George Friedman
Henry Kissinger recently spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, where he made two significant statements. One was that Ukraine must be prepared to cede some territory to Russia in order to reach a peace treaty, and in doing so allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold on to his position, which Kissinger regards as essential. He also said that Taiwan should not be allowed to become a major issue between the U.S. and China, implying that the U.S. was making it an issue, and by my inference that the Chinese seizure of Taiwan should not trigger a U.S. response.
In both cases, Kissinger believes it is in Washington’s interest to accommodate its adversary. He’s arguing that America’s utmost concern should be global stability, which requires accommodating the interests of nations that want to shift the regional balance of power. In other words, the stability of the former Soviet Union, including the political survival of Putin, will stabilize the region and increase global stability. Likewise, ceding Taiwan to China would stabilize the Western Pacific and increase global stability.
Kissinger held this view when he was advising presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. During the Vietnam War, the goal was not to win the war – he correctly regarded it as unwinnable – but to avoid a confrontation with China and the Soviet Union. In order to do that, he retained U.S. forces in Vietnam in an unwinnable war to give Moscow and Beijing a sense of American inflexibility, even as he carried out intense bombing in the north to demonstrate America’s willingness to wage aggressive warfare. The ultimate goal was to force the North Vietnamese and its allies to reach an agreement that would allow the U.S. to withdraw from Vietnam in due course and thereby stabilize relations with the Soviet Union. He wanted to show the U.S.’ mettle while maintaining a degree of flexibility. In this convoluted fashion, the war was extended, even lost, but the fundamental goal of a detente with Russia was achieved.
Likewise, his mission to China in the early 1970s had a strategic payoff. The Soviets and the Chinese had fought battles along the Ussuri River. The Russians were considering strikes on China’s nuclear facility at Lop Nor, and China was challenging Russia for leadership of the communist world. Kissinger approached the Chinese with the offer of an understanding between the U.S. and China. The strategic concern of the United States was a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Aligning with China created the possibility of a two-front war. Kissinger had no interest in a war, but the threat would reduce that danger by creating an unacceptable risk for Russia, which paradoxically helped the U.S. reach an understanding on coexistence, reduced the risk of war and stabilized the global system. It also laid the groundwork for the emergence of contemporary China.
Kissinger’s thinking was complex, sometimes seemingly heading away from his ultimate goals, but he focused on a single issue: the threat of the Soviet Union, and thus the threat to the global order. The Soviets threatened Europe, they threatened China, they fished in the Caribbean Sea, and they were a nuclear power. He was prepared to pay any price for that because he saw the Soviets alone as a threat to the global system.
The Soviets postured as though they were willing to risk up to and including nuclear war. In my opinion, they used this posture as a cape to goad the bull into spending energy on matters the Soviets were not interested in. For all his subtlety, Kissinger had a very simple end: avoid direct war with the Soviets and allow them the initiative so that the U.S. could respond and thus demonstrate its will to Moscow. Kissinger was obsessed with the Soviet Union, so when it started to support groups in Latin America, the U.S. responded. The Soviets did not see themselves as nearly as powerful as Kissinger did, but learned that if the main was quiet, Chile, Syria or Angola could be agitated.
Kissinger’s response to the Russian attack on Ukraine flows from the same logic. He sees a conflict between Iraq and Syria as frightening the Russians concerning U.S. intentions. He sees Putin as he saw Leonid Brezhnev: as a potentially stabilizing force that is less dangerous than a power vacuum filled by a less flexible person. In that sense, defending Ukraine could simply make things worse.
With China, I think a different but related dynamic was at play. Kissinger’s greatest achievement was opening China and making it an ally. In his mind, he achieved it through accommodation, but in fact it was because China never lost its fear of the United States. After the U.S. inflicted massive casualties on the Chinese army, Mao saw the U.S. as powerful, the U.S. saw China as a possible ally, and each went away relieved by the deal.
It is good to overestimate your enemy so that you are prepared for the worst. But excessive miscalculation will blind you to opportunities and make you beholden to moves by the other side. I think that for Kissinger the failure of the British and French to understand how powerful Germany was drove him to fear repeating their mistakes. This informs his positions on ceding territory to Russia and China. The weaker party must be the cleverer one and approach the obvious with utter caution. Global stability is at stake. In my view, Russia and China are declining powers, while the U.S. is the surging one. This is where you nail the door shut on your adversary.
I will confess, of course, that in the 1970s, as I rose to awareness, my fears of the Russians were as intense as anyone. But over time, as I studied their military and spoke to expatriates, I came to see them differently. That was a long time ago, and I have little right to criticize a man I admire. But thinking him wrong is not the same as being reckless. He played the game he thought he had to. He still is.
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