Diana Bolsinger
International relations theory focuses largely on acknowledged alliances, and yet secret ties also shape relations among states. U.S.-Pakistani intelligence collaboration in the early Cold War highlights the gaps in our understanding of informal and secret international alliances. This case reveals that the factors traditionally associated with bargaining leverage — especially states’ comparative dependence upon each other — also are critical to clandestine negotiations. The U.S.-Pakistani relationship in the 1950s and 60s suggests that judging the other state’s dependence and alternatives may be particularly difficult under conditions of secrecy. American and Pakistani leaders negotiated the terms allowing the United States to collect intelligence on Soviet and Chinese weapons programs from Pakistan, but with limited outside input, each side overestimated its leverage. U.S. and Pakistani leaders assumed that they could extract more through ever-increasing pressure. The resulting resentments ultimately doomed the secret collaboration and undermined the overall bilateral relationship.
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