Robert O'Brien
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) was a U.S. naval officer and strategist whose works received widespread global acclaim. His contributions retain modern relevance, as shown by the stream of current commentary referencing Mahanian theory.[1] Mahan focused on strategy rather than tactics, rendering his contributions relevant today despite technological advancements changing the nature of naval engagements at the tactical level.
Mahan’s published his breakthrough book in 1890, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783.[2] His overarching philosophy is the interdependence of military and commercial control of sea lanes and how such control can determine conflicts.[3] To ensure control of sea lanes distant from the home region, Mahan advocates for a network of bases connecting the home region and areas of strategic importance, whether for commercial, political, or military reasons.[4]
Mahan gained international renown during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly among emerging naval powers (the United States, Japan, and Germany) as well as legacy naval powers (Britain, France, and Russia). Mahan enjoyed celebrity status among heads of state. For example, German Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered all naval officers to read Mahan, while at the same time Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz commissioned a German translation of The Influence of Sea Power upon History and distributed 8,000 copies to the officer corps and every vessel.[5]
Mahanian theory has influenced the development of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).[6] But it is easy to overstate the extent to which Chinese decision-makers prioritize Mahan in strategy and naval development.[7] Author James R. Holmes claims that Chinese naval theory hybridizes Mahanian-Maoist doctrine.[8] Maoist doctrine, developed in the 1980s, assumes the PLAN approaches any engagement as the weaker force, thereby requiring an emphasis on selective tactical engagements and support from land-based and air-based forces to prevail in a naval confrontation, culminating in an “anti-access” zone protecting the Chinese near-seas.[9] Holmes contends that Chinese strategists retain a Mahanian philosophy, where sea power has three purposes in order of priority: assuring commercial, political, and military access to regions of interest.[10]
Application of Mahan’s Determinants to Chinese Conditions
In Chapter 3 of The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Mahan identifies the following determinants of sea power: (1) geographical position, (2) physical conformation, (3) extent of territory, (4) number of population, (5) national character, and (6) character of the government.[11] I will further define each and then consider China’s conditions.
Determinant 1: Geographical Position[12]
Under Determinant 1, Mahan emphasizes that countries with minor or nonexistent land borders (such as islands) enjoy a sea power advantage, because the country can focus on sea power rather than land threats. Mahan contrasts the histories of England and France in this respect, with France’s naval development suffering regular disruptions by land wars.
Second, Mahan assesses whether a country’s position lends itself towards concentration or dispersion of naval forces, where concentration increases sea power. Countries like France and the United States experience a geographic position tending towards dispersion; France’s sea power is split between (1) the Atlantic and Channel coasts and (2) the Mediterranean coast, requiring forces to circumnavigate the Iberian Peninsula and Strait of Gibraltar to reach the other area; likewise, U.S. sea power is split between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.[13]
Third, Mahan assesses whether a country’s position grants a central position from where it can launch hostilities against probable enemies. A country carries an advantage when it occupies a position which enables it to deploy concentrated forces against any one of multiple fronts quicker than the enemy can proportionally respond.[14]
When applied to China’s conditions, Determinant 1 provides mixed indications toward Chinese naval power. On the unfavorable side, China is bounded on three sides by land borders that risk distracting Beijing from sea power development. Most notably, China has a longstanding and periodically violent border dispute with India on the western and eastern ends of the Himalayas. [15] On the favorable side, China’s position promotes naval power concentration rather than dispersion, as China’s single coastline allows for relatively straightforward north-south transit for naval forces. Lastly, Mahan might view China as possessing the central position in potential US-China naval hostilities, because China’s central coastal provinces (Zhejiang and Fujian) jut out from the continent to separate the East China Sea and South China Sea, forcing enemies to either transit far around China’s central position. However, Taiwan could act as a countervailing central position against China should the island remain independent and able to endanger Chinese forces transiting the Taiwan Strait.
Determinant 2: Physical Conformation[16]
In the words of Mahan, “the seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers; and the easier access offered by the frontier to the people beyond, in this case the sea, the greater the tendency of a people towards intercourse with the rest of the world by it.”[17] Primarily, countries enjoy sea power advantage when they host multiple deep harbors, doubly so if such harbors exist at the terminus of navigable rivers extending inland that funnel internal trade towards the coast.[18] Second, Mahan adds that a country tends towards sea power when its domestic agricultural and natural resources output is insufficient to support its population and economy. He again compares the relatively unproductive lands of England to the bountiful lands of France, which pushed England more towards sea power and commerce to supply domestic markets with foreign imports.
China carries an advantage in Mahanian physical conformation. Three significant rivers, the Pearl, Yangtze, and Yellow, run west-to-east towards Chinese coasts, where estuaries and bays host megalopolises with historically unprecedented populations. Over half of China lives in coastal provinces and generates over 60 percent of GDP.[19] Fifteen of the top 50 container ports in the world are Chinese, with seven of them occupying top-ten positions.[20] Finally, China now relies on imports for food and certain resources. As the population urbanizes, China has run larger food trade deficits and has become the world’s largest oil importer.[21] Almost all oil imports, with exception of Russian supplies, require ocean shipping via the Malacca Strait.[22]
Determinant 3: Extent of (Coastal) Territory[23]
According to Mahan, the extent of coastline and quality of harbors contribute to greater sea power. Determinant 3’s analysis overlaps with Determinant 2 and folds into the analysis above.
Determinant 4: Number of Population[24]
A country’s population increases its tendency toward sea power because it increases the manpower available for its navy, merchant marine, and labor force to support its naval-industrial complex. Determinant 4 strongly favors China’s sea power. China’s population and economic capacity has translated into the world’s largest navy by vessel count (355) and the world’s largest coast guard (over 200 vessels).[25] Interestingly, the total active duty personnel count of the PLAN and China Coast Guard have yet to eclipse the that of the United States, but that is likely to change because of increasing Chinese budgets.[26] Chinese naval power is further augmented by auxiliaries from the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, although the size of the force is uncertain.[27] China is also a global leader, albeit not dominant, in shipbuilding. The largest shipbuilder in the world by revenue is China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, earning $42 billion in 2016. Chinese firms captured $70 billion of the $196 billion in total revenue of the top ten global shipbuilding firms.[28]
Determinant 5: National Character[29]
In the words of Mahan, “if sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea” (see note for disclaimer on essentialism).[30] Throughout history, China has had a complicated relationship with seafaring. Chinese trade often involved non-Chinese peoples, such as Austronesians, Tamils, Persians, and Arabs conducted the commerce.[31] To be sure, periods of Chinese maritime excellence exist, most notably during the Ming dynasty reign of Zhu Di (1402–24).[32] But these examples are exceptions. In the words of Emperor Qianlong after a British trade mission in 1793, “we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious [British trinkets], and have no use for your country’s manufactures.”[33]
Modern developments indicate a pivot from a stereotypical commercial Sinocentrism. Chinese firms maintain global commercial interests and the Chinese private sector now holds a more prominent role than at any prior point in Chinese history.[34] China holds the second largest outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock at $2.4 trillion, although it is eclipsed by U.S. stock measured at $8 trillion.[35] Comparing yearly outbound FDI flows between the United States and China does not suggest that China’s outbound FDI stock will overtake U.S. stock anytime soon.[36] Nevertheless, China leads in global goods trade as exporter or importer in 12.4 percent of global trade. Such unprecedented commercial energy is likely to override any historic aversion to the seas.
Determinant 6: Character of the Government[37]
Mahan argues that certain government forms and leader personalities have generated more sea power for their country than others. Mahan does not argue that democratic forms of government are most favorable towards sea power, but that “a government in full accord with the natural bias of its people would most successfully advance its growth in . . . the matter of sea power.”[38] He contends that governments that incorporate popular input (not necessarily through enfranchisement) are most likely to align with the “natural bias” of its people. However, despotic governments have periodically directed a country towards great sea power status faster than democratic governments by wielding “judgment and consistency” towards sea power.[39] Mahan notes that despotic regimes will struggle to retain sea power during successions of despots.
In this regard, Mahan does not disqualify China from great sea power status because of its authoritarian government. A capable despot may marshal the development of sea power faster than similarly situated democracies. While it may be impractical to provide an objective analysis of Xi Jinping’s performance at this point, it is apparent that he has prioritized the development of naval power. Xi has placed naval power in the center of state rhetoric regarding Chinese resurgence, declaring that China should pursue “true maritime power” status to ensure a “peaceful rise” in pursuit of the “Chinese dream.”[40] However, Xi’s emphasis on naval development is a continuation from his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.[41] This bodes well for Chinese sea power, as it shows that naval development is not the pet project of a zealous and charismatic leader (see Russia’s Peter the Great) but a shared vision embedded across China’s ruling elite.
Conclusion
Mahan’s determinants suggest that China will rise as a significant sea power in the 21st century, which is no longer a controversial assertion. However, Mahan’s long-term, strategic, and case study–based perspective on naval power exposes certain limiting variables, such as geographic location, that limit Chinese sea power.
Despite its rising status as a leading sea power, China’s power is inherently a continental one. Land borders will distract China from a whole-hearted naval vision, particularly as India develops into a continental rival in the 21st century. Moreover, China’s near seas present a claustrophobic environment for its navy. Despite impressive ship count, budgetary growth, and capacity building, the Chinese navy’s home seas are fenced by multiple island chains before reaching the open ocean of the Pacific. In addition, Chinese naval interests in the Indian Ocean and westward will be constrained, as ships would be vulnerable transiting the Strait of Malacca and circumventing India’s central position. India would not easily let China gain dominance in the Indian Ocean. China’s rise is undeniable. It is not inconceivable that China becomes the most powerful naval force later in the 21st century. But there is significant reason, informed by Mahanian theory, to conclude that the Chinese sea power will not be a hegemonic force on par with the eras of Dutch, British, and U.S. naval hegemony.
No comments:
Post a Comment