Minxin Pei
Typically, the most effective foreign policy pairs smart tactical substance to an overarching strategic theme. Framing a foreign policy correctly can sustain domestic political support, attract allies and provide the intellectual guidance for action. Conversely, flawed framing can undercut any good that specific policies may otherwise be doing. When it comes to China, US President Joe Biden’s administration risks falling into the latter trap.
In most respects, the White House’s China policy is delivering excellent outcomes. Unlike his Republican predecessor, former President Donald Trump, Biden has assiduously cultivated friends and allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. The United States is well on its way to building a broad-based coalition that could help sustain an open-ended rivalry with China.
Biden has also kept pressure on China by retaining tariffs on Chinese imports (although he may remove some to fight inflation) and imposing additional sanctions on Chinese technology firms. At the same time, Biden has opened lines of communication with Chinese leaders to avoid dangerous escalations. His key national security advisers now meet with their Chinese counterparts regularly. Biden himself has held three phone calls and a virtual summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He is expected to speak with Xi again in the coming weeks.
These tactical successes, however, are being undermined by Biden’s framing of the China challenge. In his first news conference in March last year, Biden called the US-China rivalry “a battle between the utility of democracies in the 21st century and autocracies.” Last December he convened a virtual “summit of democracies” to underscore the same theme.
Casting the competition with China as part of a grand battle against autocracy is at best foolish and at worst self-destructive. At a minimum, this narrative sounds hypocritical to US partners. Few of the existing or potential allies Washington needs to confront China are model democracies. Vietnam is a communist dictatorship, Thailand is effectively ruled by a military junta, and democracy in the Philippines and India has been deteriorating at alarming speed. Biden’s own visit to Saudi Arabia this week underscores the necessity of working with non-democracies.
Moreover, it’s simply not true that the U.S.-China competition is part of a global contest between democracy and dictatorship. Countries backing the U.S. such as Japan, Vietnam, Australia and India are doing so mostly because of the threat China poses to their national security. Japan is hardly known as a tireless champion of democracy promotion. India’s continued cozy ties with Russia are testimony to its pragmatism, not its ideological commitment to democracy.
To many third countries, the US approach to China also seems more about power than ideology. These countries suspect — probably correctly — that the US is largely motivated by fears of losing its global primacy; casting the rivalry with China solely in ideological terms thus invites accusations of intellectual dishonesty. Indeed, Graham Allison’s book, “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” has become a bestseller because its central argument — that competition for power, not ideology, is driving the U.S. and China toward conflict — resonates around the world.
Biden’s crusade for democracy may also paint the U.S. into a corner because it implies regime change in China is the only acceptable outcome of this competition. Logically, the U.S. wins the competition by defeating China’s autocracy. This zero-sum endgame raises questions about whether the two great powers can co-exist peacefully.
Finally, and most dangerously, Biden’s framing ignores the mortal threat to US democracy at home. As revealed by the recent hearings held by the Jan. 6 committee, a defeated Trump came perilously close to overturning the outcome of a legitimate presidential election. Today, the risk that US democracy may unravel has, if anything, grown due to extreme political polarization and Trump’s dominance of the Republican Party. If the US fails to defend democracy at home, its call to vanquish dictatorship in China can’t help but sound hollow.
How should the US approach this critical struggle instead? It may be enough to justify China policy on grounds of fundamental national interests. Biden can make clear to Americans, allies and China that the US is looking solely to advance its own security and economic interests. Compromise and cooperation with China are possible so long as its conduct does not harm such interests.
While this pragmatic and honest framing may sound less lofty than Biden’s — and less suited to the kind of sweeping appeal that politicians like to think inspires Americans — it will likely deliver better long-term outcomes. Ironically, it accurately describes the substance of Biden’s China policy to date. When he talks to Xi, Biden should make sure his rhetoric more closely matches his actions.
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