The West's Greed Could Come Back To Haunt It

By Laura Höflinger, Katrin Kuntz und Fritz Schaap

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A week before Christmas, Canada had a gift for the world: a few million doses of the most coveted substance money can buy right now. The country is planning to donate surplus vaccine supplies to poorer nations that are at risk of being left empty-handed in the race to distribute the vaccine, a government representative said in a video call.

Attendees at the meeting included members of the World Health Organization, the vaccine alliance Gavi, the heads of three major pharmaceutical companies and health experts from around the world.

The mood was hopeful. Britain had just launched its vaccination program. The end of the pandemic seemed to be within reach.

Then a journalist asked if Canada, which has secured more vaccine per capita than any other country in the world, planned to deliver those doses immediately. Or would it first do so after a large percentage of Canadians have been immunized? At what point would the country be willing to give up some of its abundance of vaccine?

The representative paused. People have to understand, she said hesitantly, that we are experiencing extraordinary times. She didn’t want to commit herself to a timeline.

It sent a clear message, especially to poorer countries. And it contained two warnings. First: Wealthy nations like Canada are perfectly willing to share their vaccines, but on terms set by the rich. Second: Once again, it might not be the people who most urgently need a remedy who get it first, but rather those who are willing to pay the most for it.

A New Alliance Rising In The East – Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, China – And Its Enemies – The U.S. and India

By Alberto M. Fernandez

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The year 2021 marks the emergence of a new Eastern alliance. MEMRI has been the first to richly document its rise, illustrated by a wide variety of media content.[1] Brought into sharp relief by the bloody November 2020 war between Azerbaijan and the Armenians of Artsakh, the alliance between three authoritarian regimes – in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan – seems to have acquired a surprising silent partner in the People's Republic of China. This is surprising because the first three countries are Muslim states, which are not shy about using religion as a tool of statecraft, but not so surprising because this alliance is as much about mutual cooperation as it is directed against a disparate group of potential adversaries large and small – India, Armenia, and the United States.[2] Some might add Russia and Iran to this list, but both countries are as often collaborators as they are rivals of their authoritarian neighbors.

The connections are not new. Religious, political, and emotional ties between the Muslims of then-British India and Turkey date to the end of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century. Both Turkey and Pakistan (along with Pahlevi Iran and Hashemite Iraq!) were members of the ill-fated U.S./U.K.-supported Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the late 1950s. Pakistan reportedly facilitated the sending of 1,500 Afghan fighters belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction to fight against Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in 1993. But it is with the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Turkey's president and the failed 2016 coup against him that these trilateral ties have blossomed. The first trilateral summit between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan was held in 2017, while the second just concluded last month in Islamabad.[3] Islamabad has supported Turkey on Northern Cyprus and Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh, while those countries have reciprocated in supporting Pakistan on Kashmir.

Turkey's ties now make it Pakistan's second-largest arms supplier, after Islamabad's longtime patron China.[4] Pakistan has been helpful to Turkey in the defense field as well, especially in pilots after the Turkish purge of its air force after the failed 2016 coup. Of greater concern is the specter of Turkish-Pakistani nuclear cooperation.[5] Some observers were startled by Pakistan's recent reminder that it is not bound by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (no nuclear power is a signatory).[6] But perhaps more significant was the latest (the 15th) session of the Turkey-Pakistan High Level Military Dialogue Group (HLMDG) and the fact that Turkish engineering students are the second-largest group by nationality studying nuclear science in Russia (Russia is building four nuclear power plants for Turkey).[7]

Drugs and Power: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

By Gareth Rice

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INTRODUCTION

Despite a significant counterinsurgency campaign since 2001, Afghanistan has transformed into a true narco-terror state.[1] Providing the source of close to 90% of the world’s supply of heroin,[2] Afghanistan’s narcotics trade has become interwoven in all aspects of Afghan society and has further compounded the country’s inability to achieve a peaceful end to hostilities. The Taliban’s relationship with this trade has slowly transformed from one of economic convenience to a dependency that sees it providing the largest source of their financing and significant political capital over large areas of the country. Moreover, that relationship has helped the group to control more territory than at any time since 2001.[3]

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) annual Opium Surveys have provided a stark depiction of the scale of this problem. In 2018, despite a drought in large areas of the country, Afghanistan cultivated the second largest area of opium on record, continuing the upward trend in cultivation since 2001.[4] Indeed, in the last 30 years of the 20th Century, opium output increased in Afghanistan by 800%.[5] As a global comparison, Columbian drugs at the height of their production never reached more than 5% of Columbia’s GDP,[6] while Afghanistan’s drug trade accounted for 50% of its GDP by 2007.[7] This figure declined to between 6-11% by 2018 (due mostly to the growth in the Afghan licit economy), although opium still surpassed the value of the country’s legal exports of goods and services.[8]

There have been several barriers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[9] and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in addressing this problem. Debate as to the extent of the Taliban’s relationship with this trade and the best methods to address the problem have contributed to some of the many reasons it has never featured as a key strategic issue.[10] Similarly, the uncertainty of Taliban profit margins from the trade have resulted in a conflicting prioritisation of counter-narcotics efforts across the member nations of ISAF and provincial governors of GIROA.[11] The drug trade in Afghanistan has simply proved to be insurmountable and its relationship to the insurgency too unclear to deserve greater attention.

BY ELISE LABOTT

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Afghanistan isn’t high on U.S. President Joe Biden’s list of priorities, given the number of crises he faces at home and abroad. But the looming deadline to withdraw all U.S. troops, part of a deal reached last year between the Taliban and the Trump administration, will force a decision that could define his presidency—and the legacy of 20 years of America at war.

Given Biden’s promise to end the so-called “forever wars,” the question is not whether he will withdraw troops. Rather, it’s how he can do so in a way that preserves something of the gains made in Afghanistan and ensures that decades of American sacrifice weren’t in vain. The problem is that Washington is stuck between two unpopular movements. The Taliban, who’ve spent the past year on a rampage, are despised nationally, with approval ratings in the single digits. But Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s government is also extremely unpopular. Most Afghans and U.S. officials agree that the Taliban’s ability to continue the insurgency has been largely due to Ghani’s bad leadership—and he has shown little interest in reaching a lasting peace agreement that might usher him out of power.

The biggest near-term obstacle for the Biden team might be its inheritance of the Doha agreement, the 2020 peace deal urged by former President Donald Trump and negotiated by (then and still) U.S. envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad. It was a well-intentioned but deeply flawed effort to end America’s two-decade presence in the country; under pressure from Trump to pull U.S. troops out quickly, Khalilzad was unable to secure guarantees on human rights, democracy, or protection for women’s rights. The deal has no provision for a cease-fire or even an express promise by the Taliban to end violence. From their point of view, the Taliban are still at war in Afghanistan and have only pledged to negotiate both as part of an intra-Afghan peace deal. The lopsided deal was seen as an act of bad faith by the Afghan people and rightly convinced the Taliban that the United States was rushing for the exit. This perceived victory over the U.S. occupation has given them confidence to stand firm in their negotiations with Afghan groups.

End of Myanmar’s Rocky Road to Democracy?

SANA JAFFREY

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After days of speculation about an impending coup, Myanmar’s military has formally seized power the very day a newly elected parliament was scheduled to meet for the first time. Military generals ruled the country from the early 1960s until 2011. Now they are taking back control, after a near-decade of sharing power with elected lawmakers.

POLITICAL VETO BY COUP

The coup began in the early hours of February 1. The military detained senior politicians from Myanmar’s largest political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. Soon after, the military declared a state of emergency, alleging unproven claims of voter fraud in the November 2020 elections, which the NLD won by a larger landslide than it had in 2015. The declaration invokes emergency clauses in the Constitution to supposedly preserve stability. Power has been formally transferred to the military’s top general, Min Aung Hlaing, with a pledge to hold elections within a year. So far, there are no reports of violence, although the military is deploying in main cities like Yangon and Naypyidaw.

THE STAKES OF MYANMAR’S POLITICAL FUTURE

For months, the military has disputed the election results by touting widespread voter fraud without proof. The national election commission rejected their allegations due to a lack of evidence. Undeterred, the military pressed on with its claims, calling on the NLD to delay seating the new parliament until the election results could be reviewed. Last week, negotiations with NLD leaders broke down when they refused to meet the military’s demands for postponement, setting the stage for a head-on confrontation.

Myanmar: Inside the coup that toppled Aung San Suu Kyi's government

GWEN ROBINSON and YUICHI NITTA

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Myanmar's bloodless coup began with surgical precision in the pre-dawn hours of Monday as teams of soldiers detained the country's de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. At the same time, the military was taking into temporary custody top officials of her National League for Democracy and about 400 lawmakers staying in the capital, Naypyitaw, for the first sitting of parliament since the Nov. 8 general election.

Internet and mobile phone communications were disrupted, and a statement read out on military television announced that the commander in chief Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing was now in charge. He declared a one-year state of emergency.

The move, according to the statement, was in response to fraud during last year's election. With this, the government of Myanmar silently and seamlessly changed hands, without a shot. But the turmoil is just beginning.

The coup followed days of stop-start threats by military commanders to "take action" over their allegations of electoral fraud. The previous day, an unexpected assurance by Min Aung Hlaing that the military would "abide by the constitution" eased tensions that had been wracking the country since the election. Ironically, in taking power the military cited Section 417 of the constitution, which under some interpretations enables a military takeover under a "state of emergency."

China and Russia: Two Big Threats the U.S. Military Can't Ignore

J. William Middendorf II

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On December 22, 2020, six strategic bombers—four Chinese and two Russian—flew a joint patrol mission over the East China and Japan Seas.

Questions persist as to whether the U.S. Navy is up to the challenge of doing what’s necessary to protect allies in the Western Pacific.

The best way to prepare for war is to be prepared to win it.

On December 22, 2020, six strategic bombers—four Chinese and two Russian—flew a joint patrol mission over the East China and Japan Seas. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the mission was intended to develop and deepen the comprehensive Russia-China partnership, further increase the level of cooperation between the two militaries, expand their ability for joint action and strengthen strategic stability.

It was the second joint patrol since July 2019, confirming Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement that “the idea of a future Russia-China military alliance” cannot be ruled out. And this is happening even as the Biden administration considers making deep cuts in the U.S. defense budget.

How the NSC can better tackle emerging technology threats

Brendan McCord and Zoe A. Y. Weinberg

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Technology is fundamentally altering the security landscape. Rapid and profound advances in hardware and software, paired with the global shift to digitally networked communications and transactions, have transformed the economic and security landscape, along with the fabric and rhythm of daily life. They have introduced new risks to personal safety and national security, fueled a strategic competition between the United States and China, and increased collective vulnerability to malicious actors armed with cheaper, more effective, and difficult-to-attribute tools.

These changes require the U.S. government to better incorporate emerging technology issues in its national-security decision making—particularly by overhauling the institutional structure and priorities of the National Security Council, which sets the stage for government’s approach to national security. Drawing from more than 25 interviews with current and former NSC staffers, interagency personnel, national security professionals, policymakers, and academics, this analysis offers several policy options for restructuring the NSC to better respond to developments in conflict. Interviewees represented a diverse array of perspectives, with strong and differing opinions on every issue. Our research sought to surface the best ideas and to probe key concerns, while recognizing that not all trade-offs will be satisfyingly balanced, nor disagreements resolved. This analysis serves as both a snapshot of the current challenges faced by our national security enterprise and a blueprint for thinking through how to solve them.

Israel's risky rhetoric on Iran

by Aaron David Miller and Richard Sokolsky

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Aaron David Miller served as a State Department Middle East analyst, adviser and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations and is the author of "The End of Greatness: Why America Can't Have (and Doesn't Want) Another Great President." Richard Sokolsky, a non-resident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was a member of the Secretary of State's Policy Planning Office from 2005-2015. The opinions expressed here are their own. Read more opinion at CNN.

(CNN)Is Israel beating the war drums again for a military strike against Iran as the Biden administration tries to reengage Tehran on its nuclear program?

It might seem that way after listening to last week's warnings by Aviv Kochavi, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces -- and earlier comments delivered by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a speech in southern Israel: bury the 2015 multinational nuclear deal with Iran ... or else.

The warnings were directed at Washington, not Tehran: Do not reenter any accord with Iran that doesn't meet with Israel's approval. For now, a traditionally risk-averse Netanyahu, burdened with his own domestic headaches and said to be eager to avoid a blowup with President Joe Biden over Iran, isn't likely to attack in the near future. But if the Biden administration can't figure out a way to constrain Iran's nuclear program, an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear sites, which could easily draw America in, may only be a matter of time.

Moscow’s Military Modernization Sets Agenda for UAV Development

By: Roger McDermott

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Moscow has made considerable progress in its military modernization over the past decade, according to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who recently gave a speech highlighting key areas of development while offering upbeat statistics (TASS, January 29). While Shoigu confirmed that the levels of progress to reequip and modernize the military across all branches and arms of service are on course to achieve set targets, an increasingly important area in this process is the use and further introduction of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability. Russia’s recent experience of military conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, as well as its strategic-level exercises demonstrate a growing awareness and willingness to exploit UAV technologies (see EDM, September 30, 2020). Whereas this has mostly focused on enhancing target acquisition, it seems the longer-term trend is toward balancing between a reconnaissance role and strike capability.

Shoigu’s statistics certainly sound impressive. The Russian defense minister delivered the keynote speech at an event in Moscow on January 29, marking an official celebration of the acceptance of military products. He stated that the share of new or modernized weapons and equipment exceeds 70 percent in Russia’s general-purpose forces. And, in the Strategic Rocket Forces (Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya—RVSN) this reached 86 percent (Krasnaya Zvezda, February 1; TASS, January 29).

Baku and Ankara Deny Turkish Military Bases Being Established in Azerbaijan

By: John C. K. Daly

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The Azerbaijani government has denied accounts, first published on January 8 in Haqqin.az but subsequently deleted, of three Turkish military bases allegedly being established in Azerbaijan as a consequence of Turkish military assistance to Baku during last year’s 44-day Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. The reports, if accurate, would represent a significant development in the geostrategic balance of power in the post-Soviet Caucasus (Lenta, January 8).

The official denials came swiftly: in response to the reports, the press service spokesperson for Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense, Vagif Dargahli, told journalists that the government adheres to its policy of not hosting any foreign military bases in Azerbaijan, except for cases envisaged in international agreements that Baku had signed (Minval.az, January 8). Further bolstering his case for dismissing the allegations, Dargahli added, “It should be noted that Azerbaijan is a member of the [120-nation] Non-Aligned Movement and is chairing this movement in 2019–2022” (RIA Novosti, January 8). Also on the same day that the media reports appeared, the Azerbaijani defense ministry issued an official disavowal on its Facebook page in Azerbaijani, Russian and English (Facebook.com/wwwmodgovaz, January 8).

America’s New Strategy for Space Nuclear Power

By Zhanna Malekos Smith

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Among the flurry of executive orders and proclamations signed during his final weeks in office, President Trump issued two directives that have received little fanfare—about space. One directive concerns enhancing the cybersecurity of GPS satellites. The other is perhaps more exciting: It focuses on exploring Mars and the moon.

Since the late 1960s, the United States has leveraged nuclear energy technology to help power spacecraft. Recent examples include the ongoing New Horizons mission, the Cassini mission to Saturn and the Voyager 1 mission to reach interstellar space for the first time in history. These missions used radioisotope power systems—nuclear energy technology that converts heat into energy by harnessing the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238.

On Dec. 16, 2020, Trump established a national strategy for enhancing space nuclear power. Space Policy Directive-6 prioritizes developing more advanced radioisotope power systems capabilities and nuclear propulsion systems to support robotic and human exploration of Mars and the moon. Stretching across the solar system from Mercury to Neptune, the United States was the first state to reach every planet with a space probe and complete a reconnaissance study of the dwarf planet Pluto. Now, the United States is poised to become the first state to launch a space nuclear propulsion system under Space Policy Directive-6. According to the Trump White House’s directive, although “no space nuclear propulsion systems have been launched to-date,” these systems are necessary for space exploration because they will shorten travel time to Mars. But while the directive’s goal of space exploration is admirable, it gives too little attention to crucial safety considerations.

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S LESSONS LEARNED IN SYRIA

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The Russian military identifies its deployment to Syria as the prototypical example of future war—an expeditionary deployment to support a coalition-based hybrid war. The Russian General Staff cites Syria as highlighting the need for Russia to develop a new military capability—deploying flexible expeditionary forces to carry out “limited actions” abroad. The Russian Armed Forces are applying lessons learned from their experience in Syria to shape their development into a flexible and effective expeditionary force.

The United States must avoid projecting its own modernization priorities—or those of other competitors such as China—onto Russia. The Russian military is making discrete choices to concentrate on certain learning opportunities from Syria while rejecting or deemphasizing others. These choices are optimized to support a Russian concept of operations that is distinct from both pre-Syria Russian modernization efforts and the United States’ own modernization efforts.

The Russian military is using lessons learned managing an ad hoc coalition and proxy forces in Syria to inform preparations to coordinate formal coalitions in future wars. The Kremlin seeks to set conditions to ensure its next “limited action” based on Syria, as described by Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, can leverage non-Russian forces. The Kremlin’s preparations in this regard include practicing coalition operations in exercises and expanding Russia’s international military ties—magnifying the Kremlin’s power projection capabilities.

Full Report Available Here: http://www.understandingwar.org/report/russian-military%E2%80%99s-lessons-learned-syria

Why Are Republican Presidents So Bad for the Economy?

By David Leonhardt

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A president has only limited control over the economy. And yet there has been a stark pattern in the United States for nearly a century. The economy has grown significantly faster under Democratic presidents than Republican ones.

It’s true about almost any major indicator: gross domestic product, employment, incomes, productivity, even stock prices. It’s true if you examine only the precise period when a president is in office, or instead assume that a president’s policies affect the economy only after a lag and don’t start his economic clock until months after he takes office. The gap “holds almost regardless of how you define success,” two economics professors at Princeton, Alan Blinder and Mark Watson, write. They describe it as “startlingly large.”

Since 1933, the economy has grown at an annual average rate of 4.6 percent under Democratic presidents and 2.4 percent under Republicans, according to a Times analysis. In more concrete terms: The average income of Americans would be more than double its current level if the economy had somehow grown at the Democratic rate for all of the past nine decades. If anything, that period (which is based on data availability) is too kind to Republicans, because it excludes the portion of the Great Depression that happened on Herbert Hoover’s watch.

Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Historical Revisionism and “Twiplomacy”

By Madison L. Sargeant

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The rise of digital diplomacy has provided state actors new venues to promote their national interests. Twitter specifically has emerged as a “megaphone and substantive communications medium”[1] for heads of state, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and scholars. The Russian Federation has exploited the growing importance of social media platforms to diplomacy in order to seek legitimization and normalization of its 2014 annexation of Crimea, which is recognized almost universally as Ukrainian territory.[2] Despite a robust digital campaign, the percentage of Ukrainians that believe Crimea is Russian territory has actually decreased since 2014. Furthermore, Russia’s social media activity has not strengthened its claim to Crimea, but it does provide insight into how the state uses emerging technologies below the threshold of war to meet strategic objectives.

Background

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine found itself in possession of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Encouraged by both the United States and Russia, Ukraine forewent the arsenal for international security guarantees protecting its independence and territorial sovereignty, as outlined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.[3] In 2014, Russia breached these security guarantees by invading and annexing the Crimean Peninsula after the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the Revolution of Dignity (known internationally as the Euromaidan Revolution). The annexation was swiftly condemned,[4] with world leaders pointing to international law as the foundation of their argument against a perceived act of aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded that the security guarantees made in the early 1990s were only valid with the pre-revolution Ukrainian government, insinuating that the post-Euromaidan government was leading a “new”[5] state, and that the Russian military had an obligation to protect ethnic Russians from the “nationalist junta”[6] in Kyiv. With most of the international community rejecting these justifications, Russia launched a revisionist information campaign to legitimize occupation of the peninsula.

Using Hybrid War Theory to Shape Future U. S. Generational Doctrine

By Justin Baumann

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“Russia has dedicated their efforts over the last 20 years to two main areas: learning from their own conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia, and learning from our involvement in the Global War on Terror. The combination of these has resulted in focused modernization that began in earnest in 2008 designed to defeat U.S. systems, prevent effective command and control, and deny key weapon systems access to the battlefield. Now the onus is on the U.S. Army to look inward and determine how to adapt to the modern threat environment.”[1] – US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group 2016

For the last 20 years of continuous conflict around the globe, state and non-state battlefield actors have rapidly shifted doctrines and tactics in the face of quickly developing threats to account for the new and changing way of war. This has created a soul-searching atmosphere for the US military as it struggles to define itself after spending trillions of dollars to produce strategic outcomes and endstates that appear to be a step backwards. Amid these fluctuating variables and competing theories, defense analysts continue to explore new ideas for how to describe these changes so that effective countermeasures can be developed. This has been difficult as the United States has been engaged in conflict and competition against multiple adversaries which present many different state and non-state threats and actors to study, stressing American defense systems and the academic response. The United States is now seeking new generational doctrines to focus the nation’s defense community energy to better tackle these emerging and continuous threats into the future.[2]

During that time, the Russians have used the Gerasimov Doctrine to successfully impose their will on the Ukraine, Crimea, Chechnya, Georgia, and Belarus to achieve geo-political gains on the international stage.[3] A good argument can also be made that they recently extended their influence and control over the Caucasus Region by negotiating a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan after 6 weeks of conflict.[4] These gains are not by accident. Russia’s actions and sometimes setbacks in Chechnya and Georgia forced them to adopt hybrid warfare capabilities as new technologies and tactics were used by threats on the battlefield. This doctrinal innovation by the Russians to blur the line between politics and war may require a paradigm shift in defense vocabulary and doctrine to properly explain and counter these modern war developments.[5]

The Conflict in Libya Is Getting Even Messier

BY AMY MACKINNON

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The report by the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, released in January, says that for around a year the UAE has had “direct relations” with armed groups from Sudan’s Darfur region fighting in Libya on the side of Haftar’s Libyan National Army. Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that the UAE had, in violation of a U.N. arms embargo, increased its deliveries of weapons to Haftar, who ended his unsuccessful 14-month assault on the capital, Tripoli, last June.

The UAE’s contact with the Sudanese armed groups in Libya, bypassing Haftar’s forces, is seen by some experts as a sign of the country’s appetite for a more hands-on role in the conflict and of growing mistrust of the renegade general.

“I think there’s an argument to be made that they distrust Haftar’s battlefield competence. Many outside backers have [distrusted it], including the Russians,” said Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Haftar’s international backers have stuck by him so far out of concern that eastern Libya could descend further into chaos fueled by fracturing rebel groups in the absence of clear leadership. But in establishing closer direct ties with Sudanese groups in Libya, the UAE could be well positioned to shift its support to another leader, should one emerge.

“Whoever takes on Haftar’s mantle later on, they’ll definitely try to endow him with the same sort of support that includes, inter alia, the mercenaries,” said Emadeddin Badi, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Program of the Atlantic Council.

Shades of Minsk, as Russians again protest against Putin

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THE TIDE came from the west. Last August mass protests broke out in Belarus, a former Soviet republic ruled by an ageing dictator, Alexander Lukashenko. Russian opposition leaders watched excitedly as tens of thousands of their Slavic neighbours took to the streets, week after week. The Kremlin was watching too, anxiously. Both sides knew that events in Belarus might be the prelude to what happens in Russia, where an increasingly autocratic Vladimir Putin has been in power for more than two decades. On January 31st, for the second weekend running, large protests broke out across Russia. More than 5,000 people were reported to have been arrested in the latest demonstrations triggered by the arrest of the opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, and his investigation of Mr Putin’s corrupt system of governance.

Paradoxically, the unrest may have been precipitated by the Kremlin’s attempt to avert a Belarus-style uprising. The scale and the suddenness of the revolt against Mr Lukashenko made it reassess the threat posed by Mr Navalny, who has made a name for himself by exposing corruption in Russia. That reassessment, many in Russia believe, led Mr Putin’s security service, the FSB, to poison Mr Navalny with Novichok, a nerve agent, in August. But Mr Navalny survived and, after undergoing medical treatment in Germany, returned last month to Moscow. His imprisonment upon arrival, and the subsequent release by his group of an explosive two-hour film about Mr Putin’s “secret palace”—swiftly radicalised the country’s politics beyond anything Russia had seen for more than a decade.

How to redesign COVID vaccines so they protect against variants

Ewen Callaway & Heidi Ledford

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People await coronavirus vaccines at a hospital in Glasgow, UK.Credit: Jeff J. Mitchell/Getty

As evidence grows that new variants of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus can evade immunity produced by vaccines or previous infections, scientists are exploring the idea of redesigning the vaccines currently being rolled out worldwide.

Researchers are still debating whether the new variants could undercut the effectiveness of these first-generation COVID-19 vaccines. But some vaccine developers are charging forward with plans to update their shots so that they could better target the emerging variants, such as those identified in South Africa and Brazil. These lineages carry mutations that seem to dampen the effects of antibodies crucial to fending off infection. Researchers are also considering the possibility that vaccines against the coronavirus might have to be updated periodically, as they are for influenza.

The best and most immediate way to combat the threat of emerging variants is still probably to quickly vaccinate as many people as possible with current shots, says Mani Foroohar, a biotechnology analyst at the investment bank SVB Leerink in Boston, Massachusetts: “We need to get vaccines in arms and to smother this virus before it blows up in our face again.”

But Foroohar and others expect that, in the future, a bevy of new vaccines will emerge to tackle the COVID-19 variants head on. Nature explores the open questions about updating the world’s coronavirus vaccines.

Will we need updated COVID-19 vaccines?

Brexit Is Probably the United Kingdom’s Death Knell

BY BRENT PEABODY 

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Ahundred years ago, Northern Ireland was established, and with it the current shape of the United Kingdom. That familiar form has survived World War II, the Troubles, and no fewer than three referendums on Scotland’s political status. But it may not survive Brexit, which has scrambled political allegiances and rekindled separatism in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Today, Brexit has placed unprecedented stress on the already fraying bonds between the United Kingdom’s four constituent countries, putting the union’s future in doubt.

The gravest and most immediate threat comes from Scotland, which headed off an independence referendum in 2014 but could hold a second one soon, thanks to the strength of the Scottish National Party (SNP). The party currently holds 47 of Scotland’s 59 seats in Westminster and a further 61 (four short of a majority) in Holyrood. Buoyed by the fallout from Brexit, the SNP is projected to win an outright majority in this year’s Scottish Parliament election, claiming a mandate for a second independence referendum in the process. The strong likelihood of a SNP majority in Scotland’s devolved Parliament should worry unionists; the last time it happened in 2011, an independence referendum followed just three years after.

The U.S. Military Must Be Nonpartisan, but Not Apolitical

Jarod Taylor 

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When an agitated mob of extremist supporters of President Donald Trump sacked the U.S. Capitol last month, egged on by Trump and other Republican politicians, they struck at the bedrock principles in the oath that members of the U.S. armed forces swear to protect and defend the Constitution. Nonetheless, America’s uniformed military leadership waited a full week to issue a public statement directly addressing that riotous invasion of the seat of the American republic.

The statement, in the form of a memorandum to service members from the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, was appropriately strong and concise, even if the delay in publishing it was unnecessarily long. It condemned the “sedition and insurrection” at the Capitol, mourned the police officers and others who died as a result of the riot, and reiterated the military’s commitment to “defending the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” The statement was also a welcome, if unusual, change from the military brass’ traditional insistence on remaining “apolitical,” even though this is not the official policy of the Defense Department. This departure from the norm probably played an important role in the delay in issuing it.

Propaganda’s Progression

BY ANGELA R. PASHAYAN 

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In the last few years, propaganda has taken on a new character, and the effects will reverberate far into the future. To understand how, it is worth looking at influences over time.

In World Wars I and II, propaganda was used to shape public opinion through print. Especially during the first war, books, newspapers, cartoons, slogans, theatre, and even postage stamps were common vehicles on both sides to promulgate favorable information. The propaganda kept publics on-side and boosted the ranks and morale of the armies. By the second World War, propaganda had changed, though, and movies in particular were used to incite fear. There were still the usual posters to mobilize soldiers, but they were negative rather than positive. “Stop this Monster that Stops at Nothing,” read one.

In 1947, a publisher in St. Paul, Minnesota released a red-scare comic book titled: “Is This Tomorrow; America Under Communism!” The animated cover displays the American flag engulfed in red flames as a backdrop of Black and white U.S. soldiers being brutally attacked by Communist soldiers. In this case, propaganda crossed racial lines to ensure that all Americans, regardless of color, could identify with the need to support and join soldiers in the fight against communism at all cost. It galvanized the public through symbolism and general personalities, like the soldier, in which all citizens respected and could relate to.

On the Extension of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE

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President Biden pledged to keep the American people safe from nuclear threats by restoring U.S. leadership on arms control and nonproliferation. Today, the United States took the first step toward making good on that pledge when it extended the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation for five years.

Extending the New START Treaty ensures we have verifiable limits on Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers until February 5, 2026. The New START Treaty’s verification regime enables us to monitor Russian compliance with the treaty and provides us with greater insight into Russia’s nuclear posture, including through data exchanges and onsite inspections that allow U.S. inspectors to have eyes on Russian nuclear forces and facilities. The United States has assessed the Russian Federation to be in compliance with its New START Treaty obligations every year since the treaty entered into force in 2011.

Especially during times of tension, verifiable limits on Russia’s intercontinental-range nuclear weapons are vitally important. Extending the New START Treaty makes the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the world safer. An unconstrained nuclear competition would endanger us all.

DoD Likely To Miss 2021 Deadline For Counter-Drone Weapon

By THERESA HITCHENS

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WASHINGTON: The Pentagon will choose a first round of industry-developed systems for shooting down small drones in early 2022, according to officials at the the Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aerial Systems Office (JCO).

That initial set of capabilities is known as “Low-Collateral Effects Increment No. 1,” JCO Director Army Major Gen. Sean Gainey told reporters in a briefing today. The plan is to figure out what industry has “ready to deliver; ready to get it out to the field, pretty quickly.”

The term “low-collateral effects” refers to counter drone systems that can be employed with few negative consequences for non-enemy aircraft and electronic systems near the field of intercept. Those types of weapons are the first focus in implementing DoD’s strategy to defeat small drones, released in early January.

How Socialism Wiped Out Venezuela's Spectacular Oil Wealth

ANDRÉS FIGUEREDO THOMSON 

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Venezuela has the world's largest proven oil reserves and yet the country has run out of gasoline. The socialist government has lost the capacity to extract oil from the ground or refine it into a usable form. The industry's gradual deterioration was 18 years in the making, tracing back to then-President Hugo Chávez's 2003 decision to fire the oil industry's most experienced engineers in an act of petty political retribution.

The near-total collapse in the nation's oil output in the ensuing years is a stark reminder that the most valuable commodity isn't a natural resource, but the human expertise to put it to productive use.

"At this moment Venezuela is living through its worst nightmare," said Luis Pedro España, a professor of sociology at Andrés Bello Catholic University in Caracas, who has studied the nation's economic collapse. "We are witnessing the end of Venezuela as a petro-state."

Gasoline shortages have crippled the economy, made travel within the country prohibitively expensive, and it has increased prices at grocery stores. Shortages and price restrictions have given rise to a vibrant black market.

"Drivers who operate gas-powered busses prefer to keep them parked so that they can suck out the gas and later resell it," says Andrés, a public bus operator in Caracas, who asked that we only use his first name.

"[My] bus runs on diesel. It uses 16 [or] 17 gallons daily. Nowadays, we have to wait in a long line to fill up," he said. "The gas stations even have national guards who ask for bribes before they'll fill up the tank because the 40 liters that the government gives us isn't enough."

5 Oil And Gas Predictions For 2021

By Robert Rapier

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When I made my 2020 predictions a year ago, the world was on the cusp of a pandemic that would upend the oil markets. In the process, it upended two of my energy sector predictions, but three others ended up being correct. The Covid-19 pandemic last year was a black swan event that caused an unprecedented fallout across the energy sector. The evolution of the pandemic this year will be the largest variable impacting the energy sector. Yes, larger even than any policies our new President will enact.

The energy sector is already off to a fast start in the equity markets this year, as the market is anticipating a return to normal. But if those expectations falter and it takes longer than expected to get the pandemic under control this year, there is a risk of a significant pullback.

Against that backdrop, below are my predictions for some of the significant energy trends I expect this year. As I usually point out, the discussion behind the predictions is more important than the predictions themselves. That’s why I provide extensive background and reasoning behind the predictions.

I also make predictions that are specific and measurable. At year’s end, there are specific metrics that will indicate whether a prediction was right or wrong.

1. The average price of WTI in 2021 will be between $50/bbl and $55/bbl.

Forging 21st-Century Strategic Deterrence

By Admiral Charles A. Richard, U.S. Navy

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense (DoD) has not had to consider the possibility of great power competition, crisis, or direct armed conflict with a nuclear-capable peer. Unfortunately, the current environment no longer affords us that luxury. The implications of today’s competition and the associated risk of great power crisis or direct armed conflict are profound; they affect nearly every fundamental assumption we make about the use of armed force in the defense of the nation and its allies. Until we, as a department, come to understand, if not accept, what we are facing and what should be done about it, we run the risk of developing plans we cannot execute and procuring capabilities that will not deliver desired outcomes. In the absence of change, we are on the path, once again, to prepare for the conflict we prefer, instead of one we are likely to face. It is through this lens that we must take a hard look at how we intend to compete against and deter our adversaries, assure our allies, and appropriately shape the future joint force.

I bristle when I hear the DoD accused of “being stuck in the Cold War.” The department is well past the Cold War; in fact, a large part of our challenge lies in the fact that we no longer view our environment through the lens of potential enemy nuclear employment. The United States has sustained global counter-terrorism efforts for two decades—and has grown accustomed to ignoring the nuclear dimension. Our recent experiences against non-nuclear-armed adversaries have allowed us to believe nuclear use is impossible and not worthy of attention. At the U.S. Strategic Command, we assess the probability of nuclear use is low, but not “impossible,” particularly in a crisis and as our nuclear-armed adversaries continue to build capability and exert themselves globally. Further, assessing risk is more than just assessing likelihood; it also involves accounting for outcomes. We cannot dismiss or ignore events that currently appear unlikely but, should they occur, would have catastrophic consequences.

Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review

GEORGE PERKOVICH, PRANAY VADDI

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Ever since the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, every U.S. presidential administration has published a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that explains the rationales behind its nuclear strategy, doctrine, and requested forces. These reviews have helped inform U.S. government personnel, citizens, allies, and adversaries of the country’s intentions and planned capabilities for conducting nuclear deterrence and, if necessary, war. The administration that takes office in January 2021 may or may not conduct a new NPR, but it will assess and update nuclear policies as part of its overall recalibration of national security strategy and policies.

Nongovernmental analysts can contribute to sound policymaking by being less constrained than officials often are in exploring the difficulties of achieving nuclear deterrence with prudently tolerable risks. Accordingly, the review envisioned and summarized here explicitly elucidates the dilemmas, uncertainties, and tradeoffs that come with current and possible alternative nuclear policies and forces. In the body of this review, we analyze extant declaratory policy, unclassified employment policy, and plans for offensive and defensive force postures, and then propose changes to several of them. We also will emphasize the need for innovative approaches to arms control.

THE OBJECTIVES OF U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY (INTRODUCTION)

Cyberthreats To States And Their National Security – OpEd

By Dr.Musarat Amin*

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Anything connected to internet is vulnerable to cyberattacks even if any system that is not connected with the internet, it still can be disrupted by cyberattack through USB device or internal drive contact. Availability of internet on an incredibly cheap price and its connectivity to devices has opened up a discussion on internet of things(IoT).

Internet of things includes everything connected to internet ranging from smart watches to all devices having connectivity with the internet i.e. sensors, smartphones, wearables and domestic appliances. This is the embodiment of the fourth industrial revolution that within 2020 almost half of the business activities are running on the IoT and pandemic has been a testing time when online business ,banking, education, health, and transactions among many other things moved to IoT.

This trend is modern and has potential to make life easier for the people of contemporary time but it also poses major risks in other terms. A cyber attack against any financial institution may empty their coffers in no time but a cyberattack against nuclear power plants of nuclear actors may lead to release of radioactive materials and can cost lives, psycho-trauma and heavy economic losses.

Cyber attack on Iran’s 15 nuclear facilities had caused massive damage to Iran’s nuclear program but later on Iran discovered that this was due to malicious Stuxnet worm files that penetrated into the system through a random USB device and caused such a massive damage.

Cyberspace has gained more power as a domain of warfare due to its significance of impacting enemy states through cyberattacks. Almost all of the major powers employ cyber armies to protect their critical infrastructure from enemy cyberattacks and locate the origin of the cyberattack and hit-back with more rigorous response.

United States is said to be the most dominating power in space and cyber space. To protect its nuclear power plants it also uses decades old analog(non-digital )safety systems, the primary objective of this is to protect against modern malware.

The Erosion of America’s Professional Officer Corps

by William S. Smith

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The politicization of many retired military officers is a sign that the healthy American tradition of a professional military officer corps is breaking down. For decades, the elite members of the officer corps generally avoided politics unless they were voicing their opinion on military matters as part of the normal political process of deciding national security policy. In recent years, however, retired senior officers have seen fit to voice their opinions on a host of partisan and divisive issues, placing civilian-military relations into uncharted waters.

The U.S. Constitution contains many provisions that have stood the test of time. There seems little doubt, for example, that the separation of powers doctrine, when properly enforced, is one of the bulwarks of liberty. One aspect of the Constitution, however, that achieved obsolescence in the nineteenth century were its provisions on civilian-military relations. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, the Framers of the American Constitution did not envision the need for strong constitutional provisions for “civilian control of the military” because the military was not a professional force but a militia, composed entirely of civilians. When the nation needed to conduct military actions, prominent civilians would be installed as officers, and the militia would be called up from the civilian population. Early in the life of the Republic, it would not have been considered odd if the president, as Commander-in-Chief, were to have accepted military command of a unit in battle. The military were civilians, so there was no need to clarify a chain of command.

The result of this constitutional omission is that, while the president is Commander-in-Chief and the Congress can structure and fund the armed forces, there is no clear provision establishing “civilian control” of the military, even though both Article I and Article II imply some congressional and executive oversight of the military. This is because the Framers of the Constitution did not envision the rise of a highly professional military and a huge standing army.