China's top national security decisionmakers are stunned by a devastating suicide bombing attack in Afghanistan last week reportedly carried out by a Uighur Muslim, sources say, provoking Beijing to either disrupt its march toward greater investments in the Taliban government or to commit further to the quagmire that has stymied other superpowers for decades.
The Islamic State group's affiliate in Afghanistan, known as ISIS-K, quickly claimed responsibility for the deadly attack at a Shiite Muslim mosque in Kunduz on Friday. But in an even more brazen and rare move, it also provided a crucial detail about the attacker, specifying that the bomber was of the ethnicity that largely originates from China's restive Xinjiang Province. Beijing's attempts to stamp out violent extremists among its Uighur population has emerged as perhaps its most sensitive problem at home and nearby, as shown through the lengths it's willing to go to quash the threat it perceives.
The highly symbolic nature of the latest attack has raised new concerns in China that its partners on the ground in Kabul are not following through on promises they made, including to prevent organizations fighting for Uighur causes from finding safe haven in Afghanistan. And it has prompted worries in Beijing that elements of the new ruling government in fact may be trying to exploit its interests there to draw greater investment and involvement.
"They seem to be in a real state of panic in terms of how to deal with Afghanistan," says a source briefed on the concerns by Chinese military officials and on their plans for the future, who like others spoke to U.S. News on the condition of anonymity.
Principal concern lies in the growing – though debatable – suspicion in Beijing that the de facto leaders of Afghanistan's government are actually coordinating with elements of ISIS-K, also known as the Islamic State-Khorasan Province. Some world powers, including the U.S., dispute that claim and conclude publicly that the two groups are rivals. ISIS-K claimed its bombing in Kunduz served in part as retribution for the Taliban's willingness to cooperate with China.
Regardless of the intricacies, those who follow the situation closely say the Chinese have good reason to be spooked.
"This is the first major attack since the Taliban takeover," says Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. "And it was carried out by a Uighur."
The news appears particularly ironic for the Chinese Communist Party following its outspoken campaign to capitalize on America's failed attempts to nation-build in Afghanistan and its embarrassing withdrawal this summer.
The Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. and its Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
At the source of China's latest problem lies the Haqqani Network, sources say, the militant Islamic group with which the Taliban's traditional leaders have associated themselves and which has in recent years redefined the ambitions and power centers of the entire organization. Composed of descendants and affiliates of Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran of the war against the Soviets, the U.S. government now considers it "the most lethal and sophisticated insurgent group" targeting American and allied forces in the region.
Its current leaders make up the elite cohort in Kabul with whom Chinese officials conduct their most serious business in Afghanistan.
The Haqqanis have long enjoyed safe havens in the remote northern reaches of Pakistan, and began bolstering the Taliban at perhaps its lowest point in the U.S.-backed war in Afghanistan, reconstituting its leadership and healing fissures that emerged from infighting. They were rewarded after the fall of the U.S.-backed government in August when the Taliban installed the network's current patriarch, Sirajuddin Haqqani – among the FBI's most sought-after terrorists – as interior minister, overseeing the appointment of local governors and managing foreign fighter networks in arguably the most influential position in government.
China has since then seen Sirajuddin Haqqani's brother Anas and his uncle Khalil as among the most influential players with whom Beijing believes it can leverage economic and military deals in the war-torn country.
"There is a political decision that has been made: Engagement with the Taliban is essential and required for China in particular, and they have identified that the Haqqanis are the real authority and influence now in Afghanistan," the source says. "If China is to achieve anything in the country, it has to be through the Haqqanis."
Beijing secured rare concessions from the Taliban not to cooperate with Uighur extremists who may seek safe haven in Afghanistan to organize and carry out attacks in retribution for China's attempts to quell the restive Xinjiang Province. At home, China has already systematically detained and forcibly relocated as many as 1 million Uighurs in the far Western reaches of the country – what the Chinese Communist Party calls vocational education and training centers in the Xinjiang region but which Western powers consider genocide.
It has aired skepticism publicly about whether the Taliban would follow through on these pledges, including through a recent piece in its English-language Global Times news outlet, considered a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party. The piece concluded, however, "In order to avoid terrorism spillover from Afghanistan, regional countries, including China, need to work more closely."
With those assurances in hand, Chinese officials, through interlocutors in Pakistan – its principal partner in the region – have already begun investing heavily in Afghanistan's mineral riches and positioning its vast resources for other economic projects, but only after whatever government rules in Kabul are able to establish security there. A Taliban spokesman on Thursday claimed China was willing to invest billions more.
Beyond monetary investments, Beijing has thrown its own reputation behind the Taliban, becoming the first international power to recognize it as the legitimate government there, as U.S. News first reported, and encouraging others to do the same.
In addition to exploiting opportunities in Afghanistan, China also sees stability in the war-torn country as useful to sustain heavy investments in neighboring Pakistan, particularly two transit lines known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that grant Beijing access to the sea to its west.
The source said recent discussions centered on assurances that Chinese workers would be able to enter Afghanistan to staff these projects. China has previously expressed interest in occupying Bagram airbase at the invitation of Kabul as U.S. News first reported – another attempt to embarrass America. Officials in Beijing have even inquired about special dispensations to ship pork and local alcohol to prospective Chinese installations once projects are underway – akin to waivers that currently exist for Chinese workers in Pakistan as a way to boost morale and remind them of home.
The investments are all at risk with the new concerns of duplicity from the Haqqanis and China's belief that they are at least communicating, if not directly coordinating, with ISIS-K. Many other world powers share that belief, though not all. A June report from the U.N.'s Sanctions Monitoring Team noted the differing conclusions among its member states but also assessed the two groups see some benefit in "joint venture attacks" and coordinate as such.
"The Chinese are coming into the realization that the Haqqanis are playing games with everybody," the source says.
"They will cooperate, but they also want financial benefits from a relationship," the source adds, "the Haqqanis do have a degree of infiltration in ISIS-K."
The details of the attack, however, don't necessarily represent only bad news for those seeking greater relations between the Chinese and the Taliban – or those looking to lure Beijing and its vast wealth into Afghanistan. Now the two sides are aligned in at least an overt understanding that China's concerns about the Uighurs are founded, justifying its need to conduct counterterrorism operations against them. What remains unclear now, however, is whether China is willing to take unilateral action.
"The attack does put China and the Taliban on the same side, and the counterterror cooperation could emerge as something more prominent in the bilateral relations," Sun says.
Ultimately, it remains unclear why the Haqqanis would support the Taliban on one hand while also acting complicitly in ISIS-K attacks against them, all while courting China. Some, including the Chinese, suspect that the Haqqanis may believe that China has staked so much already that the specter of instability in Afghanistan may actually draw it in further to help protect its investment.
And China's demonstrable ability to protect its citizens has emerged as another of its chief priorities as it expands its influence beyond its borders – magnified by a series of attacks in Pakistan against Chinese personnel carried out by insurgent groups supported by the Afghan Taliban despite assurances from Islamabad that it could provide stability and security.
"They need security. They can't look weak by having their people attacked. The Chinese are very particular about that one," says Bill Roggio, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and founder of its "Long War Journal."
"It's funny that they think the Haqqanis are being duplicitous here. I'm not shocked one bit. They should be questioning everything," Roggio adds. "These terrorist groups are fungible."
The Chinese can somewhat rely on the Pakistanis to do something about these security problems, Roggio says. But he adds, "They can't rely on the Afghan Taliban."
Whatever the power balance currently, the instability in Afghanistan is clearly positioned to change in the near future.
Colin Clarke, a senior research fellow at private intelligence analysis firm The Soufan Center, is skeptical of clear connections between the Haqqanis and ISIS-K.
"To the extent that they exist, I think it's not as much organizational but rather based on the personal relationship of individual commanders," Clark says. "So, it may indeed be there, but it's not as strong as some have suggested.
But he adds, "That could change over time."
Regardless of these alliances, China must act soon.
"Beijing seems to feel there is now a race against time," the source says. "If the Chinese do not assert themselves in Afghanistan, they will lose the advantage, which may mean in the future going into these regions is going to be very hard."
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