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6 August 2022

Breaking Down the Taiwan Problem

JOSEPH DETRANI

The Cipher Brief: How do you expect President Xi Jinping to respond to this visit by Pelosi in the long-term? Beijing was quick to put out some fairly strong warnings about a response if the House Speaker went through with her plans to visit.

Ambassador Detrani: This is a series of events and the Pelosi visit is part of that. We saw President Biden say twice that the US is prepared to militarily defend Taiwan. We have possible legislation going forth with Bob Menendez and Lindsey Graham talking about making Taiwan a non-NATO ally, not with a Mutual Defense Treaty Agreement, but a non-NATO ally with provisions to provide them with the weaponry necessary to counter any form of aggression.

From Xi Jinping and from China’s vantage point, this is escalation. This is movement towards encouraging Taiwan to move towards independence, which for China is a red line.

There is a lot of concern in China on this issue, certainly for Xi Jinping. But Xi Jinping is coming up on the 20th Party Congress, probably in October, and he doesn’t need any more grief. He’s got the COVID lockdowns, he’s got a lot of hiccups with the economy, certainly with the real estate sector. He doesn’t need more problems — but he’s got to address the Taiwan issue. It’s a seminal issue, it’s the core issue. If he shows weakness on this issue, it will eat away at his authority.

Now, he’s likely to be the president for life. He’s going to secure a third term in October, so he needs to show strength on the Taiwan issue. So yes, China has to respond. The rhetoric has been very intense, and I think they made it almost compelling for Speaker Pelosi to go forward with the visit, even if she was reconsidering it, because China had some strong language out there saying, “You will not, you should not visit.” And that’s a marker that they should not be putting down. This wolf warrior mentality works to their advantage.

I think Xi is going to have to do something. I don’t think China is going to have a boycott or an embargo. I think that’s premature, but I think they’re looking at that. I think that’s a contingency they have. They’re probably going to be looking at launching some missiles into the Taiwan Strait, probably more than 20 miles within Taiwan’s defense perimeter. They’re going to intensify the aircraft that will intrude into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. They’re going to make things difficult in the South China Sea for the US and its allies.

I think there will be a very strong reaction but I don’t think it will get to the same level as in the 1950s, when they were bombing Quemoy and Matsu. And I’m sure China has this as contingencies — where they could take Quemoy and Matsu, and force an embargo and a boycott. But this would be premature. This would not be the right time to move forward with that. But they will undoubtedly move forward with the intrusions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.

The Cipher Brief: Quemoy and Matsu are outlying islands. Is that correct?

Ambassador Detrani: Outlying islands, exactly right. In the 50s, China was significantly bombing those islands to intimidate the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taipei.

The Cipher Brief: All those things that you mentioned — the missiles, the increased potential for aircraft to infringe upon the air identification zone of Taiwan, increased maritime activity — those have all been talked about this week in the US press. What’s the likelihood that China may do something outside of the range of options that you just mentioned?

Ambassador Detrani: I think there’s always the possibility of a boycott and embargo. I think that’s something that the PLA probably has been working on, but that would be a significant escalation. I think it would still be significant if China stayed with the aircraft going into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, missiles into the Taiwan Strait and very aggressive military exercises meant to intimidate Taiwan. Personally, I don’t think the US will escalate as long as China does not go into Taiwan’s actual space — not their identification zone, but actually flying over Taiwan. China will probably get close to that line, and they may try to get the Taiwan Air Force to come out into confrontations. That’s where there could be significant escalation because Taiwan has no choice but to respond if China is flying into their territorial airspace. And I think China will push the limit to that point and try to get Taiwan to engage with them. But again, Xi Jinping has to modulate his response to this. He doesn’t want significant escalation with the United States certainly before the Party Congress in October.

The Cipher Brief: How do you explain to people who may not understand this issue in depth, why this visit is such a big deal? On one hand the US is telling China that they support a One China Policy but they’re doing it while also sending Taiwan lethal aid to defend itself. How would you explain this to folks who don’t have the history of it the way you do?

Ambassador Detrani: The issue for normalizing relations with China, going back to President Richard Nixon’s visit in 1972, indeed was the Taiwan issue. Then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told his counterpart at the time, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, that the US does not espouse a policy of two China’s, or China and Taiwan. And that was the deciding point for China to say, “Okay, we can do business with you now.” So, what does that translate into? Right from the beginning, we told China very clearly that we recognize that Taiwan is part of China. And indeed, in our communiques, we acknowledge that both sides agree that there’s one China and that Taiwan is part of China.

But then we had the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which is when Congress told the executive branch, that we should normalize relations with China but we should not forget our friends in Taiwan, the 20 million plus people who are living there. Let’s ensure that if there is unification, it’s done peacefully. Let’s tell China, ‘Fine. We agree with One China, but maintain peace and do not use military force.'” And that’s been our consistent position on this.

I think President Ronald Reagan, with the Six Assurances in 1983, that he gave to Taiwan and the world, made it very clear that we will continue to provide military assistance to Taiwan to defend themselves and to tell very clearly tell China, “Peaceful reconciliation. Peaceful unification.” And that’s been our consistent position.

But we have to remember, if you’re sitting in Beijing and you’re asking, “Hmm, are you changing your position? Are you now saying that you will militarily support and defend Taiwan? Are you now saying you will provide not only defensive military equipment to Taiwan, but also any military equipment to counter any perceived or actual aggression? Are you changing the type of relationship? By these actions, are you encouraging Taiwan to say, ‘We no longer want to unify with China? We’re not interested.’ And this is the rub. This is where we are right now.

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