Peter Layton
How did we end up here? We all thought Putin's modernized Russian army was ten feet tall and led by a General who, in military thinking circles, is a veritable rock star. What gives?
Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, in 2013 wrote a famous article that with Russia’s 2014 capture of Crimea was seen as a how-to-guide for overthrowing governments in nearby countries. Russia would use social media and covert interference to turn the population against its government, use economic measures to make it poor, and diplomatic measures to make sure it had no friends. Right at the end of this long, drawn out process, a small Russian invading force would attack, inspiring the populace to rise up and mount a coup that would install a pliant leader.
Good in theory, and many bought the idea across the world.
Gerasimov’s regime change ideas have failed dismally in Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Russian fifth columnists inside Ukraine were quickly disarmed, the special force airborne assault on Hostomel airfield near Kyiv failed, Russia’s army was halted, and Ukraine became more united and determined.
After its 2014 success, Russia kept conflict bubbling away in the Donbas. These long, hard years built a strong Ukraine nationalism not there when Crimea was captured. It seems Putin and Gerasimov have no idea what’s really happening today in Ukraine. (Note, Vitaly Gerasimov, a Russian General of similar name, was killed fighting in Ukraine recently)
Worse, Gerasimov had designed a modern Russian army under Putin’s leadership based on an active defense concept. This envisaged waging a fighting withdrawal that would bring an enemy deep into Russia to be destroyed, as was done against Napoleon’s and Hitler’s armies.
Gerasimov has now committed Russia’s army to a large scale offensive operation into another country defended by highly motivated soldiers. Russia’s army does not have the logistics systems to supply the fuel, munitions and food its advancing mechanized forces need. It's unsurprising army morale is a growing problem. Lastly, the invading force is too small, some 200,000 strong, to subjugate a country of 44 million angry people.
Today’s Russian army is not designed to fight a war of invasion – it’s too small, not properly equipped, poorly trained, and lacks the will to fight.
Wrong war, wrong army, wrong time, but this creates problems for Ukraine.
First, Gerasimov's active defense stresses firepower to both wear down an attacking force and the economic infrastructure of the attacking nation. This is firepower from tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft area bombing, rockets, artillery and cluster munitions.
The use of such firepower against the cities and critical civilian infrastructure looks like Russia's only path to some form of military victory. The model in play seems that of Mariupol: 500,000 people cut off, no power, no water and constant shelling to destroy habitations. This may bring Russia victory but leaves a wasteland and is against the laws of armed conflict.
Second, in making a wasteland, Gerasimov’s army will leave a ruined Ukraine behind. The rebuilding effort will be immense. Russian assets have been seized around the world. Rather than returning them to Russian control after the war finishes, should they be used to rebuild the ravages of the war Russia started?
Third, Gerasimov’s active defense doctrine stresses attacking critical infrastructure in Ukraine, including nuclear power plants. In its emerging wasteland policy, Russia may try to shut the nuclear reactors down it has captured in a way that prevents their being restarted because of radiation concerns.
Four, Russia’s use of offensive social media warfare continues. Russian cyber support for anti-vaxxers is now quickly shifting towards hating refugees. As done previously with Syrians, Ukrainian refugees will be actively depicted by Russian cyber trolls and bots as criminals, rapists and terrorists. Russian aims to create social discord in countries accepting them.
Fifth, there is a rising concern about Russian sabotage operations extending beyond Ukraine into NATO countries supporting the Ukraine resistance. Western leaders constantly state that if Russia attacks NATO, the alliance will attack back. This seems aimed at deterring Russian sabotage operations; it may not work.
Lastly, the front lines appear almost stabilizing. Even so, Russian forces are expected to make advances and encircle Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and other major towns and then rely on a wasteland policy to bring their surrender. This still leaves vast tracts of Ukraine unconquered, including Lviv, which may become the capital of unoccupied Ukraine until the war ends. There is a looming disaster of food security.
Occupying powers should ensure food supplies for civilians under their control. Russian soldiers, however, have been ransacking supermarkets as their supplies run out and they get hungry. Russia will need to start and keep feeding the millions of civilians coming under its control. It seems unlikely it will be able to and perhaps may not want to.
Equally, the unoccupied parts will need external help as food runs out. NATO may need to set up major food supply transit routes deep into Ukraine. Hopefully, these will be under UN authorization, but this needs Russia’s support on the Security Council. If not, faced with millions starving, military power and no-fly zones may need to be used to bring relief. Moreover, this large-scale humanitarian problem will last well beyond war's end.
Stalin’s Soviet Union withdrew food supplies in Ukraine in the 1930s, starving some four million to death. Putin laments the USSR's fall. Hopefully, he won't allow a repeat of one of its darkest deliberate actions
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