Can the U.S. Regain Battlefield Superiority against China? Applying New Metrics to Build an Adaptable and Resilient Military

BRYAN CLARK, DAN PATT, AND TIMOTHY A. WALTON

Source Link

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has undergone nearconstant reform since its founding in the wake of World War II. Frustrated by the department’s fragmented decision-making, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara restructured Pentagon processes during the 1960s to implement the same analytic and data-driven industrial approach he previously applied at Ford Motor Company.1 Additional changes ensued over the following decades: During the 1970s, the failures of Vietnam spurred the establishment of independent intelligence and assessment organizations; during the 1980s, the GoldwaterNichols Act reorganized acquisition and operational relationships to promote inter-service integration; and, during the 1990s, decreased defense spending prompted efforts to wring greater efficiencies from the defense enterprise. The pace of change only accelerated over the last two decades as defense leaders sought to produce a sophisticated, networked military by creating additional paths to speed acquisition and standing up more than a dozen new support agencies and combatant commands to address emerging missions.