Eighty years ago Japan bombed Pearl Harbour. It was a grave error, bringing the world’s mightiest country into the war and dooming the Japanese empire to oblivion. A clear-sighted Japanese admiral supposedly lamented: “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”
Today Japan is peaceable, rich and innovative. It was the Japanese who rebuilt their country, but their task was made easier by the superpower that defeated them. Not only was America midwife to a liberal, capitalist democracy in Japan; it also created a world order in which Japan was free to trade and grow. This order was not perfect, and did not apply everywhere. But it was better than anything that had come before.
Unlike previous great powers, America did not use its military dominance to win commercial advantage at the expense of its smaller allies. On the contrary, it allowed itself to be bound, most of the time, by common rules. And that rules-based system allowed much of the world to avoid war and grow prosperous.
Unfortunately, America is tiring of its role as guarantor of the liberal order. The giant has not exactly fallen asleep again, but its resolve is faltering and its enemies are testing it. Vladimir Putin is massing troops on the border with Ukraine and could soon invade. China is buzzing Taiwan’s airspace with fighter jets, using mock-ups of American aircraft-carriers for target practice and trying out hypersonic weapons. Iran has taken such a maximalist stance at nuclear talks that many observers expect them to collapse. Thus, two autocratic powers threaten to seize land currently under democratic control, and a third threatens to violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty by building a nuclear bomb. How far would America go to prevent such reckless acts?
Joe Biden can sound forceful, at times. On December 7th he warned Mr Putin of severe consequences if Russia were to launch another attack on Ukraine. He has maintained sanctions on Iran. And in October he said that America had a “commitment” to defend Taiwan, though aides insisted policy has not changed. (America has long refused to say whether it would send forces to repel a Chinese invasion, so as not to encourage any Taiwanese action that might provoke one.) China was left wondering whether Mr Biden misspoke or was craftily hinting at a more robust stance. On December 7th America’s House of Representatives passed a big boost to the defence budget. Also this week Mr Biden was to hold a “Summit for Democracy”, to encourage countries that respect the rules to club together.
And yet, as our Briefing explains, America has become reluctant to use hard power across much of the world. A coalition of hawks and doves in Washington is calling for “restraint”. The doves say that by attempting to police the world, America inevitably gets sucked into needless conflicts abroad that it cannot win. The hawks say that America must not be distracted from the only task that counts: standing up to China.
Either of these two visions would entail a partial, destabilising American retreat, leaving the world more dangerous and uncertain. Mr Biden’s debacle in withdrawing from Afghanistan led some to doubt America’s willingness to defend its friends or deter its foes, and many to worry about the competence of its planning. The president’s loose words about America’s nuclear umbrella have undermined faith among allies that it still protects them. And though Mr Biden does not insult allies as Donald Trump did, he often fails to consult them, eroding the bonds of trust that have long multiplied American power.
Just as important as the instincts of any one president is the mood of the country that elects them. America is no longer the confident hegemon of the 1990s. Its relative power has waned, even if it remains unmatched. After Iraq and Afghanistan, voters have grown weary of foreign adventures. Partisan politics, which once stopped at the water’s edge, paralyses most aspects of policy. Over 90 ambassadorial posts remain vacant, blocked by Congress. America has refused to join a trade pact that would have complemented its military ties in Asia with economic ones. The relentless drama of politics, including over such things as disputed elections and mask-wearing, makes America seem too divided at home to show sustained purpose abroad.
It would be a mistake to assume that the old, engaged America will come back—after all, Mr Trump may be re-elected in 2024. If the liberal order is to be preserved, other powers will have to do their bit, both to prepare for a world in which they have less help, but also to keep America engaged. There are some signs of this. Japan and Australia have signalled that they would help defend Taiwan. Britain has joined America in sharing nuclear-submarine propulsion technology with Australia. A new German government is hinting at a tougher line against Russia.
More adaptation to a world with less America will be required. Democracies, especially in Europe, should spend more on defence. Those, such as Taiwan and Ukraine, at risk of being attacked should make themselves indigestible, for example by beefing up their capacity for asymmetric warfare. The better prepared they are, the less likely their foes are to attack them.
Fans of the rules-based order should share more intelligence with each other. They should bury old quarrels, such as the futile spats between Japan and South Korea over history. They should forge deeper and broader alliances, formally or informally. India, out of self-interest, should relinquish the vestiges of non-alignment and draw closer to the Quad, with Australia, Japan and America. nato cannot admit Ukraine, since the rules say an attack on one is an attack on all, and Russia has already occupied Ukrainian territory. But nato members can offer Ukraine more arms, cash and training to help it defend itself.
If the liberal order breaks down, America’s allies will suffer grievously. Once it is gone, Americans themselves may be surprised to discover how much they benefited from it. Yet all is not lost. A determined and united effort by democracies could preserve at least some of the rules-based system, and prevent the world from sliding back towards the dismal historical norm, in which the strong prey unchecked on the weak. Few tasks are more important, or harder.
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