Seth Cropsey
Perception and reality are difficult to untangle in any conflict. But the Ukraine War is the first great power conflict waged fully in the Information Age. Both parties have sought to influence global narratives and manipulate international perception.
War is, nevertheless, a physical phenomenon. The fall of Snake Island demonstrates Russia’s physical inability to defeat Ukraine. The West should respond accordingly, pressuring Russia where it is most critical - in the maritime space.
Snake Island produced the Ukraine War’s first “internet meme”, a sign of its psychological importance to Kyiv and Moscow. The small, uninhabited outcrop’s garrison of a handful of Ukrainian Border Troops defiantly refused Russia’s demand to surrender. Ironically enough, the Russian warship that bombarded the island, the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva, was sunk some six weeks later near Snake Island.
Snake Island is well under a kilometer in area and has an elevation of only 45 meters. However, it has a dual political and strategic role. Politically, it marks the boundary of Ukrainian territorial waters, jutting out from the Danube Delta into the Black Sea. Militarily, a hostile power holding Snake Island can pressure Ukrainian, Romanian, and other naval and maritime movement in the Western Black Sea. Snake Island is a decisive maritime geographic point, a position from which one can limit hostile options and expand one’s own.
By taking Snake Island on the war’s first day, Russia gave itself a significant degree of leverage over Ukraine’s maritime position. Combined with the Moskva’s air defenses, it could prevent Ukrainian missile and drone attacks in the Black Sea, better cover its forces in Kherson Oblast, and over time threaten Odesa with bombardment or amphibious assault.
Ukraine, however, destroyed the Moskva in April. This was not only a psychological victory. It also removed from Russia a major mobile air defense platform. This left Russian forces on Snake Island and in the Western Black Sea vulnerable to attack. Ukraine kept up the pressure, hitting Russian attack craft and landing ships, and sporadically bombarding Snake Island. Russia sought to redeploy point air defenses to Snake Island, mitigating the effectiveness of Ukrainian missiles and UCAVs. However, armed with Western artillery, Ukraine could neutralize Russian point air defenses - some air defense platforms are designed to intercept small targets, but artillery shells or guided rockets are too small to identify.
Russia’s withdrawal demonstrates that the Russian military’s fundamental weakness is at sea. Russia can concentrate combat power at specific points, generating incremental gains and wearing down Ukrainian combat forces, as they have done in the Donbas. Elsewhere, Russia remains vulnerable. But Ukraine has yet to press an attack powerful enough to drive Russia back and jeopardize its strategic position, whether around Kherson or Kharkiv. Rather, it has conducted shaping operations designed to put Russia in a strategic bind, but not dislodge it.
Russia’s control of Kherson Oblast is its most crucial territorial possession. With Kherson in hand, and control of the Black Sea, it can prevent most Ukrainian exports from reaching the Mediterranean. It is this leverage that Russia hopes will crack Western morale and force a negotiated settlement in Moscow’s favor by the end of the year. At minimum, rising food and energy prices will spark international disorder, diverting Western attention. At best, hopes Russia’s high command, the West will fold under public pressure.
Russia’s loss of Snake Island presents the West with an opportunity to regain the strategic initiative and support Ukraine’s more active pressure on Russia. A tanker escort mission would fulfil both imperatives.
By escorting Ukrainian merchant shipping from Odesa, the West can alleviate Russia’s consciously induced global food crisis. Russia hopes to commandeer any available Ukrainian foodstuffs and repackage them as Russian products. But some 20 million tons of Ukrainian grain remain in silos. An escort mission, akin to Operation Earnest Will, under which the US defended Kuwaiti oil transports against Iranian disruption during the Iran Iraq War, would get these valuable foodstuffs into the global market.
Any escort mission would require an extensive de-mining effort, one beyond any operation the US and its allies have conducted since World War II. The US Navy has a handful of mine countermeasure ships. But the US’ Black Sea allies, namely Romania and Bulgaria, can provide additional support with their minesweeper fleets. Turkey must also be included given its status as a Black Sea power - this should form the basis of a NATO-Turkey rapprochement.
An escort mission can also create a buffer behind which Ukraine can build its strength. Odesa is a natural location for equipment stockpiling before a Kherson counteroffensive given its proximity to NATO-member Romania. A screen of Western warships separating Ukrainian merchantmen from Russian missiles can give Ukraine the time it needs to expand its capabilities, train units in-country, and deploy them when the time is right.
A de-mining and escort mission would also involve an air presence, primarily in Romania given its proximity to the maritime space in question. The US could increase extant fighter presence in Romania, while also forward-deploying a P-8 squadron to cover the Black Sea more effectively.
Finally, the US must confront and deter Russian warships still in the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia placed a major naval task force in the Levantine Basin before 24 February, including surface combatants, attack submarines, and shore-based anti-ship missiles and aircraft. Some of these forces are now trapped in the Black Sea, due to Turkey’s closure of the straits. The remainder, primarily surface combatants, must be outmuscled. This will require a robust naval deployment, likely including a Carrier Strike Group and additional surface combatants, submarines, and ground-based air support.
The Biden administration seems increasingly committed to European defense, and in turn, to Ukraine’s survival. This is commendable. It is not, however, ground forces that will shore up NATO’s eastern flank, but robust maritime presence that will protect NATO interests. The US must act decisively to break Russia’s Black Sea blockade.
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