Eli Y. Huang, Reginald Y. Lin
Introduction
On January 21, General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping promoted seven senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military and armed police officers to the rank of general: Political Commissar (PC) of Northern Theater Command Liu Qingsong, Commander of Central Theater Command (TC) Wu Ya’nan, PC of Central TC Xu Deqing, PC of Army Qin Shutong, PC of Navy Yuan Huazhi, Commander of Rocket Force Li Yuchao and PC of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) Zhang Hongbing (Xinhua, January 21). The personnel changes were the latest in a spree of promotions by Xi, who has elevated a record 38 officers to the full general rank since 2019. Xi’s rapid promotion of so many generals is extraordinary as it breaches long-standing military convention. In the past, the CMC chairman has normally presided over only one round of promotion of full generals per year, usually around Army Day on August 1 (八一, bayi) (China Brief, January 25).
Uncertainty surrounding the promotion process for PLA generals has increased since Chinese military reforms kicked off in 2016. Such developments triggered a discussion of whether objective qualifications have been replaced with Xi’s subjective preferences. Since judging the candidates’ relations with Xi and the level of subjective preference is difficult, this article argues that basic qualifications – age, seniority and experience, and other indicators for advancements such as key positions, leader’s preference and party involvement – remain key considerations for promotion. Nevertheless, as some observers have suggested, changing patterns of generals’ promotion may also reflect Xi’s efforts to ensure he retains his core leader status at the 20th Party Congress in late 2022.
Basic Qualification – Age, Seniority, Experience
Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) launched sweeping military reforms in November 2015, the organizational structure of the CMC has not only been reshaped and the hardware of the PLA upgraded, but the military officer grade and rank system has also been restructured to strengthen joint operation capabilities. The reorganization has altered promotion patterns in the military ranks, and the qualifications of some generals promoted by Xi have broken with past convention. The intersection of lengthy reform processes and potential underlying political motives increase the difficulty and uncertainty of assessing the significance of the promotion of PLA generals. Many are of the opinion that as Xi has consolidated control of the military that previous objective qualifications for promotion have been superseded by Xi’s subjective preference for personal loyalty. For example, generals that Xi knew when he worked in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces from 1985 to 2007 have received more promotion opportunities. [1]
However, building a modern military still requires regulation and standardization of education, training, assessment and promotion processes to manage and cultivate talent in key leadership positions. It is also difficult to judge the candidates’ relations with Xi and the level of subjective preference. Therefore, this article argues that age, seniority, and experience are still important qualifications for generals in the promotion process. We have assigned the following scoring system for these three qualifications in the promotion process (See Table 1):
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