Seth Cropsey
A pivotal issue in Ukraine’s defense is the West’s—and the U.S.’ in particular—ability to provide weapons and ammunition swiftly enough to defeat Russia. As Western arms shipments continue, the Ukrainian military will become more capable. Several thousand Ukrainians are now training in the UK and Eastern European NATO states, learning to employ new Western weapons. A multi-week lag exists between weapons delivery and employment because of this training. As the gap shrinks, Russia will face the unsavory prospect of redeploying its overwhelmingly concentrated units to the south, yet still being outmaneuvered and possibly outnumbered. Over time, then, Ukraine’s advantages will accumulate enough to make a serious Russian strategic reversal probable.
Nevertheless, Ukraine’s Western benefactors face a structural issue. It is not the Kremlin’s “commodity war” strategy per se. Although global food and energy pressures will cause macroeconomic stress, an impending Euro-American recession has already reduced oil prices to pre-February 24th levels. Fertilizer producers are adjusting to Russian-induced supply chain disruptions, and excess capacity has increased enough to make a price drop probable, blunting some food pressures. As central banks tighten, disinflationary effects will manage price growth, albeit too late to avoid pressure on consumers. Absent a brutally frigid winter, additional food supply disruptions, and central bank unwillingness to combat inflation, the Russian commodity weapon will disgruntle Western publics, but may not derail Western policy.
Rather, the West faces a “shell crisis” decades in the making. In short, while American and allied military stockpiles and production volumes are sufficient to sustain only Ukraine, the possibility of horizontal escalation in Europe, and the looming threat China poses in the Indo-Pacific, point to a broader materiel crunch.
While Western standard tube artillery have a greater range than their Soviet-era counterparts, this was not what motivated Ukraine’s shift. Rather, Ukraine encountered a shell crisis reminiscent of the World War I. Few factories beyond Russia and Belarus still produce Soviet-standard 152mm ammunition, and there are only a handful of remaining stockpiles in the former Eastern Bloc. Ukraine burned through its ammunition reserves within the war’s first eight weeks. Hence Ukraine’s repeated requests for Western artillery stemmed from practical considerations: the West has ammunition to spare.
That is, up to a point. The modern Western defense industrial base is a fraction of the size of its Cold War counterpart. In 1991, the United States had 51 aerospace and defense “prime contractors”. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. chose to foster a functional oligopoly, hence today only five prime contractors remain. The same three contractors produce nine-tenths of the U.S.’ missile stockpile. Of the U.S. Army’s three-barrel artillery systems, two are BAE produced.
Shell production is also limited. American manufacturing can produce around 80,000 155mm shells of various types per year. This equals Ukraine’s expenditure in around two weeks. Anti-tank missile production is also insufficient. The U.S. has already provided Ukraine with 7,000 Javelin ATGMs, while Lockheed Martin, the Javelin’s only producer, can create at most 4,000 a year. Stinger missile production chains have been cold since the early 2000s – many of the necessary parts are no longer fabricated. Ukraine has now received Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and various anti-air missiles to counter Russian standoff strikes. Only around 7,500 Harpoons have been produced. America purchases around 100 new missiles of various types every year. By comparison, Russia used up to 2,000 missiles in the Ukraine War’s first four months. U.S. allies are in no better shape: according to a recent wargame, British ammunition stockpiles would evaporate after only eight days of high intensity combat.
The United States shrank its stockpiles and industrial base because of two assumptions. First, precision weapons were expected to reduce overall ammunition expenditure. Rather than maintaining massive stocks of unguided munitions, the U.S. sought to create limited stocks of guided munitions that, when combined with stealth aircraft, would be enough to throw any adversary off balance. Second, modern combat dynamics pointed to short, sharp wars, not drawn-out high-casualty engagements demanding intensive munitions expenditure for months or years.
Both these assumptions were flawed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the relevance of traditional military factors – mass, concentrated fires, preparatory actions, and large, all-round platforms – in modern combat. Precision-guided munitions would shift combat dynamics, but they would not have a decisive impact on the conflict, at least not independently. The U.S. and its allies need quantity alongside quality.
Moreover, we remain near the bottom of the metaphorical escalation ladder. Thus far, Russia has attempted to fight its war of conquest with only limited means. The Kremlin hoped to induce a Western and Ukrainian collapse by presenting an international veneer of overwhelming superiority. It still pursues an informational strategy. Soon, however, it will be confronted with a choice: total mobilization and actual war, or strategic defeat with its attendant domestic risks. Fighting a much more aggressive war, Russia may deem it necessary to test Western resolve more sharply. The British Army has refocused on large-scale conventional European ground combat. This combat may come far sooner than we expect, perhaps even this year. Hence remedying a munitions shortfall is of the utmost importance.
Certain aspects of this shortfall can be remedied. The U.S. can establish an entity akin to the Second World War’s War Production Board, which helped private businesses transition to producing military equipment. American manufacturing is nowhere near the juggernaut it was in 1941. But it is entirely conceivable that, for example, American automobile companies could produce munitions to replenish artillery stockpiles.
Nevertheless, the weapons most common in the Ukraine War are relatively easy to produce. Artillery pieces and shells are, in military terms, cheap items. “Dumb” rounds have a sticker price of around $2,000, and extended range rounds up to $87,000. Each Harpoon Block II, by contrast, costs $1.4 million. Each hypersonic missile will cost $50-$100 million, although with greater production quantity costs may drop to $10 million a unit. These sorts of weapons will be needed to fight and win in the Indo-Pacific. They are expensive, technically complex, and will take time to produce. It is, moreover, impossible to ramp up production without significant notice, or more specifically, without extant defense industrial capacity. Time is of the essence, and the only defense manufacturers the U.S. can work with today are the extant ones.
The solution is as obvious as it is politically difficult. Congress must increase funding for high-end weapons production, accelerating hypersonic development to a commensurate degree. It must ensure the health of multiple production sites and foster increased defense productivity.
In turn, this requires long lead times. The Pentagon and Congress must jointly communicate to the defense industrial base that the United States is committed to expanding production. Multi-year and multi-decade contracts for production should be on the table to give the U.S.’ high-end producers the time needed to expand production and ramp it up before a major conflict.
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