Introduction
China’s leaders have historically been deterred from attacking Taiwan by the threat of U.S. intervention and their fears that a war would disrupt their economy and global standing. Decades of concerted modernization have resulted in a PLA that today either has or is close to achieving an initial capability to invade Taiwan—one that remains under development but that China’s leaders may employ at high risk—while deterring, delaying, or defeating U.S. military intervention. The PLA still suffers from significant weaknesses in joint operations and personnel quality but will continue working to address these shortfalls. The PLA’s progress toward building an invasion capability has already undermined cross-Strait deterrence by diminishing the credibility of the U.S. threat to deny the PLA its objectives through intervention. The overall state of deterrence is now undeniably more fragile than before and could fail entirely if certain specific conditions are met.
Cross-Strait deterrence continues to hold today, however, because Chinese leaders remain deeply concerned about the risks and consequences of a decision to invade Taiwan. Specifically, Chinese leaders are currently deterred by the inherent uncertainties of launching an invasion and fighting the U.S. military. They are also concerned about the damage a war could do to China’s economy and the possibility that an attack on Taiwan could prompt a U.S.-led coalition of countries determined to constrain any further growth of Chinese power and influence. As such, diplomatic and economic tools have also become increasingly important for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
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