“I am more worried about the future of the Taiwan Strait than I have ever been. Ominous trends are building on all three sides of the [Washington-Taipei-Beijing] triangle, and conflict could be the result. It is by no means inevitable, or even the most likely future. But for the first time in decades, I can see a plausible path to disaster in the Taiwan Strait.”
Rigger was (correctly) worried that political movements on the island, coupled with Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness and Trumpian incoherence, could upended the status quo and potentially trigger a military conflict. Rigger identified two pernicious political trends on the island: the ascension of pro-Beijing populist Han Kuo-yu, the (now-former) KMT Mayor of Kaohsiung, and the uncertain ambitions of Lai Ching-te, a self-identified member of the DPP’s pro-independence faction. Tsai entered the election as a significant underdog, with some polls showing her support at around 20 percent.
Fortunately, the island – and the world – escaped a potential calamity, as President Tsai managed to secure an improbable come-from-behind victory against extremists within her party and in the KMT. Tsai, after overpowering Lai in the DPP primary, decisively defeated Han in the January 2020 presidential election. It’s not clear if this luck will hold.
Many analysts appear to be underestimating the risks of a PRC-Taiwan conflict amid the ROC’s next presidential election in January 2024. The PRC’s military capabilities are growing, political opinion on the island continues to move against Beijing, and the Ukraine conflict has concentrated the minds of ROC defense planners and their friends. Instead of purchasing expensive (and, frankly, nearly useless) defense systems, the ROC military is finally procuring “porcupine” capabilities that would make a PRC invasion and occupation difficult, if not impossible. Bill Bishop has, in my view, correctly raised the possibility that PRC planners perceive a narrowing window of opportunity in the coming years. An extremist victory in the ROC’s 2024 presidential election could upend dual deterrence; alternatively, the CCP could conceivably attempt to pursue a military solution out of aggression, insecurity, or both. It’s too soon to say how the ROC’s 2024 election will evolve, but the probability of a major cross-Strait crisis within the next three years is already significant and appears to be rising.
A potential Taiwan contingency will likely shape Western policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. While supporting Ukrainian sovereignty is important for both practical and symbolic reasons, Taiwan is a flourishing constitutional democracy, one of the world’s 20 largest economies, and home to about 20% of all world semiconductor capacity. As Kharis Templeman wrote, “America’s global reputation and influence have far more at stake in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan than a Russian one on Ukraine.”
Ideally, the Free World would respond to the existing crisis in Ukraine and a potential one involving Taiwan by expanding its military industrial capacity for asymmetrical warfare and insurgency, such as anti-tank guided missiles, anti-ship missiles, artillery, floating mines, small arms, ammunition, etc. More likely, however, American dysfunction and Germany complacency, not to mention the practical difficulties associated with rapidly scaling industrial production, could limit relevant military industrial capacity expansions in the near-term. Western policymakers should continue to support Ukrainian independence while considering which scarce military resources must be conserved for a potential Taiwan contingency.
The Biden administration is rebuffing some of Taiwan’s requests for big-ticket weapons, instead urging Taipei to buy other equipment the U.S. believes will better deter and defend against China, according to U.S. and Taiwanese officials and documents obtained by POLITICO.
In the first polling on voter sentiments in 2022, the Blue-leaning TVBS Public Opinion Center (TVBS, 民調中心) conducted a survey in January of the satisfaction ratings for major political figures in Taiwan, and the results provide a glimpse into who voters may want to see in the running as presidential candidates in 2024. According to the poll, the top five most popular political figures in Taiwan with their corresponding popularity ratings are: Hou You-yi (侯友宜, 70 percent), Chen Shih-chung (陳時中, 57 percent), Ko Wen-je (柯文哲, 48 percent), Chen Chi-mai (陳其邁, 46 percent), and Cheng Wen-tsan (鄭文燦, 46 percent). Chu Li-luan (朱立倫), the current chairman of the KMT, came in 13th place with a 21 percent satisfaction rating.
If the KMT chooses self-preservation and shifts its cross-strait policy platform to reflect Taiwan’s mainstream views, Xi Jinping will face his own dilemma. Beijing will find it difficult, if not impossible, to sustain its fictional narrative of a Taiwanese population yearning to rejoin the Chinese motherland. And if the KMT does not forsake the 1992 Consensus, its waning political relevance will similarly beset Beijing, albeit in chronic rather than acute fashion. A cross-strait policy formulation that can satisfy the needs of both the CCP and KMT may no longer exist.
Beijing’s increasingly credible operational capability arguably represents the most fundamental change in the cross-strait dynamic in more than four decades. It imparts more leverage to Xi than his predecessors enjoyed—one of whom suffered the ignominy of failing to bend Taiwan to China’s political will during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Beijing keenly understands that without a credible invasion threat, China cannot coerce Taiwan into submission.
There should be neither shame nor fear in building Taiwan’s capacity to deter or deny an attack—a mission that serves U.S. and allied vital interests. As it does with other U.S. agencies’ activities, the American Institute in Taiwan should promote military-to-military interactions through statements, press conferences, websites, and social media. With more assertive U.S. leadership on security cooperation with Taiwan, close allies would also increase cooperation themselves, further weighing on Beijing’s calculus.
Taiwan Vice President William Lai had surgery for herniated discs on his spine on Sunday after complaining of acute lower back pain, which went successfully and he is expected to be out of bed and walking by the evening, the presidential office said.
2) The Russian Economy
The most extreme predictions for how much the Russian economy will contract this year are around 12-15 percent. More modest estimates say it will be between 7-9 percent. But still, even Russian economists say it will be severe.
"The current recession is of a transformational, structural nature and will be bigger in scale and length in all scenarios" than the last one, Russian central bank researchers said in a report released in April, referring to the downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Vladimir V. Putin is making gains in his war on Ukraine while the United States and its allies struggle with soaring energy prices and inflation.
Buying cheap Russian oil has allowed China to diversify its own reserves and given India a lucrative revenue stream by reexporting refined products like gasoline and diesel from the Russian crude. For the moment, the purchases don’t risk triggering secondary sanctions while the European Union’s current oil ban remains partial, but Beijing and New Delhi’s willingness to buy Russian oil will be put to the test later this year once stricter measures come into effect.
RFE/RL: Apart from buying oil, China has shown itself to be very cautious when it comes to avoiding triggering secondary sanctions imposed on Russia by the West. Should we expect Beijing to give more overt support to Russia in the future, especially when it comes to advanced technology like semiconductors?
Shagina: China's balancing act is very delicate and, as the war progresses, it will be more difficult for Beijing to keep this position of so-called "pro-Russian neutrality," where they’re officially neutral but lean toward Russia.
Since 2014, Russia has had rather high expectations of Beijing to step in to help out [with] this very difficult [financial] situation for Moscow. The Kremlin has since had a more sober assessment in terms of how much help can realistically be expected from China, but even now Russia is rather disappointed by the lack of support from China.
The Russian economy has held up surprisingly well in the face of Western sanctions designed to cripple it – with the rouble becoming the world’s best performing currency so far this year. Soaring oil prices have once more proven a boon for this fossil fuel-dependent economy. Beneath the surface, however, supply shortages in some sectors are starting to take a heavy toll.
3) The War in Ukraine
A secretive operation involving U.S. Special Operations forces hints at the scale of the effort to assist Ukraine’s still outgunned military.
4) Chinese Perspectives on Russia and Europe
European Union (EU) leaders have accepted Ukraine and Moldova as candidates for membership of the bloc, European Council President Charles Michel said on Thursday.
"Agreement. #EUCO has just decided EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. A historic moment," Michel announced on Twitter. EUCO is short for the European Council, which is currently being attended by EU leaders in Brussels.
The heads of state and government of the EU member states approved the European Commission's recommendation at the start of their two-day summit in Brussels from Thursday to Friday.
Ukraine applied for EU membership shortly after the conflict with Russia began in the end of February.
In an interview with People's Daily Online, Irina Yaregina, the scientific research director of the Russian National Committee for BRICS Studies, pointed out that over the years, the BRICS mechanism has practiced multilateralism and created a new model of cooperation between countries.
Yaregina said that the COVID epidemic persists, financial risks are increasing, and the technological gap between developed and developing countries has exacerbated the imbalance in global development. The development of multilateral cooperation among BRICS countries will help solve many global problems and ensure the well-being of people of all countries.
Comment: Moscow has been skeptical of BRICS expansion plans, which could dilute Russian influence due to the turmoil in the Russian economy.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on the 25th that Russia will provide Belarus with the "Iskander-M" missile system in the next few months.
According to the Kremlin website, Putin held a meeting with visiting Belarusian President Lukashenko in St. Petersburg that day. The two sides discussed the shortage of food and fertilizer in the world market, the response to NATO training flights and the national security of the Russian-Belarus Union.
When talking about training flights of U.S. and NATO aircraft carrying nuclear warheads near the Belarusian border, Putin said that there is no need to take reciprocal measures, but the security of the Russia-Belarus Union State countries [俄白联盟国家] and other Collective Security Treaty Organization countries must be ensured.
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