Armies Need, You Know, Soldiers

Mackenzie Eaglen

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For the first time in 20 years, the US Army is set to dip below one million troops in the latest budget request. As with resources, there is no magic benchmark to guarantee security, but this decline reveals a worrisome trend for the Army and its sister services. Despite a modest drawdown in the Middle East, demands for Army (and other) combat power remain on the rise.

The president’s fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget request cuts Army active duty levels from FY 2022 authorized levels of 485,000 to 473,000 soldiers. Army leadership stated that the drop is not necessarily an effect of budgetary pressures, but rather recruiting challenges that might not be resolved without either lowering uniformed number goals or recruiting standards—the latter of which the Army Deputy Secretary Gabe Camarillo says the service would not accept.

What is the real cost, if not budgetary? The readiness and sustainability of the present force. For years, Army leadership has stated goals of maintaining and growing end strength while simultaneously reducing operations and unnecessary training (i.e. training to “keep busy” and that which is mission non-essential). In 2020, the Army acknowledged that they have been practicing quite the opposite, as readiness operations with the current force have “resulted in an unsustainable operational tempo and significant demands on units, leaders, soldiers and families and stress on the force.”

Over the past few years, the Army’s operations tempo across the globe has dramatically increased. A few examples include over 1,000 air defense units being sent to the Middle East as tensions with Iran continued to boil. This spring, President Joe Biden deployed hundreds of Special Operations troops to follow the reestablishment of base operations in Somalia. Armored Brigade Combat Teams are also in high demand, with three in Europe, one in Korea, and an armored division of the Army National Guard team in Central Command. This, compared to the US’s standing commitment of one armor unit in Europe and one in Korea, is extremely high. In addition, there are smaller missions that arise, such as the recent mobilization to Kosovo, which added a yearlong deployment for an Army aviation brigade and National Guardsmen.Gen. James McConville, U.S. Army chief of staff, speaks at a dedication of Generals Bridge and Park in Quincy Center on Saturday, Sept. 11, 2021. Via REUTERS

Further straining soldiers are the back-to-back rotational deployments that are making these missions possible. Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville said he “like[s] rotations every four years,” but that they are close to one every three at this point. That is a recipe for burnout. Shrinking forces further will only tax existing troops more.

Despite efforts to cut back, the US Army’s to-do list is getting longer. Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth has focused her leadership on ensuring the Army is “well positioned” to serve as the “linchpin service” in the Indo-Pacific—where it will certainly have a role—across communications and logistics support as well as direct combat. In addition, the Army released its first climate strategy, which tasks the service to adapt global Army installations and infrastructure to meet climate goals and train for a “climate-altered world.” Both of these mandates come in addition to maintaining the current elevated pace of operations—particularly in Europe.

The Army needs units to reestablish healthier deployment-to-dwell ratios and meet increased demand where appropriate. It is impossible to accomplish quality of service across these missions without the quantity to give the service strength and influence—even the projections of which contribute greatly to our deterrence. In May, Army leaders wrote to the Senate Armed Services Committees stating that the new regionally-aligned readiness model “takes care of people by reducing operational tempo and maximizing predictability and stability to commanders, soldiers, and families.” Declining operational tempo would be terrific were it to happen. But it is highly aspirational given how much the request for forces is outside Army leaders’ control.

Army Forces Command General Michael Garrett perhaps said it best: “It’s time for us to start sweating more because we don’t know when or where the next war will happen, but when it does, I don’t want to see soldiers bleed.” Trying to maximize predictability for forces and families is helpful but only as a first step. The Army needs to both maximize end-strength numbers to match demand, as well as the threats of the unknown future. And Congress should exercise its oversight to properly fund and enable the service to make these changes.