Christopher Yeaw
Escalation. It’s Indiana Jones pulling out a revolver in response to the whirling blades of the Arabian fighter. It’s also Russia or China employing ultra-low-yield theater nuclear weapons in conflict to stun the United States and our allies into submission to achieve ambitious strategic goals. Escalation is funny in a movie but deadly serious in real life.
The U.S. has suddenly awoken to the realization that it is in the unenviable situation of facing two nuclear-armed peer competitors who have positioned themselves favorably regarding the net nuclear balance and are looking to exploit that for strategic gains.
Russia has, of course, maintained its parity with the U.S. in the area of so-called “strategic” (that is, treaty accountable) nuclear weapons, also retaining a more rapid and sizable upload capacity while also developing new exotic intercontinental-range nuclear weapons outside of the NST treaty. But it has also finished the bulk of a vast modernization program for its “non-strategic” nuclear weapons, none of which are treaty accountable, developing and fielding several thousand such warheads across an enormous variety of weapon systems with the plans for credible employment.
Recently, China’s own nuclear breakout – termed "breathtaking" by USSTRATCOM Commander ADM Richard – has come to light as several previously unknown missile fields have revealed unexpected near-term strategic parity, together with a surge of unknown size in its theater nuclear forces. China has accelerated development, production and deployment of advanced, precision, theater-range, dual-capable missile systems while massively expanding its secretive nuclear warhead production site, Pingtung. None of China’s 800+ nuclear weapons (our private, detailed estimate) are treaty accountable, and some of them may well soon be arming their newest hypersonic missiles.
The clear outlines of a coercive new “theory of victory,” which locates limited theater nuclear employment at its core, are now in full view.
If one of our rivals crosses the nuclear threshold into discriminate, extremely low yield, theater nuclear strikes, the consequences for the U.S. and allies would be grim.
Such “light” selective employment would almost assuredly focus on purely military targets with essentially zero collateral damage and fallout, designed to simultaneously compel U.S. capitulation and avoid galvanizing our resolve.
Strikes on targets such as airfields, logistics nodes and missile defense sites could debilitate the allied war effort, particularly the immediate effort to establish air dominance.
Illustrating this, a Russian ultra-low-yield Kinzhal strike on the Romanian missile defense site at Deveselu would only kill a civilian motorist if they had the misfortune of driving by the base at that exact instant.
The adversary would then begin vigorously conducting an information operation, supporting horrified voices calling for an immediate ceasefire, advising strenuously against entering into nuclear escalation, and questioning the “real value” of the political objective. The pressure to seek accommodation of any sort would be very high. The few “proportional responses” that exist are either non-nuclear, thus deprived of the same psychological effect, or involve strikes into our ally-less adversary’s homeland, thus opening up the U.S. homeland to counterstrikes.
And, in this tripolar nuclear reality, either of our rivals might also opportunistically take advantage of a limited nuclear conflict between us and the other to attempt a fait accompli of its own, underscoring the weaponized, coercive threat of limited nuclear employment.
Grim indeed.
But this unenviable imbalance didn’t happen overnight. During the past three decades, if there is one area in which the U.S. has made it abundantly clear that it refuses to compete, it is in theater nuclear weapons.
The evidence: wholesale divestment of previous theater nuclear weapons; alarmist editorials opposing even the modest introduction of a very small number of low-yield, counter-escalatory warheads into the U.S. strategic submarine force; asymmetric adherence to a “zero yield” testing policy; vigorous Congressional resistance to funding relevant activities; political statements emphasizing U.S. desire to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons” even as great power competitors engaged in precisely the opposite.
Americans may be rightfully disgusted by the prospect of having to compete in the area of theater nuclear weapons, but the alternative of leaving this field of competition to our rivals could spell catastrophe.
Building a capability to credibly respond at that specific level of escalatory intensity will deter the very violence that is most feared.
It is clear that prompt U.S. modernization of the entire nuclear Triad should be seen as the necessary floor of nuclear posture adjustments, not the ceiling.
The 2018 nuclear posture review rightly concluded that not only would the low-yield W76-2 be required as a force posture adjustment, but that the nation should also pursue a sea-launched, nuclear-armed, theater cruise missile (SLCM-N). Together, the W76-2 and a suitable SLCM-N would most assuredly provide a survivable, penetrable and prompt response option with adaptability and scalability in both numbers and yield options while retaining sovereign basing. The U.S. should re-commit to the acquisition of fielding of the highly credible SLCM-N.
Fielding additional theater nuclear capabilities to provide a sufficient and enduring deterrent, as we did in the 1980s with the theater-ranged Pershing II IRBM and Gryphon GLCM, would also hopefully open the door to a multilateral arms control treaty that captures all nuclear warheads, rather than just so-called “strategic” warheads. Absent that deterrent leverage, we have little hope of future success in meaningful nuclear arms control.
Until the United States takes the threat of Chinese and Russian theater nuclear strategies seriously and responds accordingly, our rivals will be competitively attracted to limited nuclear employment and will assiduously attempt to exploit that asymmetry.
To keep the peace, we should adapt. Guns, not knives, deter gunfights.
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