Operationalizing the Quad

Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Joshua Fitt and CDR Andrew J. Adams

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Introduction

The Quad—made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—is becoming the principal multilateral group shaping the geo-economic and technological future and the strategic orientation of the Indo-Pacific. Strengthening the Quad is a central pillar in the Biden administration’s strategic plan to compete more effectively with a rising China. Although the Quad leaders currently avoid publicly discussing defense-related initiatives and do not seek to make the Quad into a NATO-like organization, the Quad’s purpose is undeniably strategic. Its aim is to provide a counterweight to China’s growing economic and political influence in the Indo-Pacific and put forth an alternative vision of a free, open, transparent, inclusive, and peaceful region as opposed to one dominated by China’s authoritarian ideology.

The idea of a Quad dialogue among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States was conceptualized by then–Prime Minister of Japan Abe Shinzo around 2007. Abe was inspired by the formation of the Tsunami Core Group, which was created in response to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean as a way for the four nations to cooperate on disaster relief efforts.3 The first-ever Quad meeting of senior officials occurred in 2007 on the sidelines of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum meeting. Days before the meeting, China démarched all four capitals, inquiring about the agenda of the meeting and whether it would have an anti-China focus.4 That same year the Quad countries plus Singapore participated in the Malabar naval exercise, which India holds annually with the United States and Japan, in the Bay of Bengal. The Australians decided to withdraw from the Quad in 2008, in a move likely aimed at placating China, a major trading partner. The Indians—who share a disputed border with China over which they fought a war in 1962—also indicated a degree of uneasiness with the Quad around the same time.5

The Quad, however, was revived 10 years later, in November 2017, during the Trump administration. Building on a series of working-level meetings held in 2017 and 2018, the Quad met at the ministerial level in September 2019 and again in October 2020. In addition, two virtual meetings were held at the deputy national security advisor level in March and May 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the same timeframe, then–Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun held a series of virtual biweekly meetings to address issues related to COVID-19 with the Quad countries plus New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam. Also in 2020, for the first time in 13 years, India included Australia in the Malabar exercise.

The impact of the COVID-19 global crisis and China’s aggressive military, political, and economic moves in the wake of the pandemic strengthened the desire of all four countries to elevate and operationalize the Quad. Whether it was cutting off Vietnam’s access to its fishing waters, undermining Hong Kong’s self-rule, deploying submarines to threaten Japan, suspending Australian beef, barley, and other imports, or contesting Indian territorial sovereignty along the Line of Actual Control separating India and China, Beijing lashed out on several fronts.6 These actions have all taken place following an ambitious, multi-decade People’s Liberation Army modernization program, which has resulted in a vastly stronger and more capable force. Substantial new military power appears to be emboldening China’s approach toward regional disputes. Chinese economic coercion aimed at Australia and border aggression toward India reinforced for these countries the benefits of the Quad as a way for powerful like-minded democracies to combine resources and capabilities and take collective action to support the maintenance of a free, open, and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

The COVID-19 pandemic also highlighted the dangers of overdependence on China for critical goods. China’s ability to disrupt medical supply chains led the Quad countries to consider ways they could work together to build more resilient global supply chains for critical minerals and technologies.

Since the Biden administration took power in January 2021, it has strengthened U.S. commitment to the Quad and taken the group to the next level. In the past year, the Quad has held four summit-level meetings—two virtual and two in person—the latest being held in person in Tokyo on May 24, 2022. The Quad leaders released their first joint statement following their virtual meeting on March 12, 2021, and an even lengthier proclamation following their first in-person meeting, held at the White House on September 24, 2021. The increasingly substantial joint statements of the Quad leaders are a testament to their growing commitment to the group and its objectives.

The Biden administration has focused Quad efforts on issues such as economics, technology, climate change, public health, cybersecurity, and maritime domain awareness (MDA) but has shied away from defense-related initiatives. The Quad countries have a mutual interest in meeting the challenges stemming from China’s efforts to dominate the economic and technological landscape in the Indo-Pacific and its attempts to control the supply chains for critical minerals and technologies. The Quad also has a role to play in helping to set standards and norms for the use of emerging and critical technologies to ensure that they are developed and deployed in a manner consistent with a free, open, transparent, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. By combining resources and expertise and bringing to bear shared democratic values, these four powerful nations can shape the environment in which new technologies will emerge and protect global access to critical technologies.7

This paper assesses Quad activities and the progress the group has made toward its stated objectives of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. It provides a detailed assessment of the Quad’s efforts to address areas that have already been singled out for special focus: critical and emerging technologies, vaccines, climate change, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity. The paper also examines the prospects and challenges for expanding Quad cooperation on trade and economics as well as security and defense issues. Although the Quad currently downplays security and defense issues, the authors explore future possibilities for defense collaboration in the event increased military aggression or conflict should threaten the overall stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region. Finally, the paper makes policy recommendations for strengthening Quad cooperation on all the issues mentioned above and concludes by noting that a failure to make concrete progress on at least some of these initiatives in the next year will sap regional confidence in the group and provide space for China to assert regional dominance.