scale down hostilities and an accommodation with Kyiv to ease international sanctions and prevent further economic decline. The assassination may be a signal by Putin to all factions not to oppose Kremlin policy openly or face violent purges.
Regardless of the motives and actors, the Dugina assassination has crossed a line in Russia. Since the beginning of the war, the regime has tried to downplay the impact of its “special military operation” on the country’s economy and society. But as citizens now realize that Moscow itself is not immune from bombings, the sense of fear and uncertainty will grow, and the Kremlin’s propaganda of success will become increasingly hollow. Moreover, attempts at full mobilization to expand the war may have the reverse effect by intensifying resistance against the regime. The worst news for the Kremlin would be a combination of all three threats — Ukrainian, internal, and systemic — in the midst of accelerating economic decline and escalating military losses.
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