Filippo Fasulo
On June 23rd-24th, China will virtually host the 14th BRICS Summit. This event comes at a relevant time as the world order goes through a structural transition. To be sure, the great power competition between China and the US had already started with the Trump administration, in particular after the Trade War was launched in March 2018. However, between the pandemic and the war in Ukraine the US-China rivalry has been significantly accelerated. The outcome of the competition will culminate in a new world order with new power balances for the US, Europe, Russia, China, India, and the developing world. For this reason, the main players’ actions to spin this transition to their own advantage have been exceptionally remarkable.
What China wants to get from this year’s BRICS Summit is to significantly improve its international consensus and show the international community that Beijing is not isolated — together with Russia —among the world’s autocracies. The need to present China as an integrated member of the international community and to gain substantive consensus over its foreign policies is not new. However, it needs to be reinforced given the current times marred by war and mounting US pressure to contain Beijing through new and renewed regional initiatives, such as the QUAD, AUKUS, IPEF, and President Joe Biden’s emphasis of the clash between democracies and autocracies.
A “free rider” or a “positive contributor” to the international community?
It is worth noting that over the past few years, China has long been accused of playing the “free rider” role within the international system. Hence why Beijing has increasingly sought to establish itself as a positive contributor to global public goods over the last decade, particularly as regards developing countries’ security and economic development. China’s way of presenting its security and development activism across the globe goes hand in hand with its criticism of the current US-led world order. There is, therefore, an attempt on the Chinese side to present itself as an active part of a new international system that foresees the redemption of former colonial countries or nations considered to be at the margins. It is ultimately an effort to present China’s foreign policy on a South-South basis, as opposed to whatever might be done by the United States or the European Union. This was also the idea beyond the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 not only as an infrastructure plan, but also as a new way to boost globalization under the “mutual benefits” and “win-win cooperation” mission. Unfortunately for China, the BRI did not completely fulfill its goal of winning over global consensus due to US counteractions (e.g., Build Back Better for the World) and China’s poor performance in providing real win-win deals for partner countries in the BRI projects.
However, Beijing’s need to build international consensus by presenting as a positive player that provides development and security has not disappeared as it is necessary to boost its international relations and facilitate economic interactions. For this reason, President Xi Jinping has relaunched Chinese foreign policy with two sister initiatives: the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI). The former was proposed by the Chinese President at the 76th UN General Assembly on September 22nd, 2021. The timing of the occasion was no accident as it feeds into Xi’s desire to assume a central role in the context of multilateral development, promoting China’s foreign policy as in line with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. As in the case of the GDI, the GSI – presented in April at the Boao Forum – plays into a narrative to attract international consensus over China’s goal of revising the current international security order. It is no coincidence that the articles accompanying its launch in the Chinese press highlight the weaknesses of the global security architecture, historically designed by the West.
BRICS: enlargement in sight?
As such, the GDI and GSI could be seen as a prelude to the BRICS Summit, where the members will show unity and claim that another (non-Western led) world is feasible. The best way to do that is by approving an enlargement of the membership, potentially in the format of BRICS Plus. This format seems to have received an initial approval at a foreign ministers’ dialogue on May 20th. The attendees — alongside BRICS members — included emerging economies from Latin America, Asia, and Africa such as Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Senegal, the United Arab Emirates, and Thailand. In the case of a BRICS enlargement, China would score an important diplomatic victory as it would entail there are developing countries that don’t fear aligning with China and Russia within a non-Western framework. China would also emerge victorious in case of endorsement towards the GSI and GDI, signaling that Beijing can shape the international narrative.
Given India’s position as a fundamental pillar for the Indo-Pacific vision – aimed at contrasting China’s growing influence – its role at this BRICS Summit will be in the spotlight. A full endorsement of China’s policies would come as a surprise – much like its neutrality vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine. However, it is possible to imagine that New Delhi shares the same interest as other BRICS partners in strengthening emerging economies’ voice. What is sure is that the process of redesigning the international order as characterized by great power competition and emerging powers has only just begun and the 14th BRICS Summit will be a relevant stage.
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