Franklin C. Miller
Much of the current debate about the U.S. Navy’s surface force has been about the number of ships we need. Almost none of it, however, has focused on the fact that Russian and Chinese Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities will effectively deny the Navy the ability to bring our carriers, amphibious forces and surface combatants into action. Dense Russian anti-air and anti-surface systems based in Kaliningrad pose a formidable barrier to U.S. and NATO naval operations in the Baltic Sea (already a crucial area whose importance will grow larger if Sweden and Finland enter NATO). Similarly, Chinese A2/AD systems based on the Chinese mainland and on the artificial islands Xi promised never to militarize pose a barrier to U.S. and allied naval operations in the South China Sea. If we are to bring our maritime might to bear in either theater, the A2/AD defenses must be reduced first. The relatively short legs of naval tactical air (compared to the Russia and Chinese air defenses) tend to rule these out as the answer. At the same time, the sophistication of the air defenses argue against Tomahawk as the weapon of choice, as does its relatively long time of flight (which was not a factor in Iraq but could be against a sophisticated enemy).
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