Indian Strategic Studies: 12/26/21

26 December 2021

Social Media in Violent Conflicts – Recent Examples

Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)

Introduction

Alan Rusbridger, the then editor-in-chief of the Guardian in his 2010 Andrew Olle Media Lecture, stated, “News organisations still break lots of news. But, increasingly, news happens first on Twitter. If you’re a regular Twitter user, even if you’re in the news business and have access to wires, the chances are that you’ll check out many rumours of breaking news on Twitter first. There are millions of human monitors out there who will pick up on the smallest things and who have the same instincts as the agencies—to be the first with the news. As more people join, the better it will get. ”

The most important and unique feature of social media and its role in future conflicts is the speed at which it can disseminate information to audiences and the audiences to provide feedback.

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Cyber Weapons – A Weapon of War?

Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)

Introduction

The character of warfare has changed fundamentally over the last decade. In the past, it was essential for an adversary nation or insurgent to physically bring weapons to bear during combat. That requirement is no longer a necessity. In cyber operations, the only weapons that need to be used are bits and bytes. In this new era of warfare, logistics issues that often restrict and limit conventional warfare and weaponry are not impediments. This new weaponry moves at the speed of light, is available to every human on the planet and can be as surgical as a scalpel or as devastating as a nuclear bomb.

Cyber attacks in various forms have become a global problem. Cyber weapons are low-cost, low-risk, highly effective and easily deployable globally. This new class of weapons is within reach of many countries, extremist or terrorist groups, non-state actors, and even individuals. Cyber crime organisations are developing cyber weapons effectively. The use of offensive Cyber operations by nation-states directly against another or by co-opting cyber criminals has blurred the line between spies and non-state malicious hackers. New entrants, both nation-states and non-state actors have unmatched espionage and surveillance capabilities with significant capabilities. They are often the forerunners for criminal financial gain, destruction and disruption operations. Progressively, we see non-state actors including commercial entities, developing capabilities that were solely held by a handful of state actors.

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A New U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban

DANIEL R. DEPETRIS

When the U.S.-supported Afghan government collapsed in mid-August after a rapid Taliban advance across the country, President Joe Biden was quickly confronted with a choice. Should Washington work with Afghanistan's new rulers, staying well short of formal recognition but otherwise exploring whether opportunities for cooperation (fighting IS-K, for example) were available? Or should the U.S. try to exert economic and political pressure to undermine the Taliban's control of Afghanistan?

More than four months into the Taliban's reign, the Biden administration has largely taken a middle line between these two options. While U.S. officials have met with the Taliban on several occasions since the summer and remain open to the prospects of a business-like relationship, the White House is also using financial tools to force Afghanistan's de-facto government to change its ways. Washington remains adamant that the Taliban need to establish an inclusive government, allow women and girls equal access to education, stop repressing its former Afghan government opponents and ease up on human rights abuses. In other words: If you want respect and recognition from the world, you need to prove to the world you are worthy of it.

None of this economic pressure, however, appears to be having an impact on how the Taliban governs. At its core, the movement still thinks of itself as a band of fighters, not a collection of civil servants organizing trash pickup or bureaucrats collecting taxes. For hardline Taliban commanders and foot soldiers who have spent their entire lives battling U.S. soldiers and various governments in Kabul, the winners of the war hold the spoils—and the world doesn't have any right to dictate how the winners choose to operate. The Taliban may be modifying some of their conduct in terms of women's education and saying some of the right things, but the organization's first priority is maintaining internal cohesion. Any step that could potentially jeopardize this, like embracing more liberal social norms, will likely be avoided.

Trends in Terrorism: What’s on the Horizon in 2022?

Colin P. Clarke

With the world still reeling from the global COVID-19 pandemic, nearly two years in the making, few know what to expect terrorism trends to look like heading into 2022. However, certain trends from previous years seem likely to continue and may grow more severe. The terrorist threat is arguably more diverse than at any point in recent memory, with the threat posed by far-right extremists and jihadists joined by a growing roster of political and socio-cultural motivations, including ‘technophobia’ or neo-Luddite terrorism, violent anarchists, and extreme misogynists, especially those following the so-called ‘Incel’ ideology. ‘Salad bar’ ideologies, those that combine a sampling of different ideologies, sometimes diametrically opposed to one another, are also on the rise and are best exemplified by neo-Nazis growing fetishization of jihadist ideology. And while the most lethal terrorist threats are likely to remain jihadism and far-right extremism, it is important to think about how recent developments could shape patterns of terrorism over the coming year.

The recently discovered Omicron variant of the coronavirus is already forcing vaccine mandates and new waves of lockdowns in countries worldwide, fueling violent protests from anti-vaxxers and anti-government extremists, respectively. In Italy, anti-vaxxers have linked up with far-right extremists, a combustible mix likely playing out in many other countries, not just in Europe but also in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Even good news related to the pandemic is likely to be a double-edged sword. If significant progress can be made against the virus in 2022, lifting restrictions could provide extremists with a range of new potential targets, especially soft targets where crowds may begin to congregate, including sporting events, concert venues, and farmers’ markets.

Why China could win the new global arms race

David Brown

China is building up its armed forces at a rapid pace.

Its advances in missile technology, nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence have triggered serious concern among many Western observers, who believe a profound shift in the global balance of military power is under way.

President Xi Jinping has ordered China's armed forces to modernise by 2035. They should, he says, become a "world-class" military power, capable of "fighting and winning wars" by 2049.

It is a huge undertaking, but the country is on target.

Spending big

China has been criticised by some international experts for a "lack of transparency" over how much it spends on defence, and an "inconsistent reporting of figures".

Power is Power: What’s India’s Problem with Chinese Equipment in its Power Plants?

Krzysztof Iwanek

In my favorite dialogue from George R.R. Martin’s saga, A Song of Ice and Fire, two characters known for their cunning, Varys and Tyrion, consider the nature of power. They do so through a riddle: If a king, a priest and a wealthy man sit in a room with a mercenary, whom of the three will the armed man listen to? Varys’ commentary to the riddle is that “power resides where men believe it resides.”

In the HBO adaptation of the novel, another character, Cersei, known more for her cruelty and use of strength than for a fondness of riddles, has a much more simplistic answer. After a short demonstration of physical strength of her guards on her rival she tells him: “power is power.” This quote has served as a sort of inspiration for the title of this text. Power is power, and it, of course, resides in power plants.

A Redline for Iran? America Must Decide Which Nuclear Steps Merit a Military Response

Eric Brewer and Nicholas L. Miller

Iran’s expanding nuclear program and foot-dragging at the negotiating table have imperiled U.S. plans to revive the Iran nuclear deal, forcing Washington to consider alternatives to diplomacy. In June, President Joe Biden promised that Iran will “never get a nuclear weapon on my watch.” Last month, Robert Malley, the U.S. special envoy for Iran, stated that the United States would not “sit idly by” if Iran’s nuclear advances get “too close for comfort,” echoing his prior comments that “all options” would be considered if diplomacy fails.

This is not the first time the United States has put all options on the table to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. Indeed, every U.S. president since George W. Bush has done so. For most of this time, the United States has had the luxury of not needing to think too concretely about what might trigger the military option because Iran’s program was many months if not years away from having material for a bomb. But that luxury is gone. Iran’s nuclear program is far more advanced today as a result of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. Iran is already quite close to the nuclear threshold. Its “breakout time”—meaning the amount of time Tehran would need to make enough enriched uranium for a bomb—is probably as short as a month right now—and getting shorter. According to international inspectors, Iran is enriching uranium to 60 percent (a hair’s breadth away from the 90 percent usually used for nuclear weapons), using larger numbers of advanced centrifuges that enrich faster, and carrying out experiments with uranium metal that would help with weaponization. Although Iran would probably still need a year or two to produce a missile-deliverable weapon, those activities would be much harder to detect and stop because they aren’t tracked by inspectors.

A Redline for Iran? America Must Decide Which Nuclear Steps Merit a Military Response

Eric Brewer and Nicholas L. Miller

Iran’s expanding nuclear program and foot-dragging at the negotiating table have imperiled U.S. plans to revive the Iran nuclear deal, forcing Washington to consider alternatives to diplomacy. In June, President Joe Biden promised that Iran will “never get a nuclear weapon on my watch.” Last month, Robert Malley, the U.S. special envoy for Iran, stated that the United States would not “sit idly by” if Iran’s nuclear advances get “too close for comfort,” echoing his prior comments that “all options” would be considered if diplomacy fails.

This is not the first time the United States has put all options on the table to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. Indeed, every U.S. president since George W. Bush has done so. For most of this time, the United States has had the luxury of not needing to think too concretely about what might trigger the military option because Iran’s program was many months if not years away from having material for a bomb. But that luxury is gone. Iran’s nuclear program is far more advanced today as a result of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. Iran is already quite close to the nuclear threshold. Its “breakout time”—meaning the amount of time Tehran would need to make enough enriched uranium for a bomb—is probably as short as a month right now—and getting shorter. According to international inspectors, Iran is enriching uranium to 60 percent (a hair’s breadth away from the 90 percent usually used for nuclear weapons), using larger numbers of advanced centrifuges that enrich faster, and carrying out experiments with uranium metal that would help with weaponization. Although Iran would probably still need a year or two to produce a missile-deliverable weapon, those activities would be much harder to detect and stop because they aren’t tracked by inspectors.

The Real Crisis of Global Order Illiberalism on the Rise

Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 sparked a major debate over the nature and fate of the liberal international order, suddenly caught, it seemed, between the Charybdis of illiberal great-power challengers and the Scylla of a hostile U.S. president. Trump may have lost the presidency in 2020, but the liberal order remains under threat. If anything, recent events have underlined the magnitude of the challenges it faces—and, most important, that these challenges are only one manifestation of a much broader crisis endangering liberalism itself.

For decades after World War II, the dominant factions in both the Democratic and the Republican Parties were committed to the project of creating a U.S.-led liberal international order. They saw Washington as central to building a world at least partly organized around market exchanges and private property; the protection of political, civil, and human rights; the normative superiority of representative democracy; and formally equal sovereign states often working through multilateral institutions. Whatever its faults, the order that would emerge in the wake of the Cold War lifted millions out of poverty and led to a record percentage of humanity living under democratic governments. But it also removed firebreaks that made it more difficult for turmoil at one political level to spread to another—by, for instance, jumping from the subnational to the national to the regional and, finally, to the global level.

Collusion or Collision? Turkey-Russia Relations Under Erdogan and Putin

Aykan Erdemir and Sinan Ciddi

U.S. relations with Turkey and Russia have soured over the last two decades. Once a staunch ally anchoring NATO’s southern flank, Turkey has increasingly drifted from the West. With Russia, post-Cold War hopes for strategic partnership between Moscow and the West have given way to renewed strategic competition and confrontation.

Meanwhile, despite a long history of fraught relations dating back to the 16th century, Turkey and Russia have moved closer. This report serves as an indispensable guide to the relationship between Ankara and Moscow.

To be sure, their differences are many, and mutual suspicion still runs deep. Yet the authors carefully document how the regimes of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin have managed to compartmentalize their relationship, mixing competition with substantial — if transactional — cooperation across a range of areas. Many in Washington continue to see Turkey as a bulwark against Russia, yet this report capably demonstrates that such notions are fanciful, at least for as long as Erdogan remains in charge.

Economic ties, particularly in the energy sector, drove Russian-Turkish rapprochement following the Soviet Union’s collapse. These ties remain a key pillar of their relationship, helping to buffer against growing Russian-Turkish geopolitical competition across multiple regions.

Mission Unaccomplished: Describing Failing US Military as 'Awesome'

ANDREW BACEVICH

Professional sports is a cutthroat business. Succeed and the people running the show reap rich rewards. Fail to meet expectations and you get handed your walking papers. American-style war in the twenty-first century is quite a different matter.

Of course, war is not a game. The stakes on the battlefield are infinitely higher than on the playing field. When wars go wrong, "We'll show 'em next year—just you wait!" is seldom a satisfactory response.

At least, it shouldn't be. Yet somehow, the American people, our political establishment, and our military have all fallen into the habit of shrugging off or simply ignoring disappointing outcomes. A few years ago, a serving army officer of unusual courage published an essay—in Armed Forces Journal no less—in which he charged that "a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

A New Cuba? The Fight to Define the Post-Castro Era

Jon Lee Anderson

While I was on a visit to Moscow a short time after the Soviet collapse, a retired senior Red Army general sighed nostalgically when I asked about his time in Cuba during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. “Kuba,” as he called it, heavy on the K, the rest of the word drawn out in a kind of caress, had held a special place in the Soviets’ hearts, he said. Its commitment to revolution was passionate and courageous, and in exchange, the Soviets had given everything they could to help sustain the country, going to great lengths to make sure the islanders had whatever they needed to survive. “We spoiled them,” he said, throwing up his hands and chuckling ruefully.

Cuba inhabits a special place in the imaginations of its one-time allies and would-be possessors. In the last hundred-odd years, these have included the Spaniards and the Americans, as well as the Soviets. All regard Cuba with the covetous memories of former lovers—longing mingled with knowledge of the island’s practical side, its transactionalism.

Almost from the beginning of its recorded history, Cuba has been seen in such terms, as a supine beauty ready to be seduced and taken, its fruits exploited. In a letter to Spain’s King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella in 1492, Christopher Columbus wrote lyrically of the island’s charms:

Is Israel Facing Up To Reality On Hamas and Hezbollah?

Tony Badran

On Dec. 10, a large explosion rocked the Palestinian camp Burj al-Shemali outside the southern Lebanon city of Tyre. The site of the explosion was a center belonging to the Palestinian terror group Hamas that includes a mosque and a health clinic. Residents told local media that a fire from the blast spread to the mosque, where it triggered the explosion of weapons stored inside.

On the surface, the explosion served as a reminder of Hamas’ habitual use of civilian structures for military purposes and of the group’s military activity in Lebanon. But, more important, the incident highlighted that Israel may finally be breaking with its shortsighted public posture that Hezbollah bears no responsibility for Hamas’ activity. Shortly before the explosion at Burj al-Shemali, there were long overdue signs of Israel developing a new willingness to acknowledge reality and hold Hezbollah responsible for attacks carried out in the country the group controls.

In 2018, Israel publicized an assessment of Hamas building training camps and weapons facilities in Lebanon with assistance from Hezbollah, but its posture toward Hezbollah in Lebanon mostly impeded its willingness to take any overt action to deter the buildup. Then the issue resurfaced this past May, during the brief war between Israel and Hamas. While the fighting was focused in Gaza and southern Israel, on three separate occasions that month, an unidentified group, which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at the time maintained was a Palestinian faction, fired rockets at Israel from southern Lebanon. Most of them landed in the Mediterranean or failed to make it into Israeli territory. The IDF responded with artillery shelling, and that was the end of it. No second front opened up in the north, and Hezbollah didn’t join the fray.

Ukraine’s Military Has Come a Long Way Since 2014

Amy Mackinnon, and Jack Detsch

Western officials are unsure whether Russian President Vladimir Putin has made a final decision to launch another invasion of Ukraine, but they are furiously working to build up a package of responses to deter Russia and bolster Ukraine’s ability to defend itself—which is already a lot better than it was seven years ago.

When Russian troops invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014 and occupied the Crimean Peninsula, they faced little resistance from a decrepit Ukrainian military—inexperienced, hollowed out by decades of corruption, and lacking the most basic supplies, such as medical kits, boots, and proper helmets. Now, after years of reform and billions of dollars of security assistance from the United States, the Ukrainian military is battle-hardened and highly motivated after seven years of conflict with Russian-backed rebels in Ukraine’s separatist-held Donbass region.

“It’s certainly not going to be an easy operation. It’s not going to be a quick victorious war [for Russia],” said Andrii Zagorodniuk, who served as Ukraine’s defense minister from 2019 to 2020.

Since 2014, the United States has given $2.5 billion to support the development of the country’s armed forces, including Humvees, patrol boats, radar systems, and anti-tank Javelin missiles. But with Russian troops massing on Ukraine’s borders, U.S. officials are weighing requests by Kyiv for further assistance, including support to plug substantial gaps in the country’s air and naval defense capabilities, as Ukraine’s navy lost 70 percent of its vessels following the occupation of Crimea. This month, U.S. officials were dispatched to Kyiv to asess the country’s air defense needs, a Ukrainian defense official told Foreign Policy.

The Strategic Case for Risking War in Ukraine

John R. Deni

As Russia continues its destabilizing military buildup around Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies have made clear they prefer to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. This reflects not simply the preference of the Biden administration when it comes to national-security matters but also the West’s desire to avoid inflaming and escalating the situation through military action.

This makes good sense. Any Russo-Ukrainian war is likely to be bloody for the combatants, result in a wave of refugees heading west, and further destabilize an already precarious regional security situation. Nonetheless, as diplomatic efforts unfold, there are good strategic reasons for the West to stake out a hard-line approach, giving little ground to Moscow over its demand to forsake Ukrainian membership in Western institutions and halt military activity in Central and Eastern Europe. Rather than helping Russian President Vladimir Putin back down from the position he’s taken, the West ought to stand firm, even if it means another Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s efforts to destabilize and undermine the Ukrainian government by keeping alive the smoldering war in the Donbas region haven’t returned Kyiv to Moscow’s orbit. Instead, Ukraine has used the past several years to boost its military capabilities gradually, strengthen its ties to the West, and improve its economy. It’s unclear why Mr. Putin has chosen this moment to demand assurances that Ukraine won’t become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. Perhaps the Kremlin believes time isn’t on its side as Ukraine continues to slide closer to the West. Or Mr. Putin might assume Washington is more willing to accommodate Russia’s demands, given the intensifying American rivalry with China. Or it could even be that Mr. Putin hopes to bolster his declining public support with a jingoistic foreign adventure.

North Korea’s Military Capabilities

Introduction

The United States and its Asian allies see North Korea as a grave security threat. North Korea has one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, which, combined with its missile and nuclear tests and aggressive rhetoric, has aroused concern worldwide. But world powers have been ineffective in slowing its path to acquire nuclear weapons.

While it remains among the poorest countries in the world, North Korea spends nearly a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its military, according to U.S. State Department estimates. Its brinkmanship will continue to test regional and international partnerships aimed at preserving stability and security. Negotiations on denuclearization have remained stalled since February 2019.

What are North Korea’s nuclear capabilities?

The exact size and strength of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal are unclear. However, analysts say Pyongyang has tested nuclear weapons six times and developed ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States and its allies Japan and South Korea.

Episode 12: A Return To Cold War Influence? Putin’s Strategy from Ukraine to Central Asia

Robert D. Kaplan and Chris Miller

As Russia competes with China and the U.S. in Eurasia and elsewhere on the world stage, how is Vladimir Putin hoping to regain Russia’s sphere of influence? In this episode of the Global Demons Podcast, Robert D. Kaplan will be joined by FPRI Eurasia Program Director Chris Miller to discuss Russia’s actions in Ukraine, its hope of returning to great power status, and Russia’s future after Putin.

Jamestown Foundation

Terrorism Monitor, December 7, 2021, v. 19, no. 23

India Responds to New Kashmiri Militant Factions’ Campaign against Civilians

The Window for a Negotiated Settlement in Ethiopia’s War is Closing as the Country Faces Protracted Civil War

Pakistan's Peace Talks with the Pakistani Taliban: Insights from an Interview with Abdul Wali Mohmand (alias Umar Khalid Khurasani)

Routing Without Rumor: Securing the Internet’s Routing System

Danny McPherson

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies is pleased to announce the launch of the first Cyberstability Paper Series.

Since the release of the final GCSC report in November 2019, the concept of cyberstability has continued to evolve. A number of new ‘conditions’ are emerging: new agreements on norms, capacity building and other stability measures have solidified. The constellation of cyber initiatives is expanding, underlining the need to connect the traditional state-led dialogues with those of the Internet communities. Gaps continue to close, not only between the global north and south and between technology and policy, but also between the stability in and the stability of cyberspace.

The first Paper Series explores these “New Conditions and Constellations in Cyber” through twelve papers from leading experts, each providing a glance into the challenges and contributions to cyberstability. The papers are released on a rolling basis from July until December 2021, culminating in an edited volume.

Download the paper here!

Cybersecurity, Internet Governance, and the Multistakeholder: Approach The Role of Non-State Actors in Internet Policy Making

Wolfgang Kleinwächter

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) and The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies is pleased to announce the launch of the first Cyberstability Paper Series.

Since the release of the final GCSC report in November 2019, the concept of cyberstability has continued to evolve. A number of new ‘conditions’ are emerging: new agreements on norms, capacity building and other stability measures have solidified. The constellation of cyber initiatives is expanding, underlining the need to connect the traditional state-led dialogues with those of the Internet communities. Gaps continue to close, not only between the global north and south and between technology and policy, but also between the stability in and the stability of cyberspace.

The first Paper Series explores these “New Conditions and Constellations in Cyber” through twelve papers from leading experts, each providing a glance into the challenges and contributions to cyberstability. The papers are released on a rolling basis from July until December 2021, culminating in an edited volume.

Download the paper here!

Cybersecurity:Federal Actions Urgently Needed to Better Protect the Nation's Critical Infrastructure

Fast Facts

Recent events—including the ransomware attack on a major U.S. fuel pipeline—illustrate the need to strengthen the cybersecurity of the nation's critical infrastructure.

We testified on the need for the federal government to develop and execute a comprehensive national cyber strategy, and to strengthen the role that it plays in protecting the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. Ensuring the cybersecurity of the nation is on our High Risk List, and we have urged federal agencies to act on it.

If the federal government doesn't act with greater urgency, the security of our nation's critical infrastructure will be in jeopardy.

Top 10 cyber security stories of 2021

Alex Scroxton

Cyber security was once again top of the agenda for IT leaders in 2021, with a barrage of news and analysis making it hard to separate the wheat from the chaff and the genuine insight from the self-promotional nonsense. If IT buyers struggled to make sense of it all, imagine how reporters felt.

But this said, there were some stand-out security stories in the past 12 months that were indubitably worthy of attention. We learned new lessons from SolarWinds’ experience at the hands of Russian spooks, followed the news from the US as the new president Joe Biden stood up to cyber criminals, looked in-depth at impactful vulnerability disclosures, worried over our privacy and shook our heads over the NSO Group spyware revelations. In that spirit, here are Computer Weekly’s top 10 cyber security stories of 2021:

1. How SolarWinds came through its darkest hour

In December 2020, it emerged that SolarWinds had been the victim of possibly the biggest state-orchestrated cyber attack in history, after a Russia-backed group compromised its Orion platform and used it to target government bodies. The fallout from this attack persisted throughout 2021, and through it all, SolarWinds’ new CEO, Sudhakar Ramakrishna, emerged as a bit of a security hero for his frank and honest response. Later in the year, in his first major UK press interview, he told Computer Weekly all about his experience.

GAO raises more questions about DoD’s capabilities to monitor threats in spaceby

Sandra Erwin

WASHINGTON — The Government Accountability Office issued another report critical of a U.S. Space Force program that is developing software tools to track objects and potential threats in outer space.

GAO in a report released Dec. 22 raised concerns about the Space C2 program — short for space command and control — previously run by the Air Force and now by the Space Force.

Space C2 uses agile software methods to develop apps intended to help operators identify and monitor threats to U.S. and allied space assets, as well as communicate and share information.

Factors Contributing to Radicalization: A conceptual framework

Academics, practitioners and policymakers have long debated models of radicalization leading to violent extremism (RLVE). They have struggled to find a simple framework to explain how an individual may come to accept and justify the use of violence to achieve their political or ideological goals to the point that they support, advocate for, or carry out terrorist acts.

The intention of this paper is not to review all available theories, as the literature on this subject is vast.

However, with Hedayah’s central role in capacity building for countering violent extremism (CVE), both for practitioners and policymakers, the purpose of this paper is to present a framework that can easily be explained in the field of CVE, reflect the nuances of the available theories and build upon the existing evidence base for RLVE.

Surviving the Deadly Skies: Integrated Air and Missile Defence 2021-2035

Paul van Hooft, Lotje Boswinkel

European states are facing an increasing threat from missiles and aircraft. Interacting geopolitical and technological trends have both made these weapons more effective and increased the scenarios in which aggressors could find use for them. Consequently, there is now an increasingly complex, precision, and dangerous combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, manned and unmanned aircraft, and other weapon systems that can be used against European states. This underlines the need for better and more integrated air and missile defence (IAMD).

Multiple technological trends are taking place. The transparency of the battlefield is increasing. Greater precision, speed, and integration of air and missile weapons systems are becoming more accessible to more actors. Attackers and defenders are engaged in a highly competitive struggle for advantage. European military infrastructure and forces, as well as civilian targets, are vulnerable to attacks that use an extensive mix of sophisticated and unsophisticated weapons to overwhelm and confuse the defender.

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