John R. Deni
As Russia continues its destabilizing military buildup around Ukraine, the U.S. and its allies have made clear they prefer to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. This reflects not simply the preference of the Biden administration when it comes to national-security matters but also the West’s desire to avoid inflaming and escalating the situation through military action.
This makes good sense. Any Russo-Ukrainian war is likely to be bloody for the combatants, result in a wave of refugees heading west, and further destabilize an already precarious regional security situation. Nonetheless, as diplomatic efforts unfold, there are good strategic reasons for the West to stake out a hard-line approach, giving little ground to Moscow over its demand to forsake Ukrainian membership in Western institutions and halt military activity in Central and Eastern Europe. Rather than helping Russian President Vladimir Putin back down from the position he’s taken, the West ought to stand firm, even if it means another Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s efforts to destabilize and undermine the Ukrainian government by keeping alive the smoldering war in the Donbas region haven’t returned Kyiv to Moscow’s orbit. Instead, Ukraine has used the past several years to boost its military capabilities gradually, strengthen its ties to the West, and improve its economy. It’s unclear why Mr. Putin has chosen this moment to demand assurances that Ukraine won’t become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union. Perhaps the Kremlin believes time isn’t on its side as Ukraine continues to slide closer to the West. Or Mr. Putin might assume Washington is more willing to accommodate Russia’s demands, given the intensifying American rivalry with China. Or it could even be that Mr. Putin hopes to bolster his declining public support with a jingoistic foreign adventure.
Regardless, Mr. Putin’s tactics have placed the West in a reactive mode, hoping to avoid a war in Europe that could result in tens of thousands of casualties. The death and destruction could far outpace that of the relatively more limited war in Donbas, where as many as 14,000 have died since 2014. But Mr. Putin’s price for turning down the heat is anathema to Western values of national self-determination and sovereignty. Moreover, a NATO-Russia agreement preventing Ukraine from seeking membership would violate a 1975 Helsinki agreement on security and cooperation in Europe—signed by Moscow—which said European states have the right to belong to any international alliance they choose.
Mr. Putin therefore appears to have taken quite a risk—and the West ought to exploit his gamble by maintaining a hard-line stance in diplomatic discussions. In the best case, Mr. Putin is forced to back down, losing face domestically and internationally, even if his state media spins it as a victory or claims the buildup was merely part of an exercise.
In the worst case, if Mr. Putin’s forces invade, Russia is likely to suffer long-term, serious and even debilitating strategic costs in three ways. First, another Russian invasion of Ukraine would forge an even stronger anti-Russian consensus across Europe. Although the EU has shown a remarkable degree of solidarity in maintaining its limited sanctions on Russia since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, there are cracks in the edifice. Germany’s new left-leaning government hasn’t yet found its footing on Russia. Italy, Austria, Hungary and even France have shown a willingness to consider opening up to the Kremlin, despite the Russian forces in Crimea and Donbas. And NATO’s attention and resources remain split between Russia on the one hand, and instability and insecurity emanating from across the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Russian tanks crossing into Ukraine would focus minds and effort.
Second, a Russian reinvasion of Ukraine would likely result in another round of more debilitating economic sanctions that would further weaken Russia’s economy. Disconnecting Russia from the tools of global finance and investment—such as the Swift banking-payment system—would make it difficult for Moscow to earn money from its oil exports. Similarly, a ban on Western institutions’ trading of existing Russian debt in secondary markets would limit Moscow’s ability to finance development. Over time, a stronger, more effective round of sanctions would hasten Russia’s economic decline relative to the West, reduce its power overall, and make it far more expensive for Mr. Putin to intimidate and destabilize his neighbors.
Third, another Russian invasion of Ukraine, even if militarily successful in the short run, is likely to spawn a guerrilla war in those areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces. This will sap the strength and morale of Russia’s military while undercutting Mr. Putin’s domestic popularity and reducing Russia’s soft power globally.
If Russian forces enter Ukraine yet again, Kyiv is likely to lose the war and the human toll will be extensive. The long-term damage suffered by Moscow, however, is likely to be substantial as well. The seemingly impetuous Mr. Putin has maneuvered his way into a strategically risky position, and the West ought to leverage the Kremlin’s mistake and drive a hard bargain in any diplomacy.
Mr. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “Coalition of the Unwilling and Unable: European Realignment and the Future of American Geopolitics.”
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